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Abstract
Muon tomography represents a new type of imaging technique that can be used in de-
tecting high-Z materials (such as shielded HEU). As muons pass through materials,
they continuously lose energy via ionisation and can stop within a material. Upon stop-
ping secondary processes can occur, which result in the production of excess neutrons
and γ-rays. Due to their high energies most muons can pass through large depths of
different materials. These muons will also undergo multiple scattering. Previous radio-
graphic methods that looks to differentiate high-Z materials from low-Z clutter tend to
be based on multiple scattering of muons only.
Presented is the development of two new types of analysis algorithm, which makes use
of the different interactions cosmic-ray muons undergo when passing through a mate-
rial. The first algorithm developed makes use of the multiple Coulomb scattering that a
muon will undergo. This involves using a novel density based clustering approach that
ascertains regions of high-Z material placed within an inspected volume. The capability
of this new type of algorithm has been tested under realistic scenarios. These scenarios
involve placing shielded HEU in cargo containers filled with a variety of different clut-
ter. The algorithm has been shown to be efficient in detecting shielded HEU amongst
low-Z clutter, but struggles upon the introduction of blocks of aluminium, or materials
with densities higher than this.
Whereas previous radiographic methods were based on multiple scattering of muons
only, the second developed algorithm uses muon absorption on nuclei to enhance the
detection capabilities of the scattering technique. In particular, the goal is to improve
on the distinction between high-density materials and low-density clutter. Muons will
more readily lose energy in higher density materials. Therefore multiple muon disap-
pearances within a localised volume may signal the presence of high-density materials.
Muons that disappear have their track evaluated using a 3D line extrapolation algorithm,
which is in turn used to construct a 3D tomographic image of the inspected volume. The
viii
ability to differentiate between materials using the 3D line extrapolation algorithm is
established.
The technique of muon disappearance has been applied to identifying shielded HEU
in realistic scenarios. Despite being capable of identifying shielded HEU in otherwise
empty cargo containers, multiple additional regions (due to the lorry and container it-
self) were misclassified as possible threat materials. This makes accurate detection
systems that solely use this technique for shielded HEU unlikely. However, since the
build-up of nuclear materials was apparent, we have demonstrated how this technique
can be used as a supplementary technique to help enhance muon scattering tomography
capabilities. This is done through first identifying ‘areas of interest’ using muon scat-
tering tomography before confirming whether they are threats or other materials with
the muon disappearance algorithm. It is concluded that while muon disappearance can
slightly enhance the capabilities of muon scattering tomography, muon scattering still
remains the most efficient method for detection of nuclear materials.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Current passive technologies in place at international borders involve the use of polyvinyl
toluene scintillator (PVT) γ-ray detectors and pressurised 3He-based neutron counters,
to detect the naturally occurring radioactive signatures emitted by nuclear materials.
While effective under some circumstances these systems struggle to detect nuclear ma-
terials (in particular highly enriched uranium (HEU)) upon the introduction of shield-
ing.
Generated in outer space, cosmic-rays interact with the Earth’s upper atmosphere pro-
ducing a variety of secondary particles. These secondary particles include short-lived
pions, which decay to produce muons. Muons represent a natural and free source of
inspecting radiation with a flux at sea level of ≈170 m−2 s−1.
Muon scattering tomography (MST) represents a new type of imaging technique that
has shown promise in both simulation and experimental studies in discriminating high-
Z shielding materials from low-Z background clutter [1–5]. As muons pass through
matter they undergo multiple Coulomb scattering. The degree of observed scattering
is dependent on the Z of the material. Due to their intrinsically high energies (average
energy of 3-4 GeV at sea level) they can pass through any shielding present and hence
be used to probe an object of unknown composition.
Muons undergo energy loss via electromagnetic interactions and can stop within the
material they are passing through. Individual muons can be tracked as they enter a
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volume to be inspected, with any tracks belonging to muons that disappear being eas-
ily identifiable. The rate of muon disappearance in the air surrounding a target (due
to muon decay) will remain fairly constant, independent of the target material. High-
density materials, such as HEU and its shielding components are more likely to cause
a muon to stop than low-density materials. Therefore the disappearance of multiple
muons within a particular volume represents a strong signature for high density and
nuclear materials, which can distinguish them from lower density clutter.
Using these interactions the capability to discriminate different materials is investigated.
The development and performance of a new type of analysis algorithm for MST, and
the development of a new analysis algorithm for muon disappearance tomography is
presented, under a variety of different scenarios. The capability of the two techniques
when used in conjunction with one another is also described. The advantages of using
muons to interrogate a volume are that they naturally occur, therefore no excess dose
will be delivered to the target. This limits potential dangers involved and allow inspec-
tion to be performed while the cargo operators remain within their vehicle.
Other particles produced via primary cosmic-ray interaction with the atmosphere in-
clude cosmic-ray neutrons. A discussion into whether cosmic-ray neutrons can be used
to aid the detection of shielded HEU is presented. Upon interaction with a target ma-
terial, cosmic-ray neutrons will cause multiple secondary neutrons and γ-rays to be
produced. The number of excess secondaries is dependent on the density and atomic
weight of the material. Higher density materials (such as HEU and shielding compo-
nents) will produce more secondaries than lower density materials (such as clutter).
For these systems ‘clutter’ is defined as any material or commercial good that may be
transported in cargo containers. Through measuring the gross count rate of neutrons
or γ-rays over a defined time interval, the observation of an elevated rate may infer the
presence of nuclear materials.
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1.2 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 introduces background information on the topics to be discussed. A descrip-
tion of passive detection methods currently in use at ports and the inherent limitations
of this system is given. Other techniques that have been investigated to solve the is-
sues of passive detection, along with their inherent problems are also presented. The
production of cosmic-ray muons and a description of the cosmic-ray muon spectrum
are given. The physics behind muons interactions with materials is summarised. A re-
view is given of the previous work that has been done into using cosmic-ray muons as a
probe for information, along with prior attempts that have looked to use these cosmic-
rays to detect hidden nuclear material. This chapter concludes with a description of the
cosmic-ray neutron spectrum and neutron interactions with matter.
Chapter 3 introduces the concept of muon scattering tomography along with introduc-
ing initial simulation conditions, the Point of Closest Approach (PoCA) algorithm and
parameters involved in volume reconstruction. Initial numerical tests for discriminating
different density materials from one another are presented.
Chapter 4 introduces the concept of using stopping muons for material segregation. In-
dividual muons can be tracked as they enter a volume to be inspected, with any tracks
belonging to muons that disappear easily identifiable. The rate of muon disappearance
in the air surrounding a target will remain fairly constant, independent of the target
material. High-density materials, such as HEU and its shielding components are more
likely to cause a muon to stop than low-density materials. Therefore the disappear-
ance of multiple muons within a particular volume represents a strong signature for
high density and nuclear materials. Detailed GEANT4 simulations are presented that
demonstrate the capability of using muon disappearance to distinguish between differ-
ent density materials.
Chapter 5 discusses the capability of using cosmic-ray muons to detect shielded HEU in
empty cargo containers. Using muon scattering tomography the dependence of the de-
tector capability to detect high-Z targets in empty cargo containers, on spatial resolution
has been studied. A number of different resolutions representative of gaseous and scin-
tillator detectors are tested. The development of a new secondary analysis algorithm
that is applied to the reconstructed PoCA points is also presented. Using this secondary
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algorithm the effect of other parameters, such as the distance between detectors and
the number of detectors per set, on detecting shielded HEU is presented. Finally, the
capability of both muon scattering tomography and muon disappearance tomography
in conjunction with one another, to correctly detect five shielded HEU targets in empty
cargo containers is presented.
Chapter 6 analyses the feasibility of using cosmic-ray muons to correctly detect shielded
HEU when placed in a cargo container, filled with different levels of clutter. Two types
of clutter scenario are considered. Ones where shielded HEU is surrounded by low-Z
clutter and ones where shielded HEU is surrounded by medium-Z clutter. The ability
to detect shielded HEU in each of these scenarios is considered using muon scattering
tomography, muon disappearance tomography and the two techniques in conjunction
with one another.
In addition to muons, cosmic-ray neutrons also cascade down upon the Earths surface.
Chapter 7 discusses whether these neutrons can be used as an additional source of in-
formation to detect shielded HEU in empty cargo containers.
This thesis will conclude in Chapter 8 with a summary of the material presented. Any
supportive material will be delivered in separate Appendices.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter introduces the justification behind the work along with any relevant theory.
Section 2.1 gives a discussion into the current systems in place at borders for detecting
radioactive materials, along with the limitations of these systems. Section 2.2 presents
other techniques that have been investigated to solve the issues with current systems in
place, along with their inherent problems. Section 2.3 discusses the physics processes
upon which passive and active interrogation techniques are based. This includes a brief
description of radioactive decay, spontaneous fission and induced fission. In section 2.4
a discussion into cosmic rays and how they are produced is given, in particular cosmic-
ray muons and cosmic-ray neutrons. The theory behind muon interactions with matter
is presented in section 2.5 and neutron interactions with matter is presented in section
2.6. Finally, sections 2.7 and 2.8 give a review of the previous work done using cosmic
rays as a probe for information, along with prior attempts that have looked to use these
cosmic rays to detect ‘hidden’ nuclear material.
2.1 Passive Interrogation
Nuclear material refers to the metals uranium, plutonium, and thorium, in any form,
according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These elements are ra-
dioactive and undergo radioactive decay as well as spontaneous fission, resulting in the
emission of multiple neutrons and γ-rays. The detection of these signatures is the prin-
ciple behind passive detection systems. The ability to detect illicit nuclear materials,
in particular highly enriched uranium (HEU) is an important, yet challenging issue of
concern in securing nuclear materials that are attempted to be smuggled into a country.
A large percentage of goods imported and exported from the UK (and other countries)
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are contained within shipped cargo containers, meaning efficient scanning techniques
of these containers is of the utmost importance. Current systems in place are passive
detection methods that involve using radiation portal monitors (RPMs) installed at in-
ternational borders. An example of this type of system is given in Fig. 2.1. The majority
of RPMs consist of multiple polyvinyl toluene (PVT) scintillators, due to their low cost
and large coverage area. Because of their low resolution, isotope identification is diffi-
cult to measure. For neutron detection multiple pressurised 3He neutron detectors are
placed around the cargo to be inspected [6]. Detection of both neutrons and γ-rays
is based on observing a significant increase in the total amount of counts measured
above the background. The main advantages of these systems over active interrogation
techniques are:
• Due to there being no irradiating source the system becomes simpler to deploy.
• Since there is not an irradiating source no intense radiation dose is delivered to
the target.
Fig. 2.1 Example display of a radiation portal monitor employed at an international border
crossing [7].
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During the decay process, a radionuclide will usually undergo α or β decay resulting
in the formation of a decay product, with this decay product often left in an excited
state. The emission of a γ-ray allows this newly formed excited nucleus to lose energy
and reach a lower (normally ground), more stable state. If the emitted γ-ray has high
enough energy, it is able to penetrate through any surrounding fissionable materials and
shielding. In addition to undergoing α and β decay, ultra-heavy radionuclides can also
spontaneously fission resulting in the production of two (sometimes more) daughter
nuclides, 2-3 neutrons and multiple photons. These signatures are of interest when de-
tecting nuclear material via passive methods. A description of each of these radioactive
processes is given in section 2.3.
Gamma-rays and neutrons will also be present in the background. Gamma-rays are pro-
duced from radionuclides within the soil, such as the γ-rays emitted when 238U, 232Th
and 40K undergo radioactive decay. Neutrons are also naturally present in the surround-
ing environment, as they are produced by radioactive contaminants and the interaction
of cosmic rays in the upper atmosphere. These cosmic-ray neutrons reach the surface
with a continuous flux of ≈ 30 neutrons s−1 m−2 [8]. Large intensity variations of the
neutron background can occur aboard large ships where, due to the high volume of ma-
terial (particularly iron and lead), high-energy neutrons can produce multiple secondary
neutrons with MeV energies via spallation [9].
Current RPM gross count algorithms attempt to detect an elevated rate of γ-rays or
neutrons above the background. The total amount of background γ-rays and neutrons
detected by the RPMs is continuously measured, while no vehicle is present. Over a
certain time interval the probability of detecting those γ-rays or neutrons present in the
background will remain constant, since their arrival times are random. Upon the in-
troduction of a vehicle to be inspected, the total amount of γ-rays and neutrons over
a specific time interval is measured. The measured amount when a vehicle occupies
the inspected volume is compared to the average background rate over the same time
interval [10]. If nuclear material is present, then γ-rays and neutrons produced by nu-
clear materials will be detected in addition to the background. Therefore measuring
an increased rate of γ-rays or neutrons over a defined time period will provide an un-
ambiguous signature of nuclear material [11]. Given the average background rate, the
threshold that the number of counts must be above for detection to be made is given by
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Eq. (2.1):
T = B+ k
√
B (2.1)
where T is the gross count threshold, B is the background count rate and k is the sigma
level. A high detection efficiency with a low false alarm rate is required, therefore k =
4 is often used.
There are a number of issues with passive detection techniques. Although an elevated
rate of γ-rays can be detected if the nuclear material is unshielded, these signatures are
both low in intensity and in energy. Therefore a sufficient amount of high-Z materials
placed around any nuclear materials present, can attenuate the number of γ-rays to be-
low the threshold required for detection to be made. This makes detection of shielded
nuclear materials for security applications in short time periods, with low false posi-
tives, problematic for passive techniques. While emitted neutrons will have no problem
overcoming high-Z shielding, this method of detection is limited to certain radionu-
clides (238U and some Pu isotopes) where the specific activity for spontaneous fission
is high. For radionuclides where this is not the case (235U) a sufficient increased rate of
neutrons will not be produced, hence detectors will struggle to measure elevated levels
of neutrons above the background.
A secondary concern with passive techniques is the lack of information that can be
gathered upon an alarm. Many cargo containers will house materials that naturally un-
dergo radioactive decay (fertiliser, cat litter, etc), as these materials can contain trace
amounts of uranium, thorium or potassium. Therefore if the cargo possesses sufficient
quantities of these materials, the amount of γ-rays detected may be above the alarm
threshold, resulting in a false alarm.
Finally the technique of using gross counts over time to detect nuclear materials is
sensitive to baseline suppression [12]. Baseline suppression occurs when placing a ve-
hicle to be inspected between the radiation portal monitors. The presence of a vehicle
acts to absorb a number of the background γ-rays and therefore reduce the number de-
tected. Therefore the background count of γ-rays measured while a vehicle occupies
the inspected region is lower than when no vehicles are present. This effect raises the
detection threshold, meaning sources that would have caused an alarm no longer do.
A final consideration to be discussed is whether detectors with greater energy resolution
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can be used to enhance passive interrogation techniques when detecting unshielded nu-
clear materials. Each radioactive isotope has a well described γ-ray spectrum that is dis-
tinguishable from each other and from background signals. Through measuring these
emitted γ-rays the identity and quantity of certain radionuclides can be determined. Fig
2.2 displays a comparison of the natural background γ-ray spectra for plastic (PVT),
sodium iodide (NaI), cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) and high purity germanium (HPGe)
γ-ray detectors, in the energy range 30 keV to 3000 keV [13]. It is clearly evident from
Fig. 2.2 that given a high energy resolution and efficiency, individual γ-ray peaks are
able to be identified.
Fig. 2.2 A comparison of the natural background γ-ray spectra for plastic (PVT), sodium iodide
(NaI), cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) and high purity germanium (HPGe) γ-ray detectors, in the
energy range 30 keV to 3000 keV [13].
The effect shielding has on the ability to detect HEU is shown in Fig. 2.3 [14]. The
unique signatures of HEU observed on its γ-ray spectra are its 185 keV peak, produced
when 235U undergoes radioactive decay and its 2614 keV peak, produced if the sample
contains 232U as a contaminant. However, due to the low energy of emitted 185 keV
γ-rays, they are readily attenuated by shielding down to background levels meaning it is
not useful for detecting shielded HEU. The 2614 keV peak is also problematic since it
requires the contamination of the sample with 232U. Despite being highly penetrating,
the 2614 keV γ-ray is also present in background radiation as it is emitted from 208Tl,
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which is a daughter product of the 232Th series. Therefore any signatures which could
be detected, may end up being hidden by the high background [14]. The decay chain
of 232Th is displayed in Fig. 2.4. 232U will undergo α decay to 228Th, at which point it
will move through the same decay sequence given in Fig. 2.4 (from 228Th). Therefore
both isotopes will result in the emission of the 2614 keV peak.
Fig. 2.3 Computer synthesised sodium iodide γ-ray pulse-height spectra from a 1 kg source of
HEU and background radiation using COG code from LLNL [14].
A secondary technique has been developed to help detection capabilities, which in-
volves actively interrogating the cargo with either neutron or photon beams in an at-
tempt to induce fission in any special nuclear material (SNM) present. This type of
technique is known as active interrogation.
2.1 Passive Interrogation 11
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2.2 Active Interrogation
As discussed in section 2.1, while signatures for passive detection may be detectable
under the right conditions, they are also easily hidden from detection through the use
of shielding. When detecting special nuclear material (SNM) for security applications
it is reasonable to assume that anyone attempting to smuggle SNM, will have shielded
it in order to overcome passive detection.
Active interrogation involves the use of highly penetrating particles (photons, neutrons
and other particles) that have sufficient energy to pass through any surrounding shield-
ing and/or cargo, before interacting with any SNM present. The interaction between
incident radiation and target nuclei, at the appropriate energy, can result in the capture
of the radiating particle by the SNM nucleus, which in-turn acts to induce nuclear fis-
sion. Fission is the process in which incident radiation is absorbed by a nucleus causing
it to fragment into two or more daughter nuclei of unequal mass. In addition to this,
subsequent energy is released along with other secondary products, such as neutrons
and γ-rays. A simple schematic of this process is shown in Fig. 2.5 with these addi-
tional neutrons and γ-rays known as fission specific signatures.
These signatures represent the characteristic signals to be detected when determining
the presence of SNM. There are four types of fission specific signature that are de-
tectable when attempting to observe SNM. These are:
• Prompt neutrons.
• Delayed neutrons.
• Prompt γ-rays.
• Delayed γ-rays.
The multiplicity of these signatures is dependent on the energy of the interrogating par-
ticle along with the nucleus that is undergoing fission (235U, 238U, 239Pu) [16]. Prompt
signatures represent those that are emitted almost simultaneously, within 10−15 sec-
onds of the fission event. On average upon undergoing fission by either neutrons or
γ-rays, approximately 6-7 prompt γ-rays along with 2-3 prompt neutrons are emitted.
The advantage of detecting these signals is that they represent some of the most numer-
ous signatures available when attempting to observe SNM. Unlike prompt signatures,
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Fig. 2.5 Simple schematic of the fission process [16].
delayed signatures are not produced as a direct result of the fission event, but are in-
stead emitted at a time much after interrogation. They are produced when the fission
products undergo subsequent decay (usually β decay, which is sometimes followed by
neutron emission) to get to a more stable state. Since there is a wide range of fission
products that can be produced all with a unique decay time, subsequent time scales
for these signatures can range from seconds to minutes. Table 2.1 gives a summary of
these fission signatures. Gamma-rays, whose energies exceed 3 MeV are of particular
interest since there very few naturally occurring background photons having energies
greater than 2.614 MeV. A description of how prompt and delayed neutrons and γ-rays
are produced after the fission event is given in section 2.3.
2.2.1 Interrogation Sources
As mentioned previously, both neutrons and photons can be used as interrogation sources.
The production of interrogating neutrons or photons can occur in a variety of ways. For
neutron production, the easiest method involves using radioactive nuclei which upon
decaying, emits the desired particle. Sources for this process include nuclei that un-
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Table 2.1 Summary of prompt and delayed fission signatures (approximate yields per
fission) for a number of radioisotopes.
Fission Signature Interrogation Source 235U 238U 239Pu
Prompt neutrons Thermal neutrons 2.41 [17] - 2.88 [17]
Prompt neutrons Neutrons with E>2.5
MeV or photofission
2.8 [16] 2.9 [16] 3.16 [17]
Prompt γ-rays Neutron and photofission 6.6[18] 6.7 [16] 7.06 [18]
Prompt γ-rays (E>3
MeV)
Neutron and photofission 0.2 [19] 0.3 [16] 0.3 [19]
Delayed neutrons Neutron Fission 0.015 [20] 0.044 [20] 0.0061 [20]
Delayed neutrons Photofission (10.2 MeV
endpoint)
0.0113 [21] 0.0306 [21] 0.0037 [21]
Delayed γ-rays (E>3
MeV)
Neutron and photofission 0.127 [20] 0.11 [20] 0.065 [20]
Delayed γ-rays (E>4
MeV)
Neutron and photofission 0.046 [20] 0.03 [20] 0.017 [20]
dergo spontaneous fission, such as 252Cf which produce neutrons with a most probable
energy of∼1.2 MeV, or (α , n) sources such 241Am(α ,n)7Li, which produce low energy
neutrons (average E = 0.5 MeV). However, neutrons used for active interrogation are
normally produced using pulsed neutron generators (PNG’s) or electronic neutron gen-
erators (ENG’s). These generators work through accelerating charged particles (deu-
terium or protons) into a target material (deuterium, tritium, lithium, beryllium). The
target material will absorb the accelerated particle resulting in the formation of a com-
pound nucleus. This nucleus is unstable and will result in the emission of a neutron
[22]. The energy of emitted neutrons will depend on both the target material used and
the energy of the incident neutron. Neutron energies emitted by several accelerator-
based neutron reactions have been taken from [23], and can be viewed in Fig. 2.6 [23].
The energies of the interrogation neutrons can be altered through placing extra materi-
als between the source neutrons and volume to be interrogated.
For photons the radioactive sources 137Cs and 60Co are used to produce γ-rays of 0.66
MeV and 1.17 or 1.33 MeV respectively [24]. Photons of this energy are typically
used for imaging techniques, as they have sufficient energy to penetrate large amounts
of cargo, but their energy is lower than that required for fission to occur [25]. In or-
der to generate photons of sufficient energy to induce fission, electron accelerators are
used. In a typical set-up electrons are generated by an accelerator with energies of 9-10
MeV. These electrons are fired into high-Z materials such as tungsten or tantalum. The
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Fig. 2.6 Neutron energies emitted as a function of incident particle kinetic energy (at the 0◦
emission angle) for multiple accelerator based neutron reactions [23].
interaction between these electrons and the atomic electrons of the material, result in
the formation of multiple photons. The photons produce a continuous spectrum due to
bremsstrahlung, with the maximum energy possible equal to the maximum energy of
the electron beam. This maximum energy is important, as in order for a high percent-
age of photons to induce fission this energy must be much greater than the minimum
required for fission to occur. The accelerator is often operated in a pulsed mode with
the pulse widths usually being a few µs in duration. A pulsed configuration reduces
the interrogating source from contributing too heavily to the background, which any
signals are to be detected against. This type of source is used due to its ability to gen-
erate fission in shielded SNM through two different avenues. The first being fission
induced directly through the interaction between interrogation photons and SNM. The
second as a result of the interrogation photons interacting with any surrounding mate-
rial, producing neutrons, with these neutrons then going on too induce fission in any
SNM.
2.2.2 Background Interferences
The main drawback to methods that utilise interrogating sources is that the source can
induce certain nuclear reactions in surrounding materials. This generates additional
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secondary neutrons and photons, which can act to mask both prompt and delayed sig-
natures. For prompt signatures both photon and neutron interrogation sources produce
large levels of background radiation, which act to ‘drown out’ the unique signatures that
are looked for. Either interrogation source (neutron or photon beam) will act to mask the
signature of same particle type, as well as producing excess neutrons and γ-rays through
interactions with the surrounding medium. Neutron interrogation typically results in the
production of a multitude of high energy photons. In photon interrogation, significant
prompt neutron emissions occur through the interaction of interrogation photons with
surrounding low-Z materials. Both neutrons and photons produced in these processes
have energies that overlap those produced through the fission of SNM. This requires
any detection techniques that act to utilise prompt signatures to either account for or
suppress these background signatures. A summary of some notable photon-induced
interferences are shown in Table 2.2 [23].
When detecting delayed signatures, the activation of certain isotopes within the cargo
can lead to their subsequent decay via emission of either neutrons or γ-rays. Following
photon interrogation, the detection of delayed neutrons from nuclear materials can be
hindered through the creation of delayed neutrons via the interaction of interrogation
photons with surrounding cargo. Most notable here is the delayed neutron produced
from the activation of 18O, which is present in both the atmosphere and water. Upon
activation by a γ-ray, 18O will decay to form 17N. Since 17N is unstable, it will undergo
β decay to form 17O, with a half-life for this process of 4.173 s. 17O is left over in an
excited state and will itself undergo neutron emission to form 16O. This decay chain is
shown in Eq. (2.2), Eq. (2.3) and Eq. (2.4).
18O+ γ →17 N+ p (2.2)
17N →17 O∗+ e−+νe (2.3)
17O∗→16 O+n (2.4)
For neutron interrogation, multiple neutron capture γ-rays are produced via the interac-
tion of these interrogation neutrons with isotopes present in the surrounding medium.
Activations include, 48Ca(n,p)48K, 34S(n,p)34P and 37Cl(n,α)34P however, the activa-
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tion of oxygen 16O(n,p)16N, and fluorine 19F(n,α)16N are of particular concern since
both activations produce a 6 MeV γ-ray. The reaction threshold for 16O(n,p)16N is
≈10.4 MeV therefore interrogation neutrons with an energy less than 10 MeV are used
to counteract this signature. Since the reaction threshold for 19F(n,α)16N is much lower
(≈1.6 MeV) it represents a signature that is much harder to remove. Table 2.2 lists some
of these neutron induced interferences [23].
Table 2.2 Some photon and neutron induced interferences.
Reaction Interrogation
Source
Prompt or Delayed
Interference
Reaction
Threshold
(MeV)
Significant Emissions
2H(γ ,n)1H γ Prompt 2.226 n
6Li(γ ,n)5Li γ Prompt 5.666 n
6Li(γ ,p)5He γ Prompt 4.590 n
6Li(γ ,np)4He γ Prompt 3.700 n
7Li(γ ,n)6Li γ Prompt 7.254 n
9Be(γ ,n)8Be γ Prompt 1.666 n
17O(γ ,p)16N γ Delayed (7.13 s) 13.79 γ (Eγ = 6.129 MeV)
18O(γ ,p)17N γ Delayed (4.17 s) 15.95 n
19F(n,α)16N n Delayed (7.13 s) 1.6 γ (Eγ = 6.129 MeV)
34S(n,p)34P n Delayed (12.4 s) 4.7 γ (Eγ = 2.127 MeV)
37Cl(n,α)34P n Delayed (12.4 s) 1.6 γ (Eγ = 2.127 MeV)
16O(n,p)16N n Delayed (7.13 s) 10.4 γ (Eγ = 6.129 MeV)
There are multiple advantages of active interrogation systems over their passive coun-
terparts. Firstly, the conditions in which detection is most favourable can be optimised
through altering the interrogation radiation intensity and energy. A second advantage
is the increased amount of fissions, and therefore signals available to detect. How-
ever, these techniques are hampered with higher background levels and increased dose
rates, with these problems needing to be addressed. Some of the current techniques
which have attempted to overcome the inherent problems with detecting prompt and/or
delayed signatures will be discussed in the next section.
2.2.3 Techniques that Detect Prompt Signatures
The advantage of utilising techniques that detect prompt signatures are the increased
multiplicity, lower dose rates and decreased scan time. These signatures are produced
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within 10−15 seconds of the initial reaction. Techniques that act to detect these signa-
tures, must overcome the issue of high background radiation. Primary in this field is
differential die away analysis (DDAA), which uses a pulsed neutron beam at energies
of ∼ 14 MeV [26, 27]. As the neutron pulses impinge on the cargo, some neutrons will
rapidly lose energy, become thermalised and can be absorbed. The number of epither-
mal and fast neutrons present within the cargo will fall away within a few microseconds.
Those neutrons that have lost energy to become thermal neutrons will decrease in num-
ber much more slowly, with times of the order of a few hundred µs to several ms. This
characteristic time is dependent on the material and density of the medium being ex-
amined and is known as the die-away time of the medium. If SNM is present these
thermal neutrons will cause fission to occur, resulting in the production of a new source
of prompt neutrons. Therefore if fissile material is present, the population of epither-
mal and fast neutrons will decrease much more slowly than if no SNM is present. If no
fissile material is present, only the cargos characteristic neutron ‘die-away’ time plus
the natural background is detected. However, if fissile material is present an additional
signal is detected above the mediums own characteristic signal [28]. This additional
signal is a unique signature of SNM. An example of this feature is shown for 235U in
Fig. 2.7 [28]. Detection is made using moderated 3He detectors.
Fig. 2.7 Representative time dependence of DDAA signals in cargo, with and without 235U
[28]. The target used was 350 g of 20 % enriched uranium. Neutrons were generated using a
pulsed neutron beam at energies of ∼ 14 MeV.
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The capability of this technique to detect 235U when surrounded by hydrogenous ma-
terial has been demonstrated [28]. In particular [26, 27] has shown the proficiency this
technique has when detecting ∼ 350 g of 235U that has been surrounded by wood or
paper, with detection fully established within 100 seconds [26, 27].
As discussed, when the neutron generators are ‘on’, detection methods for prompt neu-
trons are problematic due to the high background. With this in mind, systems have
been developed that use low energy (average energy ∼ 0.06 MeV) neutrons as their
interrogation source [29, 30]. Neutrons are generated via the 7Li(p,n) reaction and due
to their low energies, almost all are absorbed by the cargo. This means the background
caused by the interrogation source is almost negligible; meaning even a small level of
counted prompt neutrons is enough to infer the presence of SNM. The low background
also enables measurements to be taken at the same time as when the cargo is being in-
spected. The main background comes from large levels of γ-rays produced by captured
neutrons. However, although 60 keV neutrons have been shown to penetrate medium
and high-Z materials almost as efficiently as higher energy neutrons [30], if hydroge-
nous cargo is present the neutrons are much more efficiently absorbed than their higher
energy counterparts. Therefore if significant levels of hydrogenous cargo are present,
the neutrons will not penetrate far enough to reach any SNM.
In addition to the techniques discussed, further techniques that use prompt neutrons
for SNM detection have been demonstrated. When considering photons as the inter-
rogation source, prompt neutrons can be emitted from any surrounding materials, if
the energy of the incident photon is large enough. In order to circumvent this issue,
photons are used with energies low enough to prevent significant numbers of neutrons
being generated from common benign materials. As incident energy decreases so does
the photofission cross-section of any fissionable nuclei. Therefore a fine balancing act
is required between having a high enough energy to induce fission, but low enough so
neutron production will not be induced in the surrounding material. Fig. 2.8 displays
the photofission and photoneutron cross sections for a number of isotopes for incident
γ-ray energies of 5 - 30 MeV [16].
In such a system gross counting of neutron emissions will be enough to determine
the presence of SNM, since prompt neutron production from the surrounding material
should have been eliminated. The current systems that incorporate this technique use
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Fig. 2.8 Photofission and photoneutron cross sections for a number of isotopes in the 5 to 30
MeV endpoint X-ray energy range [16].
incident photons with an energy of 6-9 MeV [31]. Material detection is made through
counting the level of prompt neutrons during interrogation [32, 33]. However, despite
the low energy of source photons, certain isotopes (such as 9Be and deuterium) still
have a (γ , n) reaction threshold that is low enough to produce significant amounts of
neutrons. Therefore false alarms become a concern if a significant amount of these
materials is present [31]. While 9Be is a fairly rare isotope and therefore unlikely to
be present in high enough quantities to produce a false alarm, hydrogenous cargo (deu-
terium containing cargo) is very common and hence could result in significant back-
ground neutrons.
Currently much fewer studies have been conducted into the detection of prompt γ-rays
for nuclear materials assay. Applications involving neutron sources and prompt γ-ray
detection (Prompt Gamma Neutron Activation Analysis - PGNAA) have traditionally
been used in assaying unwanted metal contaminants (such as mercury, cadmium or
lead) in mixed nuclear waste containers [34] as opposed to illicit nuclear material de-
tection.
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2.2.4 Techniques that Detect Delayed Signatures
Unlike prompt signatures, delayed signatures do not have to contend with detection be-
ing made against the interrogation source. Due to their unique signature, much work
has been done into detecting delayed neutrons following photon induced fission. Pri-
mary in this category is the pulsed photonuclear assessment (PPA) inspection system,
which has been developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in conjunction with Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Idaho State University’s Idaho Accelerator
Center (IAC) [35, 36]. This system uses a variable electron accelerator (2-12 MeV)
to generate photons in 3 µs pulses, to inspect the cargo. These photons then produce
neutrons via fission with any SNM present. Delayed neutrons are emitted by fission
products. A description of the fission process and how delayed fission products are pro-
duced is given in section 2.3. If no nuclear material is present then the delayed region
(∼ 2 ms after the end of the pulse) will be free of neutrons. Therefore the detection
of neutrons after the initial photon flash has died away (∼ 2 ms), is a good indication
of fissionable material being present [37]. Standard polyethylene moderated 3He gas
neutron detectors are used and the system has been shown successful in detecting a
4.8 kg depleted uranium sample, amongst a variety of shielding materials including,
polyethylene, wood and iron [35, 36]. However, similar to all techniques that rely on
delayed neutrons, they represent a fairly low energy, low abundance signal. High levels
of shielding will therefore cause significant attenuation of these signals, posing signifi-
cant challenges for definitive detection.
In addition to delayed neutrons, delayed γ-rays can also be used for SNM detection.
These delayed γ-rays are produced through the β decay of fission products. For systems
that use neutrons as the interrogating source, delayed γ-rays are the signal of choice.
The majority of neutron interrogation set-ups use a pulsed beam configuration. Once
switched off any neutrons present falloff within a few tens of milliseconds, leaving only
the natural backgrounds and delayed γ-rays to detect. One of the most efficient tech-
niques which exploits this signature is the a system developed at LLNL known as ‘The
Nuclear Car Wash’ [20, 38]. In order to combat interferences caused by activation of
background materials, the interrogation neutrons were generated with energies ranging
from 3.5-7 MeV. This prevents the activation of 16O(n,p) (since the energy required for
this reaction is ∼ 10.4 MeV), greatly reducing background interferences. The neutron
generator is placed below ground, with the inspected cargo passed over the generator at
a constant rate. As the cargo passes over the generator the entire sample is irradiated.
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Delayed γ-rays are detected by plastic scintillators, located at either side of the cargo.
A schematic of this set-up is shown in Fig. 2.9 [20]. The technique has been shown to
be capable of detecting 5 kg of HEU within 30 s in a variety of different scenarios both
experimentally and via computational modelling [20, 38]. Scenarios include surround-
ing the target with low-Z material (plywood), and hydrogenous material (polyethylene)
[20, 38]. However for high-Z materials (lead), once the thickness of shielding increases
above 40-80 g/cm2, the detection of delayed γ-rays becomes more problematic, as they
become readily attenuated down to background levels [20].
Fig. 2.9 Schematic of nuclear car wash developed at LLNL [20].
2.2.5 Summary of Active Interrogation Methods
Solutions to the problem of shielding for passive interrogation have been considered in
the area of active interrogation. Active interrogation introduces beams of photons or
neutrons at the cargo to be inspected. The interrogation source is used in an attempt
to induce fission in any SNM and thus provides a means of increasing the intensity of
the signatures emitted. However, the implementation of active interrogation techniques
comes at a cost, not only financially but also in terms of dose delivered to the target,
induced backgrounds and system complexity. These issues cause the benefits of active
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techniques to not be as clear-cut as it first appears and are the main reasons why they
are yet to be implemented. Therefore, while there must certainly be optimism in this
area of inspection, this optimism must be tempered given the issues which arise from
implementing active techniques.
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2.3 Radioactive Signatures for Passive and Active In-
terrogation Methods
The following section will give a brief description of the physics processes that occur
when radioactive nuclei undergo decay and fission.
2.3.1 Radioactive Decay
As discussed in section 2.1, passive detection techniques look to observe neutrons and
γ-rays emitted when nuclear materials undergoes radioactive decay. Fig. 2.10 displays
the chart of isotopes, along with the type of decay they will undergo in order to get back
to a stable state [39].
Fig. 2.10 Chart of isotopes along with the type of decay they undergo. Black squares represent
isotopes that are stable. Orange blocks display isotopes that undergo β+ decay, blue squares
are isotopes that undergo β− decay, yellow squares undergo α decay, green squares undergo
fission, red squares undergo proton emission and purple squares undergo neutron emission [39].
The primary types of decay suffered by radionuclides are α and β decay. Upon under-
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going α or β decay, the produced nucleus can be left in an excited state. Relaxation
to the ground state occurs through the emission of a γ-ray. Alpha decay mainly occurs
in heavy nuclei, through emission of a helium nucleus. Beta decay can occur in one of
three ways depending on the ratio of neutrons to protons within the nucleus. If this ratio
is too high then β− decay, which involves the transformation of a neutron into a proton
and emission of an electron, will occur. If this ratio is too low than the nucleus can be
brought to a more stable state through either the conversion of a proton to a neutron and
the emission of a positron, known as β+ decay, or through the capture of an electron by
the nucleus which turns a proton into a neutron, known as electron capture. The process
of α decay is given by Eq. (2.5), β− decay by Eq. (2.6), β+ decay by Eq. (2.7) and
electron capture by Eq. (2.8).
A
ZN →A−4Z−2 N+42 He (2.5)
A
ZN →AZ+1 N′+ e−+νe (2.6)
A
ZN →AZ−1 N′+ e++νe (2.7)
A
ZN+ e
−→AZ−1 N′+νe (2.8)
In addition to these decay modes, some radionuclides can also undergo spontaneous
fission. This process is similar to induced fission, except the capture of a neutron is not
required for the fission process to occur. The process of induced fission is discussed in
the next section. Table 2.3 displays a comparison of the rate at which different isotopes
produce neutrons via spontaneous fission for a number of different isotopes.
2.3.2 Induced Fission
As discussed in section 2.2, active interrogation techniques aim to induce fission in
nuclear materials through irradiating a volume with neutrons or photons. Fig. 2.11 dis-
plays the cross-sections for neutron induced fission of 235U and 238U. It is clear from
Fig. 2.11 that nuclear fission can be induced by thermal neutrons for 235U, whereas
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Table 2.3 A comparison of the rate at which different isotopes produce neutrons via
spontaneous fission. Given are the half-life, the probability for fission to occur, number
of neutrons per fission and the number of neutrons emitted by the isotope per second
per gram [40].
Isotope Half-life Fission
probability per
decay (%)
Neutrons per
fission
Neutrons/gram/sec
233U 1.59 × 105 y 1.3 × 10−10 1.76 8.6 × 10−4
235U 7.04 × 108 y 2.0 × 10−7 1.86 3.0 × 10−4
238U 4.47 × 109 y 5.4 × 10−5 2.07 0.0136
238Pu 87.7 y 1.8 × 10−7 2.28 2.7 × 103
239Pu 2.41 × 104 y 4.4 × 10−10 2.16 2.2 × 10−2
240Pu 6569 y 5.0 × 10−6 2.21 920
241Pu 14.35 y 5.7 × 10−13 2.25 0.05
252Cf 2.638 y 3.09 3.73 2.3 × 1012
only fast neutrons can cause fission to occur in 238U.
There is also the presence of multiple nuclear resonance peaks for 235U. These resonant
peaks occur when the incoming neutron has an energy that is very close to the energy
required to move the nucleus into an excited state. At these levels the probability of cap-
ture is increased. The extreme differences between 235U and 238U fission cross sections
can be explained from the relationship between the excitation energy of the compound
system formed when a neutron captures on uranium and the activation energy needed
to overcome the fission barrier. The activation energy required to overcome the fission
barrier for 236U is 6.2 MeV and for 239U is 6.6 MeV. For neutrons at thermal energies,
we can consider them to have zero kinetic energy. The excitation energy when a neutron
captures onto 235U to form the compound nucleus 236U∗ is given by Eq. (2.9).
Eex = [m(236U∗)−m(236U)]c2 (2.9)
The mass of 236U∗ equals the mass of 235U + mn (mass of a neutron) and is 236.052589
u, where u is the atomic mass unit (1 u = 931.494061 MeV/c2). The mass of 236U
is 236.045563 u, therefore Eex = 6.5 MeV. This is greater than the 6.2 MeV required
to overcome the activation barrier for fission to occur. A similar calculation for 239U
yields Eex = 4.8 MeV, which is far smaller than the required activation energy needed
for fission to occur in 239U. In order to reach this value (6.6 MeV) fast neutrons are
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Fig. 2.11 Cross section for neutron-induced fission of 235U and 238U [41].
required.
Upon undergoing fission the nucleus of an atom splits into lighter nuclei, emits multiple
neutrons and γ-rays, and emits a large amount of energy. These are known as the prompt
signatures, with the multiplicity of these signatures for different nuclei given in Table
2.1. The neutron to proton ratio for uranium isotopes is ≈ 1.57. The fission fragments
(in addition to any emitted neutrons) must also have this initial ratio. However, stable
nuclei around the mass of typical fission fragments, have neutron to proton ratios of ≈
1.2 - 1.4, hence these fission fragments will undergo β− decay until a stable nuclei is
reached. Both neutrons and γ-rays can be emitted from the β− decay products if they
are left over in an excited state. An example schematic of how neutrons can be emitted
from a fission decay product is displayed in Fig. 2.12 [41]. The time taken for neutrons
to be emitted is dependent on the half-life of the isotope which emits them. Since few
processes other than fission result in the production of delayed neutrons after the fission
event they represent a strong signature for nuclear material.
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Fig. 2.12 Delayed neutron emission from 93Rb. After the original β decay, the excited state of
93Sr has enough energy to decay by neutron emission to 92Sr. The neutrons are delayed relative
to the prompt fission neutrons by a time characteristic of the mean lifetime of 93Rb [41].
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2.4 Cosmic Rays
2.4.1 Cosmic Rays in the Atmosphere
Cosmic rays represent particles that have been accelerated to very high speeds by astro-
physical sources. Although a fraction of them are generated by the sun, the majority are
produced outside the solar system by multiple sources, including supernova [42, 43].
These particles are referred to as ‘primary’ cosmic rays and are primarily made up of
nuclei (∼98%, mostly high energy protons), with a fraction of electrons and positrons
(∼2%) [44]. They have a range of energies from 1 GeV up to 108 TeV. The flux of
primary cosmic-rays interacting with the Earth’s atmosphere is dependent on a number
of factors. For cosmic-rays that have originated outside of the solar system, the ex-
panding magnetised plasma generated by the sun (solar wind), acts to decelerate and
partially exclude the lower energy galactic cosmic-rays from the inner solar system.
For the fraction of primaries generated by the sun there is a significant anti-correlation
observed between solar activity (which has an alternating eleven-year cycle) and the
intensity of cosmic-rays with energies below about 10 GeV. Finally, lower-energy cos-
mic rays are affected by the Earth’s geomagnetic field, which must be penetrated to
reach the top of the atmosphere [45]. Primaries have greater difficulty penetrating the
Earth’s magnetic field near the equator than they do near the magnetic poles, hence the
intensity of any component of the cosmic radiation in the GeV range depends both on
the location and time [45].
Upon entry into the Earth’s atmosphere, due to the sudden increase in density, primary
cosmic rays will collide with air nuclei, resulting in the production of additional ‘sec-
ondary’ particles. These particles are typically short lived and either decay or interact
to produce more particles, before reaching the Earth’s surface. This process is demon-
strated in Fig. 2.13.
Muons are the result of the decay of charged mesons, such as pions. Pions can be neu-
tral, positively charged or negatively charged. The decay of a charged pion will produce
a muon with the same charge, in addition to a neutrino. Neutral pions will decay to pro-
duce γ-rays, which convert into e-/e+ pairs in what is known as the ‘electromagnetic’
part of the shower. Pion decays are shown in Eq. (2.10), Eq. (2.11) and Eq. (2.12).
π+→ µ++νµ (2.10)
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Fig. 2.13 Illustration of the particle cascade produced in the atmosphere from a primary cosmic
proton [46].
π−→ µ−+νµ (2.11)
π0 → γ+ γ (2.12)
Having a mass of 105.7 MeV/c2 muons are often referred to as ‘heavy electrons’. They
have an average lifetime of 2.2 µs. Due to muons travelling near to the speed of light,
the effects of special relativity acts to increase the lifetime of muons as we perceive it,
thus enabling them to reach the surface.
Secondary cosmic-ray neutrons are also produced when primary cosmic rays collide
with nitrogen and oxygen nuclei in the atmosphere. As they propagate through the
atmosphere to the surface, they will also undergo interactions with atmospheric nuclei,
resulting in a loss of energy and production of further additional particles.
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2.4.2 Cosmic-Ray Muon Spectrum at the Earth’s Surface
Typically produced at an altitude of 15 km [45] muons reach the Earth’s surface with
an average energy of≈ 4 GeV, having on average lost≈ 2 GeV of energy via ionisation
in the atmosphere. The overall spectrum has a wide range of energies and angles,
with the spectrum dependent on the location on the Earth it is measured, the altitude
at which measurements are made and the degree of solar activity. These dependancies
are a reflection of the factors affecting the primary cosmic-ray flux, energy loss in the
atmosphere and decay. For example, 2.4 GeV muons have a decay length of 15 km,
which is reduced to 8.7 km by energy loss [45]. Over time the muon spectrum has
been well documented at various angles through experimental measurements [47, 48]
and modelling [49]. In general when considering the muon spectrum the following
parameters listed in the Review of Particle Physics by the Particle Data Group can be
used to describe it [45]:
• They impact the Earth’s surface at a rate of 0.0167 cm−2 s−1for horizontal detec-
tors with an average energy of 3-4 GeV for vertical muons and ≈ 6 GeV for all
muons.
• For energies below 1 GeV the energy (E) distribution is almost flat. With increas-
ing energy the spectrum becomes steeper, until it falls as E−2.7 for energies in the
range 10-100 GeV.
• For average energies the flux is greatest at the zenith before falling with an angu-
lar distribution that is ∝ cos2θ , where θ is the angle between the muon path and
the vertical.
Fig. 2.14 displays the muon energy spectrum at sea level for both θ = 0 degrees and
θ = 75 degrees. This figure has been taken from the Review of Particle Physics by the
Particle Data Group [45]. For large angles the average muon energy at the surface is
greater than for smaller angles. This is due to the increased distance that muons have
to cover before reaching the surface, therefore low energy muons will decay before
reaching the surface. The parameterisation used in this thesis for muon production is
a modified Gaisser parameterisation [50] and is discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.
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Fig. 2.14 Spectrum of muons at θ = 0 deg (black diamonds [51], black squares [48], black
triangles [52], black inverted triangles [47], cross’ [53], hollow circles [54], black circles [55])
and θ = 75 deg (hollow diamonds [56]) taken from the Review of Particle Physics by the Particle
Data Group [45]. dN/dρµ is the differential flux and ρµ is the muon momentum.
2.4.3 Cosmic-Ray Neutron Spectrum at the Earth’s Surface
After muons, neutrons represent the most abundant particle produced by cosmic-ray
interactions to reach the surface. They are produced when primary cosmic-rays collide
with nuclei in the atmosphere. As they propagate through the atmosphere to the surface,
they will also undergo interactions with atmospheric nuclei, resulting in a loss of energy
and production of further additional particles. As with muons the overall spectrum has
a wide distribution of angles and energies, which are a reflection of the factors affecting
the primary cosmic-ray flux. Hence their distribution is dependent on the altitude, solar
activity and physical location in which it is measured. A number of measurements and
parameterisations have been made over time [49, 57–59]. A schematic of the cosmic-
ray neutron energy spectrum [59] is displayed in Fig 2.15. Fig 2.15 also shows a plot
of the neutron energy times the differential flux, measured on the roof of the IBM (In-
ternational Business Machines Corporation) T. J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown
Heights, NY [57]. The differential flux is given by the number of radiant-energy par-
ticles incident on a surface during a given period of time divided by the product of the
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area of that surface, the characteristic energy of the incident particles, and the given
period of time. This 2nd plot is shown to allow finer details of the spectrum to be easier
to view. There are three distinct areas in Fig. 2.15 that are to be considered:
• A thermal peak, which is a result of neutrons with thermal energies, that are
in thermal equilibrium with the surrounding medium. These neutrons have lost
energy until they have reached thermal energies, but are yet to have been captured
by the surrounding medium.
• After the thermal peak the spectra exhibits roughly a 1/E dependence up until 1
MeV. This dependence is simply a result of neutrons slowing down by interacting
with the surrounding nuclei. Centred at 1 - 2 MeV there is a secondary peak,
which is a result of nuclear evaporation processes. Particles have collided with
nuclei in the atmosphere resulting in neutron production via excitation. Upon
closer inspection there is finer structure from nuclear resonances with oxygen
and nitrogen in the atmosphere.
• Neutrons above 1 - 2 MeV which encompasses the high energy peak. This peak
is a result of giant dipole resonances (GDR).
Fig. 2.15 Illustration of the cosmic-ray neutron energy spectrum [59] (left figure) and the dif-
ferential neutron energy spectrum multiplied by the energy, measured on the roof of the IBM
[57] (right figure). A 2nd plot is given to allow finer details of the spectrum to be easier to view.
The numbers 200 g/cm2, 700 g/cm2 and 1030 g/cm2 refer to the different atmospheric depths
where measurements were made.
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2.5 Muon Interactions with Matter
Muon interactions with matter are the primary reason they represent an effective al-
ternative for probing materials. For the purpose of interrogation there are three main
areas to be considered. Firstly, energy losses of muons can occur through four main pro-
cesses: ionisation, bremsstrahlung, electron-positron pair production and muon-nucleus
inelastic scattering. If this energy loss is sufficient enough then muons can stop within
a target. Since muons are charged, when they interact with atomic nuclei they will
undergo deflections via multiple Coulomb scatterings. Muon deviation can also occur
through the other interactions taking place, such as inelastic scattering, bremsstrahlung
and pair production, however the process of multiple Coulomb scattering dominates.
Finally, upon stopping there is the possibility that muons can be captured by the ma-
terial being traversed, resulting in fission or spallation events depending on whether
the material is nuclear or not. The following subsections will discuss each of these
interactions.
2.5.1 Energy Loss
As muons traverse materials they lose energy via electronic (ionisation and excitation),
radiative (bremsstrahlung and electron-positron pair production) and muon-nucleus in-
elastic scattering processes. The total energy loss in a material is a combination of all
these processes and is referred to as the ‘mean stopping power of the material’ [60]. It is
given by Eq. (2.13), where a(E) is termed the electronic stopping power, b(E) describes
losses due to radiative processes and inelastic scattering, and E is the total energy,
−dE
dx
= a(E)+b(E)E. (2.13)
The relative contribution of each of these processes is primarily dependent on whether
the incident muon energy is above or below the critical energy associated with the
material. The critical energy is when energy losses for both radiative and electronic
processes are equal. For most materials the critical energy is of the order of several
hundred GeV and hence much greater than a typical cosmic-ray muon whose average
energy at sea level is 6 GeV. Since radiative losses occur at much higher energies than
electronic, this indicates that the dominant process of energy loss for muons through
materials is via electronic interactions such as ionisation rather than any radiative pro-
cess. This effect is shown in Fig. 2.16, which displays the stopping power of positive
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muons in copper as a function of kinetic energy. In practical cases the mean energy loss
rate is close to the minimum and therefore cosmic-ray muons are know as ’minimum-
ionising particles’.
Fig. 2.16 Stopping power of positive muons in copper [45]. The appropriate energy range for
cosmic-ray muons is represented by the Bethe region (0.1 - 1000 GeV).
As muons pass through materials they strike electrons resulting in a transfer of energy
from the muon to the electron. The total energy lost by the muon is dependent on the
energy of the muon and the thickness of the material. The majority of slowing down for
muons at the Earth’s surface occurs within the Bethe region, where muons are travel-
ling with high speeds (β = v / c). The mean rate of energy loss in the region that occurs
is well described by the Bethe formula (Eq. (2.14)) [61], while Fig. 2.17 shows the
energy loss suffered by muons as they traverse different materials, which is given by,〈
−dE
dx
〉
= Kz2
Z
A
1
β 2
[
1
2
ln
2mec2β 2γ2TMAX
I2
]
−β 2− δ (βγ)
2
, (2.14)
where K is a constant (K = 4πNAr2mec2), z is the unit charge of the incident particle,
Z is the atomic number of the absorber, A is the atomic mass of the absorber, γ is the
Lorentz factor, TMAX is the maximum energy transfer in a single collision and is given
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in Eq. (2.15), me is the electron mass, I is the mean excitation energy, δ (βγ) is the
density effect correction to ionisation energy loss, NA is Avogadros constant and r is
the classical electron radius. The units are given in MeV g−1 cm2.
TMAX =
2mec2β 2γ2
1+2γme/M+(me/M)2
(2.15)
where M is the mass of the incident particle.
There is always the possibility that muons will lose all their energy and be absorbed by
the material they pass through. As demonstrated by Eq. (2.14) and Fig. 2.17 the energy
loss for a muon as it passes through a material varies with the energy of the incoming
muon and the material being traversed. In the energy range of the cosmic-ray muon
spectrum (100 MeV - 1000 GeV), the approximate energy loss of a muon is 2 MeV per
g/cm2. For a precise calculation of the range of muons in materials, integration of the
energy loss relationship outside the energy range where the 2 MeV loss per g/cm2 is
appropriate is required. Table 2.4 demonstrates the range of muons for multiple differ-
ent materials, when calculated using an approximate energy loss of 2 MeV per g/cm2.
Since muons with energies of a few GeV are capable of penetrating over a metre of very
dense materials, and higher energy muons up to tens of metres, this process is mainly
applicable to low energy muons.
Table 2.4 Average range of muons passing through various materials.
Material Volume Density (g cm−3) Average range (cm) for muons with energy :
0.4 GeV 4 GeV 40 GeV
Water 1.00 200.00 2000.00 20,000.00
Concrete 2.20 90.91 909.09 9090.91
Iron 7.87 25.41 254.13 2541.30
Lead 11.35 17.62 176.61 1766.61
238U 18.95 10.55 105.54 1055.41
2.5.2 Multiple Coulomb Scattering (MCS)
As muons pass through a medium, they interact with atomic nuclei of the medium,
resulting in a slight deflection from the muons original path. Since muons will pass
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Fig. 2.17 Mean energy losses for muons traversing different materials [45].
close to multiple atomic nuclei, multiple deflections will take place, resulting in a total
scattering angle that is non-negligible once the muon exits the medium. For small angle
deflections the distribution is well represented by a zero mean Gaussian approximation,
while less frequent ‘hard’ scatters produce non-Gaussian tails. If we define
θ0 = θ rmsplane =
1√
2
θ rmsspace (2.16)
for small angle deflections the distribution is well represented by a zero mean Gaussian
approximation, for the central 98% of the scattering distribution [62], with a rms width
given by [63],
θ0 =
13.6MeV
βcρ
z
√
x/X0[1+0.038ln(x/X0)]. (2.17)
Here βc is the muon velocity, ρ is the momentum, z is the charge of the incoming muon
and x/X0 is the thickness of the scattering medium, measured in radiation lengths (X0).
The value for θ0 is a fit to Molières distribution for scattering angles [62] for singly
charged particles with β = 1 for all Z, and is accurate to 11% or better for 10−3 < x/X0
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< 100 [45].
The projected (plane) and non-projected (space) angular distributions can be approxi-
mated by,
1
2πθ 20
exp
(
−θ
2
space
2θ 20
)
dΩ, (2.18)
1√
2πθ0
exp
(
−θ
2
plane
2θ 20
)
dθplane, (2.19)
where θ is the deflection angle. For the approximation, θ 2space ≈ (θ 2plane,x + θ 2plane,y),
where the x and y axes are orthogonal to the direction of motion, and dΩ≈ θplane,xθplane,y.
Deflections into the θplane,x and θplane,y are independent and identically distributed [45].
The radiation length represents the amount of matter there is for electromagnetic inter-
actions. It is both the mean material depth over which a high-energy electron loses all
but 1/e of its energy, and 7/9 of the mean free path for pair production by a high-energy
photon. The radiation length in units of g/cm2 is given by,
1
X0
= 4αr2e
NA
A
{Z2[Lrad− f (Z)]+ZL′rad} (2.20)
where α is the fine structure constant, r2e is the classical electron radius, NA is Avo-
gadro’s number, A is the mass number, Z is the atomic number of the nucleus, Lrad =
ln(184.15 Z−1/3), L′rad = ln(1194 Z
−2/3) and
f (Z) = a2[(1+a2)−1+0.20206−0.0369a2+0.0083a4−0.002a6], (2.21)
where a = αZ [45].
For mixtures or compounds the radiation length can be approximated by,
1
X0
=∑w j/X j (2.22)
where w j and X j are the fraction by weight and the radiation length for the jth element
[45]. Fig. 2.18 displays the radiation length, calculated using Eq. (2.20), as a function
of Z.
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Fig. 2.18 Radiation length in g/cm2 as a function of Z calculated using Eq. (2.20).
For materials of the same depth the radiation length is shorter for higher density mate-
rials, as there are more nuclei and electrons available for electromagnetic interactions.
As the scattering width is dependent on the radiation length, higher density materials
(such as SNM and its possible shielding) will on average, cause muons to scatter more
than lower density materials assuming the same thickness; hence SNM can be identi-
fied through measuring the scattering width of muons. Since measuring the energy of
a muon normally requires the use of a magnetic field, for nuclear security purposes the
ability to measure the scattering angle is easier than the energy loss and hence is the
primary source of information that is utilised for muon tomography. Simulations were
run using GEANT4.9.6-p02, where mono-energetic muons were vertically propagated
through 10 cm of various materials. Given in Table 2.5 is the atomic number, radiation
length and average scatter for a number of materials, that demonstrate how the average
scattering angle observed for muons varies.
2.5.3 Muon Capture
As muons pass through materials they lose energy and can slow down to the point where
they stop within the material (range out). Upon stopping µ− will be captured into an
atomic orbit, resulting in the formation of a muonic atom. This capture can result in the
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Table 2.5 Average scattering angle suffered for muons passing through 10 cm of various
materials.
Material X0 (g cm−2) Z
Average scattering angle (mrad) for muons of energy :
0.4 GeV 4 GeV 40 GeV
Water 36.1 1 and 8 18.52 ± 0.17 2.11 ± 0.09 0.17 ± 0.07
Concrete 26.6 Z/A=0.5 31.10 ± 0.23 3.60 ± 0.12 0.28 ± 0.10
Iron 13.8 26 100.04 ± 0.40 10.79 ± 0.23 0.84 ± 0.17
Lead 6.4 82 192.79 ± 0.80 20.05 ± 0.35 1.92 ± 0.31
238U 6 92 295.99 ± 1.55 27.26 ± 0.44 2.65 ± 0.38
production of multiple neutrons via muon induced fission. Pathways for both delayed
and prompt processes exist for this procedure [64].
Upon capture onto an orbit, µ−’s will rapidly cascade down the orbital levels through
Auger and radiative emissions to the lowest quantum state (1S) available. This cas-
cade is coupled to the release of multiple muonic X-rays. As the muon approaches the
ground state, due to its bigger mass over its electron counterpart, the muons orbital is
‘pushed’ closer to the nucleus. This increases the probability of interaction between
the muon and a nucleus. Since the nuclear radius increases with Z number, so does
the probability of a µ− finding itself within the nucleus when reaching this state. For
delayed muon induced fission, upon reaching the ground level, muon absorption by the
nucleus competes against muon decay, with the probability of absorption increasing as
the elements become heavier. Muon absorption is mediated by the weak interaction and
centres on the capture of the muon by a nuclear proton, resulting in the emission of a
neutron and neutrino with the reaction shown in Eq. (2.23) [65].
µ−+ p→ νµ +n (2.23)
Typically the neutrino takes most of the mass energy of the muon (∼ 100 MeV) with
very little being delivered to the recoil neutron. However, the capture of the muon also
acts to excite the nucleus and therefore further neutron emissions in addition to γ-ray
emission can occur as the excited nucleus de-excites. The characteristic mean lifetime
of this process for the actinides is 70-80 ns.
In prompt muon-induced fission, it is possible for the 2P-1S transition energy (∼ 6
MeV) to exceed that of the fission or neutron emission thresholds, meaning excess neu-
tron production can occur without the absorption of the muon. The process is described
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by
(Z,A)(µ−)∗→ (Z,A)∗(µ−). (2.24)
Upon fission the muon will tend to attach itself to the heavy fragment, resulting in its
capture and further neutron production [66]. These excess neutrons may be measured
when attempting to detect high-Z and nuclear materials.
Table 2.6 displays the average neutron multiplicity from µ− capture for a number of
different elements, taken from literature [67–69]. Beams of muons were generated
using the Berkeley 184-in cyclotron and fired into a CH2 absorber. The thickness of
this absorber was enough so that µ− would lose enough energy to be captured by the
target material. Neutrons emitted after µ− capture have energies of the order MeV,
therefore detection was made in a large (30 in. high, 30 in. diam) cadmium loaded
liquid scintillator tank.
Table 2.6 Average neutron multiplicity from µ− capture for a number of different ele-
ments.
Material Mass (A)
Number
Atomic (Z)
Number
Average Neutron Multiplicity
Aluminium 27 13 1.26 ± 0.06 [68]
Silicon 28 14 0.86 ± 0.07 [68]
Calcium 40 20 0.75 ± 0.03 [68]
Iron 56 26 1.12 ± 0.04 [68]
Silver 108 47 1.61 ± 0.06 [68]
Gold 197 79 1.66 ± 0.04 [68]
Lead 207 82 1.71 ± 0.07 [68]
235U 235 92 2.4 [69]
238U 238 92 2.2 [69]
From Table 2.6 it appears that the average number of neutrons emitted per muon capture
increases as Z number increases, however deviations from this generalisation do occur
[67]. A more accurate description can be determined if the kinematics of the system
are taken into account. If the process of µ− absorption is assumed to occur with a
proton at rest, then the neutron recoils with an energy of ≈ 5.2 MeV. This energy
transfer is assumed to be distributed amongst all other nucleons to produce a ‘thermally’
excited nucleus. In reality the proton will have some finite momentum. Therefore the
overall energy of the recoil neutron, and hence the energy distribution (I(Q)) within
the nucleus, will be different from this value (Q is the excitation energy). The excited
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nucleus will primarily undergo neutron emission until sufficient energy for this process
is not available. At this point the nucleus will relax back down to its ground state via
photon emission. Through measuring the number of neutrons that are emitted, a lower
limit on the energy transfer to the nucleus can be determined. This limit is given by the
difference in mass between the initial nucleus (Z, A), and the residual nucleus (Z - 1,
A), plus the binding energies of the neutrons that are emitted from the residual nucleus.
The average energy transferred to the nucleus has been calculated to be between 10 and
20 MeV [67], which is not high enough for proton emission to become a factor due to
the effects of the coulomb barrier. The probability N of the emission of ν neutrons has
been demonstrated to be [67], [70]:
Nν = 1− exp[−(Q−Bν/θn)]×
2ν−3
∑
n=0
[Q−Bν/θn]n(n!)−1 (2.25)
where Q is the excitation energy, Bν is the binding energy of ν neutrons in the initial
nucleus and θn is the temperature of the residual nucleus and assumed to be constant.
As shown by Eq. (2.25), neutron multiplicity is heavily dependent on the difference
between the excitation energy and the binding energy of the neutrons. This explains
the variation from the general trend of increasing neutron multiplicity with increasing
Z number. In order for any prediction of neutron multiplicity to be made the process
behind nuclear excitation and nuclear excitation distribution, I(Q), must be understood.
There are a number of models of the nucleus that have been evaluated with regards to
this process, including the Fermi-gas model, Gaussian model and shell model [67].
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2.6 Neutron Interactions with Matter
As discussed in section 2.2 neutrons can be used as an effective source when attempt-
ing to detect hidden nuclear material. Since they have no charge neutrons do not lose
energy via electromagnetic processes and are able to penetrate large volumes of high-Z
material. However, neutron interactions are mediated by the strong force and they un-
dergo interactions with the nuclei of these materials. These interactions are of interest
when using neutrons to detect nuclear material. The probability of any interaction oc-
curring is expressed by the cross-section, which is measured in units of barns (1 b =
10−24 cm2), with the probability of a particular event occurring being dependent on the
energy of the incoming neutron. There are two main categories of interaction between
neutrons and nuclei that are considered; these are elastic or inelastic scattering and ab-
sorption.
Elastic scattering is the process in which a neutron imparts some of its kinetic energy
to the nucleus, resulting in the loss of energy and scatter of the neutron. The overall en-
ergy within the system (neutron + nucleus) remains the same. On average, the amount
of energy lost by the neutron is given by the formula 2EA/(A+1)2 where E is the ki-
netic energy of the neutron and A is the atomic number of the material. This formula
indicates that materials with low-A numbers (such as hydrogen) are more efficient at
lowering neutron energy than high-A materials. Unlike elastic scattering, inelastic scat-
tering does not conserve the overall energy of the system (neutron + nucleus). Instead
when inelastic scattering occurs some of the energy from the neutron is used in elevat-
ing the nucleus to an excited state or producing new particles. Upon relaxation back to
the ground state energy is released in the form of radiation.
Due to the wide energy range which cosmic-ray neutrons span (see Fig. 2.15) there is
always the possibility that some of these neutrons will be absorbed by the target they are
passing through. If this target is shielded HEU then this may result in the production of
excess neutrons via fission (for nuclear material) and spallation (for shielding material).
The probability of this process initiating is given by the neutron capture cross section.
Fig. 2.19 shows the fission cross section for 235U, 238U and 239Pu. As can be seen the
probability of capture occurring is much higher at thermal energies before falling away.
There are also specific peaks located at higher energies. These represent the resonant
peaks and occur when the incoming neutron has an energy that is very close to the en-
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ergy required to move the nucleus into an excited state. At these levels the probability
of capture is increased.
Fig. 2.19 Fission cross section for 235U, 238U and 239Pu [71].
If cosmic-ray neutrons were to be used as a substitute for active interrogation neutrons,
the same signatures as active interrogation are detected. However, unlike active interro-
gation there would be no interrogation source. This in turn means there is no danger of
harming potential stowaways, or activation of the cargo. However, since the source of
neutrons cannot be controlled by the user, optimised properties of the neutron energy
and direction of beam cannot be defined.
The average energy of the cosmic-ray neutrons is ≈ 140 MeV. At this energy the fis-
sion cross section for 235U is ≈ 1.45 b and for 238U is ≈ 1.30 b [72]. Fission with
incident neutrons of this energy will produce on average 11 neutrons per fission for
235U and 10.5 neutrons per fission for 238U [73]. Fission neutrons will have an average
energy of ≈ 2.56 MeV for 235U, and 2.45 MeV for 238U [73]. Neutrons produced via
the initial fission may then escape the material for detection or cause additional neu-
tron production to occur through additional fission events, neutron capture or neutron
scattering. The probability of each of these events occurring is dependent on the size
of target which is being inspected. The amount of neutrons which reach the detector is
dependant on a number of factors including the detectors distance from the source, the
detectors total area coverage and the detectors efficiency. Neutrons with MeV energies
can be detected with CH4 fast-neutron detectors. CH4 fast-neutron detectors rely on the
recoil of light nuclei to ionise the gas in the tube. CH4 fast-neutron detectors have a
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detection efficiency for 1 MeV neutrons of 78% [41]. This efficiency is the interaction
probability for neutrons of energy 1 MeV striking the detector face at right angles for a
detector thickness of 5 cm. The disadvantage of this type of detector is its sensitivity to
γ-rays. Other types of detector available include 3He proportional counters, which have
a detection efficiency of 77% for thermal neutrons [41]. These detectors are very insen-
sitive to γ-rays. If this type of detector is used then a moderating material is required to
surround the detector in order to reduce the neutron energy to thermal energies.
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2.7 Cosmic-Ray Muon Radiography
2.7.1 History
Over the last several decades many applications have used cosmic-ray muons as a
source for radiography. The initial approach into muon radiography was done by E.P.
George in 1955 [74] who, through measuring the attenuation of muons as they passed
through the rock above the Guthega-Munyang tunnel, was able to deduce the thickness
of this overburden that the muons had passed through.
This pioneering approach of measuring the cosmic-ray muon flux to determine the
depth of material was built upon in the late 1960s when Luis Alvarez and his team
attempted to image the interior of the pyramid of Chepren located at Giza, in an at-
tempt to discover any hidden chambers that may have been present [75]. Two spark
chambers were placed in the Belzoni chamber of the pyramid. Through knowledge of
the geometry of the pyramid, an estimation was made whereby those muons that pass
through one of the faces of the pyramid, would traverse ∼ 2.3 m less limestone than
those that pass through the corners of the pyramid. That difference corresponds to a
difference in the signal intensity of ∼ 5% for muons passing through the faces, over
those that pass through the corners. This difference is due to the increased volume of
limestone in the corners. In addition to this, multiple simulations were run, which mea-
sured the attenuation of muons as they passed through the pyramid. These simulations,
coupled with estimations of how much the muon flux would have been altered given a
certain size of chamber, allowed Alverez and his team to deduce that in fact there were
no hidden chambers within the examined region at the pyramid of Chepren.
More recently, several efforts have been made to map other large objects. This includes
the Higashi-Honganji temple gate [76] and the interior of mountains and volcanoes [77–
80]. Research has developed in this area over time from basic mountain measurements,
to inner volcano measurements with resolutions of ±50.0 m [78] and the development
of a three-dimensional computed tomography system [80], all with the aim of attempt-
ing to predict when a volcano may erupt. Currently the most active area of research
in this field involves the MU-RAY project [81]. This is an international collaboration
whose aim is to map the inside of Mount Vesuvius, through the development of new
analysis tools and the construction of muon telescopes equipped to survive the harsh
environments of an active volcano.
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2.8 Cosmic-Ray Muon Tomography
2.8.1 Previous Work
The work in section 2.7.1 relies on measuring muon attenuation, to build up tomo-
graphic images of the volume these muons traverse. When considering cosmic-ray
muons for nuclear material detection, techniques developed rely upon the multiple scat-
ters muons undertake as they pass through an object. These multiple small interactions
add up to yield a total angular deviation, which is well represented by Eq. (2.17). The
technique was originally established and validated by the team at Los Alamos National
Laboratory [1–5]. Both experimental and simulation tests were conducted for a variety
of different scenarios.
Initial reconstruction algorithms developed by the team at LANL used a basic point
of closest approach (PoCA) method [4]. PoCA approximates the trajectory that muons
travel as two straight lines joined by a single point, hence it assumes the muon only scat-
ters once within the inspected volume. The total geometry is split into voxels. Through
using the PoCA algorithm, the most probable voxel in which scattering occurs is calcu-
lated. The scattering strength in this voxel is then determined. This process is done for
all muons that pass through the inspected volume. Using this algorithm discrimination
between low-Z (water, plastic, concrete), medium-Z (iron, copper) and high-Z (lead,
uranium) materials was apparent in 1 minute exposure times [4]. The PoCA algorithm
was validated experimentally through attempts to detect a cylinder of tungsten (radius
5 cm and height 5.7 cm) placed on a plastic sheet, with two steel support beams. Two
drift chambers, spaced 27 cm apart with an active detection area of 60 cm × 60 cm
were placed above and below the inspected volume. Detectors had a spatial resolution
of 400 µm at full width half maximum (FWHM). Both experimental and simulation
studies were conducted, with clear detection of the tungsten target made [2].
The PoCA algorithm was proven to work for detecting small isolated objects in simple
geometries [4]. However, since the PoCA algorithm assumes scattering to occur at a
single point, it fails to take into account the actual physics of multiple scatterings that
are taking place. As a muon passes through many objects, particularly those which are
stacked vertically, it will scatter at various locations. This can cause the single scatter-
ing point reconstructed using PoCA, to be located between targets and in the volumes
that surround where a target is located. This effect is more apparent for high-Z materi-
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als and occurs more predominately in the vertical direction. The ‘blurring’ is caused by
the inherent nature of the PoCA algorithm, with the position of a PoCA point weighted
towards the element that caused the greatest scatter to occur. This causes a propensity
for the misclassification of low density, medium density or even high-density materials
[3]. The combination of these two issues limits the accuracy of nuclear materials detec-
tion in realistic scenarios, when solely using the PoCA algorithm.
A secondary the of algorithm, based on the actual physics taking place, has also been
developed. This algorithm is known as the expectation-maximisation (EM) algorithm
and was originally developed at LANL [3]. The EM algorithm is used to find maximum
likelihood estimates of a statistical model, where the model is dependent on parame-
ters that cannot be measured directly. Thus follows a two step process. First is the
expectation (E) step, which creates a function for the expectation of the log-likelihood
evaluated using the current estimate for the unknown parameters. This is followed by
the maximisation (M) step, that computes the parameters which will maximise the ex-
pected log likelihood found on the previous step [82]. These parameters are then passed
back to the E step to determine the new distribution of the hidden parameters. These
two steps are done until the parameters converge, or for a predetermined number of
iterations. Unlike the PoCA algorithm, the EM algorithm is based on the actual physics
of multiple scattering that is taking place. Therefore EM is expected to perform better
than PoCA in systems where multiple scatters are taking place. The main issue with the
EM algorithm is the long running times required. A full derivation of how this type of
algorithm is developed and implemented for muon tomography applications is beyond
the scope of this thesis but can be found at [5].
This thesis will discuss the development of two algorithms that look to enhance nu-
clear materials detection. One is based on PoCA and uses a density-based clustering
approach [83] to ascertain regions of high-Z materials. The other makes use of muons
that disappear within the inspected volume [84]. Previous work done by the group in
Sheffield include the development of an empirical relation for the angle of deviation
with the incident muon energy and the thickness, atomic mass, radiation length and
density of the material [85].
Since the initial study conducted by the team at LANL various other people and groups
have developed detectors, more complex analysis algorithms and simulated more com-
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plex systems in which high-density materials could be placed. This most noticeably
started with C.L. Morris [86], who simulated the capability of muon tomography to
detect 1000 cm3 blocks of tungsten, when placed within a cargo van [86]. Other
muon tomography systems that have been built and tested, use Gas Electron Multi-
pliers (GEMs) with the PoCA algorithm. These type of detector have extremely good
spatial resolution (as low as 130 µm [87]) and have shown to be efficient in detecting
metallic objects within an inspected volume both via simulations [88, 89] and experi-
mentally [87]. Within the UK, the University of Bristol, in conjunction with the Atomic
Weapons Establishment (AWE) have developed a muon tomography inspection system
based on high resolution resistive plate chambers [90]. More on what Bristol and AWE
have done can be viewed at the following references [91–93].
The multiple scattering muons experience as they pass through a material have been
used to image objects with a variety of size, density, and atomic mass. It has been
demonstrated that this technique is capable of detecting and discriminating materials
from one another. In addition to detecting nuclear material at international borders the
use of cosmic-ray muons is spreading to the broader scientific community. The applica-
tions they are now being used for include volcano imaging, reactor imaging and spent
nuclear material imaging [77–81, 94, 95].

Chapter 3
Material Segregation using Muon
Scattering
In this chapter an overview of the cosmic-ray muon scattering tomography concept will
be discussed in section 3.1. Section 3.2 gives a discussion of the different code packages
that have been used to generate the results presented in this thesis. Also presented
are the initial parameters that are inherent to all simulations discussed in this Chapter.
Following a discussion of these parameters, section 3.3 displays the capability of muon
scattering and the PoCA algorithm for material segregation, using full energy spectrum
muons in 5 minute exposure times. Section 3.4 summarises the work presented.
3.1 Concept
As mentioned in section 2.4.2, muons cascade down upon the surface of the Earth at a
rate of 0.0167 cm−2 s−1 for horizontal detectors. Due to this low rate, individual muons
can be tracked one at a time as they pass through sets of detectors that have been placed
around a volume to be inspected. The focus of this thesis is to make use of the various
interactions of muons with different materials, to detect shielded nuclear materials, in
particular HEU located within shipped cargo containers. The first interaction to be dis-
cussed is the multiple scatters a muon undergoes as it passes through a material. The
system envisaged for this purpose involves placing a volume to be inspected between a
minimum of four sets of detectors. Individual muons are tracked as they pass through
each set of detectors. The initial position and direction cosines for each of the incoming
and outgoing muon tracks are recorded. Upon determination of the direction of both the
incoming and outgoing tracks, these muon tracks are passed through a reconstruction
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algorithm, which is used to deduce the most likely position where scattering has oc-
curred. The amount of scattering is determined through calculating the angle between
the two tracks. As discussed in section 2.5.2 higher density materials such as shielded
HEU will cause muons to scatter more than lower density materials, such as any sur-
rounding clutter. Through measuring muons as they pass through the inspected volume,
analysis of the volume can be conducted based on the amount of scattering each muon
undertakes. Further analysis is then conducted to determine if there are any areas within
the cargo that may contain high density material. A schematic of the muon scattering
tomography concept is shown in Fig. 3.1. The average scattering angle suffered for
muons passing through 10 cm of various materials is given in Table 2.5.
Fig. 3.1 Schematic of the cosmic-ray muon scattering tomography concept. The scattering
angles described are not drawn to scale.
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3.2.1 GEANT4
For this study, simulations have been conducted using GEANT4.9.6-p02 with the ‘Shield-
ing 2.0’ physics list [96]. GEANT4 (GEometry ANd Tracking), is a simulation toolkit
written in C++ that uses Monte-Carlo methods for simulating the passage of particles
through matter [97]. Due to the wide variety of applications it can be used for, users
are able to tune the simulations they run to their individual needs. All aspects of the
simulation process are covered, with the most important three being the system ge-
ometry along with their materials, production and tracking of the particles of interest,
and detection and storage of the particles produced [98]. This set-up allows the user
to have control over the geometry of the system, the ability to generate primary parti-
cles, the choice of which particles to track and store and most importantly, the physics
processes at the heart of the particle interactions. Several physics lists have been cre-
ated in GEANT4, which have their advantages and disadvantages depending on the
purpose of the simulation. For the applications discussed in this thesis the Shielding
physics list is used. This list has been specifically designed for simulations involving
shielding purposes. The Shielding physics list was originally developed for neutron
penetration studies and ion-ion collisions, but is also used for high energy calorimetry
and for underground or low background experiments. Its high energy part is taken from
the FTFP_BERT_HP physics list (recommended by GEANT4 for HEP) and radioac-
tive decay has been added to deal with background radiation. It is the recommended list
for shielding, space and HEP applications. Scheduled validation tests can be viewed at
[96]. The physics processes on which GEANT4 is built have been extensively tested
and validated, the details of which can be viewed in ‘GEANT4 Developments and Ap-
plications’ by [98].
The set-up used for all simulations discussed in Chapter 3 involve placing detectors
above, below and at two of the sides of the volume to be inspected (much like a tunnel).
An example schematic can be viewed in Fig. 3.2. In order to run simulations of inter-
est, an appropriate cosmic-ray muon spectrum at sea level is required. For this other
software packages are used.
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Fig. 3.2 Simple GEANT4 schematic of four detectors placed above, below and at the sides of
the volume to be inspected.
3.2.2 Muon Spectrum
The muon energy spectrum at sea level is calculated using the parameterisation pro-
posed by Gaisser [99], but modified so that large zenith angles, muon decay in the
atmosphere and fraction of prompt muons are included [50]:
dN
dEµdΩ
(Eµ ,θ ∗)= 0.14(Eµ+∆Eµ)−2.7
(
1
1+ 1.1(Eµ+∆Eµ )cosθ1115GeV
+
0.054
1+ 1.1(Eµ+∆Eµ )cosθ1850GeV
+Rc
)
× pd
(3.1)
• dNdEµdΩ(Eµ ,θ
∗) is the differential muon intensity at sea level in units cm−2s−1sr−1GeV−1
• Eµ is the muon energy at the surface in GeV.
• θ ∗ is the muon zenith angle at the surface.
• θ1 is the muon zenith angle at the height of muon production.
• cosθ1 =
√
1−0.99(1− cos2θ ∗).
• ∆Eµ = 2.06× 10−3(1030/cosθ1 − 120) is the muon energy loss in the atmo-
sphere.
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• Rc = 10−4 is the ratio of prompt muons to pions.
• pd is the probability for a muon to not decay in the atmosphere, which can be
expressed as pd = ab, where a = 1201030/cosθ1 and b =
1.04
cosθ1(Eµ+∆Eµ/2)
[50].
For the work presented in this thesis the modified Gaisser parameterisation (MGP) is
used to generate a muon spectrum, which is then incorporated into the simulations so
that the true distribution of cosmic-ray muons at sea level are represented. Fig. 3.3
shows a comparison of the MGP muon spectra at two different angles with compu-
tational data (CRY) [49], experimental data [47, 56] and a different modified Gaisser
parameterisation [100]. Tests of vertical muons (0◦), show good agreement (within a
few %) with theoretical and experimental results for muon momentum greater than 1
GeV/c. Below this momentum is where deviations start to occur. Experimental mea-
surements are only given down to 0.4 GeV/c. From these results it appears the flux
from CRY [49] gives a systematic underestimation of the muon flux at low energies,
the flux from Mengyum’s MGP [100] gives a systematic overestimation of the flux at
low energies, and the flux from Kudryavtsev’s MGP [50] yields the most reasonable
agreement. For muons which arrive at much larger angles (75◦), both MGPs demon-
strate good agreement with experimental data for all energies. The muon flux from
CRY gives a systematic underestimation of the muon flux for momentum greater than
≈ 30 GeV.
3.2.3 PoCA Algorithm
PoCA is a heuristic algorithm originally designed as a proof of principle concept to
show that muon scattering could be used to distinguish between low density, medium
density and high density material [3]. Instead of treating each individual scatter a muon
undertakes as it passes through a volume, it assumes the muon scatters just once, at a
single point. It is assumed that the initial and final tracks of the muon are known, and
therefore their entry and exit paths can be extrapolated back to their point of closest
approach. Since scattering has been assumed to occur in a single location, the tracks
can be thought of as points moving along two fixed lines in space. PoCA represents the
position where these two tracks reach their closest possible distance, with the scattering
point being the midpoint between these two lines.
(a) Generate an N × N × N grid over the inspected volume and split into L × L
× L voxels. Establish a cartesian co-ordinate system in three dimensions with z
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Fig. 3.3 Comparison of the CRY generated, two modified Gaisser parameterisation and exper-
imental data muon spectra at sea level for two different zenith angles. Red open circle - 0 deg
experimental [47]; red triangle - 0 deg CRY [49]; black open circle - 0 deg modified Gaisser
parameterisation used in this thesis [50]; green filled square - 0 deg a different modified Gaisser
parameterisation [100]; black filled circle - 75 deg modified Gaisser parameterisation used in
this thesis [50]; blue square - 75 deg CRY [49]; blue open circle - 75 deg experimental [56];
green hollow circle - 75 deg a different modified Gaisser parameterisation [100].
as the vertical. Measured data is position (xpos, ypos, zpos) and direction cosines
(mx, my, mz) of each of the incoming (xpos, ypos, zpos, mx, my, mz)in and outgoing
(xpos, ypos, zpos, mx, my, mz)out muon tracks (M).
(b) For i:=1 to M tracks get incoming ((xpos, ypos, zpos, mx, my, mz)in)i and outgoing
((xpos, ypos, zpos, mx, my, mz)out)i muon track data.
(c) For each muon track calculate the PoCA point using Eq. (3.2), Eq. (3.3), Eq.
(3.4) and Eq. (3.5).
(d) For each muon track calculate the scattering angle using Eq. (3.6).
(e) Add the calculated scatter angle to the PoCA voxel it resides within.
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(f) Calculate the average scatter angle for all scatter points that reside in the calcu-
lated voxel.
(g) Repeat steps c - f for all M tracks.
PoCA Mathematics
Consider two infinite lines L1: P(s) = P0 + s (P1-P0) = P0 + su and L2: Q(t) = Q0 +
t (Q1-Q0) = Q0 + tv, where a vector between points on the two lines can be created:
w(s,t) = P(s)-Q(t). In any n-dimensional space, L1 and L2 are closest at the unique
points P(sc) and Q(tc), for which w(sc,tc) achieves its minimum length. Also, for the
situation when L1 and L2 are not parallel, then the line segment from P(sc) to Q(tc)
joining the closest points becomes uniquely perpendicular to both lines at the same
time, while also being the only line segment to have this property. In other terms, the
vector wc = w(sc,tc) is uniquely perpendicular to the line direction vectors of L1 and
L2, u and v, and obtaining this vector is equivalent to satisfying the two equations: u ·
wc = 0 and v · wc = 0. This concept is shown graphically by Fig 3.4 [101].
Fig. 3.4 Points of closest approach (P(sc), Q(tc)) are the end points of the line segment where
the length of wc is at a minimum [101].
By substituting wc = P(sc)-Q(tc) = w0 + scu - tcv, where w0 = P0-Q0, into each of these
two equations we get two simultaneous linear equations:
(u ·u)sc− (u ·v)tc =−u ·w0 (3.2)
(v ·u)sc− (v ·v)tc =−v ·w0 (3.3)
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Then, letting a = u · u, b = u · v, c = v · v, d = u · w0, and e = v · w0, we solve for sc
and tc as:
sc =
be− cd
ac−b2 (3.4)
tc =
ae−bd
ac−b2 (3.5)
whenever the denominator ac − b2 is nonzero. When ac − b2 = 0, the two equations
are dependent, the two lines are parallel, and the distance between the lines is constant.
Having solved for sc and tc, through substituting each of these values into the equation
of each line (L1 and L2), we can determine the points P(sc) and Q(tc) where the two
lines L1 and L2 are closest. The PoCA point is the mid-point between these two points.
The angle between the two vectors can be calculated using the following equation:
θ = cos−1
(
a ·b
|a| |b|
)
(3.6)
where a and b are the vectors of the incoming and outgoing muon rays.
3.2.4 Simulation Parameters
Five million muons are generated over a 10 m × 10 m surface area. This corresponds
to a 5 minute exposure time. These muons are implemented into the simulations so
that the true distribution of cosmic-ray muons with respect to their energies and zenith
angles at sea level are represented. Muons are generated using the MGP (Eq. (3.1)) and
interfaced with GEANT4, which is used to simulate and track the passage of particles
through the inspected volume and detectors. A standard setup for the muon tomography
system implemented in GEANT4 is displayed in Fig. 3.2.
When using GEANT4 each volume created needs to be designated as a specific mate-
rial. For this study the total volume in which target materials are placed is designated
as being made of air, with each of the virtual detectors being comprised of a vacuum.
Detectors are comprised of a vacuum so that any muons passing through them will not
undergo any scattering. The detectors are placed above, below and at the sides of the
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volume to be inspected. They are assumed to have 100% detection efficiency, so an
idealised scenario could be simulated. For the simulations discussed in this chapter the
top and bottom detector planes are of size 7 m× 4 m and are 0.1 mm thick. This size of
detector is chosen so that all muons generated will pass through the top detector plane,
with a thickness chosen to limit the amount of time a muon will spend in each detector.
There is a distance of 4 m separating the top detector from the bottom detector. This
gap size was chosen as it is large enough to fit three 100 cm × 100 cm × 100 cm sized
blocks stacked vertically with a 50 cm gap between each block. Upon passing through
a detector the muons are tagged, with their energy, position and direction recorded.
The targets to be inspected are blocks of different sizes. These are 10 cm × 10 cm ×
10 cm, 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm or 100 cm × 100 cm × 100 cm and are made up
of low density (water, polyethylene, concrete), medium density (iron) or high density
(lead, 238U) material. Muon scattering between the two sets of detectors is assumed
to occur at a single point. This point of muon scattering is then reconstructed using
the PoCA algorithm [101]. Since the volume is not totally enclosed by detectors some
muons will be missed that pass through the sides that are not covered. Secondly, as
discussed in section 2.5, muons will lose energy as they pass through materials and can
stop within the material. Finally, muons will also sometimes undergo decay within the
total volume. Therefore in addition to missing some muons, others may stop in a target
or undergo decay within the total volume and hence be unavailable for analysis.
Only muons that pass through the top detector then either side detector, or the top detec-
tor then bottom detector, are available for analysis. Since only those muons that initially
pass through the top detector are used in the analysis, a muon plane surface area of 10
m × 10 m is chosen. The muons are generated with a z-position directly above the top
detector plane. As the muon plane is implemented directly above the top detector, a
surface area of 10 m × 10 m is large enough for muons of all angles and energies to
meet the initial criteria to be considered for analysis (passing through the top detector).
In this system it is extremely unlikely that muons with large zenith angles, which pass
through the top detector, will also interact with targets in the inspected volume. This
reduces the acceptance of the system for large zenith angle muons. Muons with large
zenith angles typically have higher energies than overhead muons. Since the amount of
scatter a muon undergoes is based on the muon energy, these large angle muons will
scatter less in a given material then muons which arrive from overhead. Therefore the
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rejection of these muons will have little impact on the ability to differentiate between
materials based on muon scattering. To incorporate these muons, an analysis system
that also uses muons which pass through a side detector then bottom detector, or side
detector to side detector, can be used. In such a system the muon plane surface area
would need to be made larger so that large zenith angle muons are not restricted.
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3.3.1 Material Segregation using Realistic Muon Momentum Spread
Table 2.5 shows the ability to distinguish between different materials using mono-
energetic muons. This section presents a similar study but using muons generated via
the MGP. Table 3.1 displays the average 3D scattering angle a muon undergoes when
it passes through a material and the reconstructed ratio for each material that has been
tested. Values are given for both the 3D scattering angle observed when propagating
5 million muons through the volume displayed in Fig. 3.2 using GEANT4 (Average
Scatter (mrad) - GEANT4), and when using Eq. (2.17) (Calculated Scatter (mrad) -
Eq. (2.17)). The reconstructed ratio is defined as the total number of muons that have
interacted with the target and been correctly reconstructed where the target is located
(correct reconstructions), divided by the total amount of muons that have interacted
with the target and are available for reconstruction (muons detected in detectors). As
discussed previously some muons that interact with the target may stop, miss a sec-
ondary detector, or decay. Therefore when calculating the average scattering angle by
muons in each target, only those muons that have both interacted with the target and
been detected in the surrounding detectors are included. As it can be seen for targets of
the same depth, higher density materials such as 238U and its possible shielding com-
ponents, such as lead or iron, are clearly distinguishable from lower density materials,
such as polyethylene, concrete or water. This clearly displays the ability of the PoCA
algorithm to categorise different densities of materials under simple systems, assuming
it is known that a muon passed through a target.
However, a feature that may cause concern is the similar average scattering angle ob-
served for low density materials with high thicknesses, against high density materials
with low thicknesses. As shown in Eq. (2.17), the amount of scattering by a muon
depends on the radiation length of the material being traversed. Through increasing the
thickness of low density materials their thickness, as measured in radiation lengths, can
become the same as high density materials. Since the amount of scattering undertaken
by a muon as it passes through a material is dependent on this quantity, materials with
the same lengths as measured in radiation lengths may result in similar scattering angles
being observed. This therefore causes concern over whether different density materials
can be clearly identified based on this measurement alone. It is generally counteracted
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through estimating the projected scattering angle distribution width per unit length.
As material density increases so does the reconstructed ratio for blocks of the same
size. Since the PoCA algorithm assumes scattering to take place at a single point, this
point will be most heavily weighted towards the object that causes the greatest degree
of scattering. In the simulations, only the block and air can contribute to the overall path
of a muon. Low density materials cause muons to undergo less scattering on average
than high density materials. It is therefore more likely that when muons interact with
air, this interaction will have greater significance on a muons overall path for systems
involving low density materials, than those involving high density materials. Hence the
reconstruction ratio increases from low density to high density materials. A secondary
feature is that the reconstruction ratio increases for larger volumes of the same mate-
rial. This is for the same reasons as discussed above. As the average scattering angle
by a muon increases with increasing thickness, the reconstructed scattering point will
become more heavily weighted towards the target as opposed to the surrounding air.
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64 Material Segregation using Muon Scattering
3.3.2 Comparison of Three Block Scenarios
The three block scenario consists of either three 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm, 50 cm
× 50 cm × 50 cm or 100 cm × 100 cm × 100 cm blocks of low density, medium
density and high density materials placed in air. Both horizontal and vertically placed
blocks, separated along with the x-plane or z-plane are tested. As in section 3.3.1,
both the average scattering angle of a muon and the reconstruction ratio for each of
the blocks within a simulation have been calculated. These tests has been conducted to
demonstrate the capability of the PoCA algorithm to accurately differentiate blocks of
materials with different densities, in simple geometries. Visual analysis is conducted
through first splitting the total geometry into 5 cm × 5 cm × 5 cm voxels. For all
muons reconstructed with PoCA in a particular voxel, the average scattering angle for
this voxel is calculated. Only those voxels that have three or more muon scattering
points reconstructed within it are included in the analysis. This is done for two reasons.
Firstly through using at least three muon scattering points per voxel, it helps account
for any large scattering angles that may have been calculated through incorporating it
into an average. Secondly, muon scattering points are more likely to be reconstructed
where targets are located. Therefore through using three or more it helps remove re-
constructed scatter points from the volumes surrounding the targets, where no targets
are located. 3D images are plotted with a colour gradient based on the scattering angle
observed in each voxel. All voxels with an average scattering angle of less than 1◦
are made transparent. The transparency of the voxels then decreases uniformly until
all those voxels with an angle greater than 8◦ are completely solid. Full results for all
three block scenarios are given in Table 3.2. Fig. 3.5 displays the ability to distinguish
different density materials in a horizontal system along with a schematic of the system.
The schematic is not drawn to scale. Water (right) is centred at x = 150 cm, y = 0 cm,
z = 0 cm, 238U (middle) at x = 0 cm, y = 0 cm, z = 0 cm and iron (left) at x = -150 cm,
y = 0 cm, z = 0 cm. As shown by Table 3.2, under this configuration approximately the
same amount of muons will interact with each block.
The PoCA reconstruction of the three block scenario shows similar results to that of the
one block under the same conditions. All blocks of size 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm and
100 cm × 100 cm × 100 cm have been clearly reconstructed, with each of the different
density materials being clearly distinguishable from one another. For blocks of size 10
cm × 10 cm × 10 cm, iron and 238U have been clearly reconstructed, whereas water
cannot be detected above the background. This is due to the low number of muon tracks
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(a) Schematic for the three block set-
up with iron (left), 238U (middle) and
water (right).
(b) PoCA reconstruction for 10 cm ×
10 cm × 10 cm blocks.
(c) PoCA reconstruction for 50 cm ×
50 cm × 50 cm blocks.
(d) PoCA reconstruction for 100 cm
× 100 cm × 100 cm blocks.
Fig. 3.5 Reconstructed image of the three block scenario where blocks are separated along the
x-axis. Blue circles represent targets that have been reconstructed. Red circles represent targets
that have not been reconstructed.
reconstructed where the target is located, which is caused by additional scatters in air.
From Table 3.1 (and Eq. (2.17)) the average scatter of a 4 GeV muon passing through
water of depth 10 cm is 1.7 mrad. In the setup used for these simulations, muons that
pass through a block of 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm water will also traverse a minimum
of 390 cm of air. The average scatter of a 4 GeV muon passing through air (X0 = 37.1
g/cm2) of depth 390 cm, when using Eq. (2.17), is 0.322 mrad. As muons scatter less
in water then higher density materials (assuming the same depth) the additional scatters
from air have a larger weight to the total scatter of a muon through the system. This
is reflected in the reconstruction ratio of a block of water of size 10 cm × 10 cm × 10
cm. From Table 3.2 it is only 0.09. The combination of fewer muon tracks correctly
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reconstructed where the target is located, along with the condition for reconstruction
of a voxel requiring 3 or more muon tracks to be reconstructed within it, demonstrates
an inability to reconstruct small, low density materials. This shows a limitation of the
PoCA algorithm. However, since most shielding that will be used consists of higher
density materials such as iron or lead, the inability to correctly reconstruct small blocks
of low density materials does not offer too much concern.
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68 Material Segregation using Muon Scattering
A secondary concern is the build up of multiple scattering points in volumes where
targets are not located, which have scattering angles similar to that of high density mate-
rials. This effect is mainly due to the interactions of muons with air. Through requiring
multiple voxels with high average scattering angles to be located close together, it can
be determined whether these voxels are attributed to high density materials or whether
they are a product of occasional high scatters in air.
There is also a build-up of multiple voxels in volumes that surround where a target is
located, with this effect more apparent for high density materials. This ‘blurring’ is
caused by the inherent nature of the PoCA algorithm in which scattering is assumed to
have occurred at a single point, with this point weighted towards the element that caused
the greatest scatter to occur. As a muon path consists of multiple small deviations, the
reconstructed scattering point can end up occurring close to but outside the voxels oc-
cupied by the target. As most muons arrive from angles close to directly overhead, and
the PoCA point must lie somewhere along the incoming muon tracks trajectory, this
effect is more noticeable along the vertical axis as opposed to the horizontal. Overall
this system again displays the success of PoCA at reconstructing simple scenarios, with
the capabilities and issues discussed consistent with previous results [3].
A three block scenario was also run in which the blocks were stacked vertically. This
type of scenario is significantly different from previous simulations and looks to ex-
plore the difficulties PoCA has been shown to have in reconstructing vertical objects,
compared to how it performs with non-vertical systems [3]. The reconstruction uses
the same materials as before where 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm, 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm
and 100 cm × 100 cm × 100 cm blocks of iron (top) centred at x = 0 cm, y = 0 cm, z
= 80 cm, 238U (middle) centred at x = 0 cm, y = 0 cm, z = -50 cm and water (bottom)
centred at x = 0 cm, y = 0 cm, z = -180 cm were placed between four sets of detectors.
A schematic and results for the reconstruction of this geometry is shown in Fig. 3.6.
The schematic is not drawn to scale.
The PoCA reconstruction shows both the capabilities and issues of the PoCA algorithm.
Once again all 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm and 100 cm × 100 cm × 100 cm blocks are
clearly distinguishable from both the background and each other, while the 10 cm ×
10 cm × 10 cm block of water is again not visible against the background. As it can
be seen in Fig. 3.6, many scattering points have been reconstructed in the volumes
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(a) Schematic for the three block set-
up with iron (top), 238U (middle) and
water (bottom).
(b) PoCA reconstruction for 10 cm ×
10 cm × 10 cm blocks.
(c) PoCA reconstruction for 50 cm ×
50 cm × 50 cm blocks.
(d) PoCA reconstruction for 100 cm
× 100 cm × 100 cm blocks.
Fig. 3.6 Reconstructed image of the three block scenario where blocks are stacked vertically.
Blue circles represent targets that have been reconstructed. Red circles represent targets that
have not been reconstructed.
between where targets are located, with the effect becoming more apparent as material
size increases. Despite the correct reconstruction of all of the targets (except 10 cm ×
10 cm × 10 cm of water) this effect creates the propensity for the misclassification of
low density, medium density or even high density materials in volumes where no tar-
gets are located. As mentioned previously due to the nature of the PoCA algorithm the
reconstructed scattering point will be most heavily weighted towards the element that
causes the greatest amount of scattering to occur. As muons arrive from overhead, for
vertically stacked targets a muon is likely to interact with and scatter in more than one
target. This can cause the scattering point to be reconstructed in the volumes between
where these targets are located. This effect is demonstrated in Fig. 3.7 where three
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separate test cases are considered. Test case a considers two volumes of same density
and equal size. Test case b considers two volumes of equal size but with a high density
volume placed above a low density volume. Test case c considers the opposite of test
case b. For muons that pass through same size, same density materials (test case a) the
Fig. 3.7 Illustration of why the reconstruction of multiple muon scattering points can occur
outside a target material when passing through multiple targets. For simplicity muon tracks are
shown to only scatter once within the target it is passing through.
amount of scattering that occurs within each target will tend to be the same. This will
in turn result in the muon scattering point being incorrectly reconstructed between the
two targets. As the density of one target increases relative to the second (test case b and
c) the amount of scattering caused by the higher density target will increase, causing
the reconstructed scattering point to tend to lie towards this target. This effect of scat-
tering points being incorrectly reconstructed is confirmed by the reconstruction ratios
measured in all targets in the vertical scenario as compared to the horizontal scenario.
From Table 3.2 the reconstruction ratio, and therefore the amount of correctly recon-
structed muon scattering points within a target, is slightly higher for all materials in the
horizontal system over the vertical. The majority of those muons that have been ‘lost’
represent ones that have been reconstructed in the volumes between where the targets
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are located, as is shown in Fig. 3.7.
In realistic systems, multiple detector planes are placed around the inspected volume
and a line fitting algorithm is used reconstruct the muons incoming and outgoing tra-
jectory. In these systems the inherent position resolution of the detector will determine
how accurately a muon track can be reconstructed. As resolution decreases the uncer-
tainties in the line fit lead to vertical uncertainties in the calculated PoCA point. The
uncertainties in the line fit become the dominant source of error in where a PoCA point
is reconstructed (as opposed to the multiple deviations adding up). To counteract the
line fit uncertainties, detectors can either be placed further apart or additional detectors
can be used. Both these solutions have their positives and negatives. More detectors
provide additional muon data points, but also increase the cost and complexity of the de-
tector system. Increasing the distance between detectors will decrease the uncertainty
in the line fit, but will also increase the overall inspection volume. This in turn will
increase the complexity of the system and reduce the total number of muons passing
through the inspected volume and therefore being available for analysis.
72 Material Segregation using Muon Scattering
3.4 Summary
This chapter has discussed the initial concept of muon scattering tomography and the
performance of the PoCA reconstruction technique in detecting different materials.
Muon scattering tomography represents a feasible technique in detecting high density
materials, such as shielded HEU, with the ability to locate and distinguish different
density materials in simple geometries being demonstrated. However, since the PoCA
algorithm only assumes scattering to occur at a single point it fails to take into account
the actual physics of multiple scatterings that will be taking place. Upon the introduc-
tion of clutter this may result in multiple muon tracks being incorrectly reconstructed
and therefore hinder the ability to detect shielded nuclear materials. In addition to this,
due to the nature of the cosmic-ray muon spectrum, materials surrounded with verti-
cal clutter may result in erroneous scatters being reconstructed in volumes where no
materials are located, thus increasing the probability for false positives to occur.
Chapter 4
Material Segregation using Stopping
Muons
In this chapter an overview of the concept of muon capture coupled to the production
of secondaries is given in section 4.1. Section 4.2 displays the validity of GEANT4
when applied to muon capture and the processes that occur. Using GEANT4 the mul-
tiple physical processes that arise when µ− and µ+ stop in different density materials
has been investigated. This study is presented in section 4.3. A discussion of the sec-
ondaries produced when muons stop within a material and how they can be used to
distinguish different materials then concludes this section. Following this, section 4.4
will present and discuss a new reconstruction algorithm that uses 3D line extrapolation
of muons, which disappear in the inspected volume. Material differentiation using this
new reconstruction algorithm in single and three block systems are tested. These tests
are done for full energy spectrum muons in 5 minute exposure times. Scenarios are
tested assuming 100% detector coverage and efficiencies and realistic detector cover-
age and efficiencies. Section 4.5 summarises the work presented.
4.1 Concept
As muons pass through a material they undergo energy losses via ionisation and µ−
can be captured on the orbital of a nucleus. This capture is followed by the release of
muonic X-rays as the µ− cascades down the energy levels towards to nucleus. Upon
reaching the nucleus µ− can be absorbed resulting in the production of excess neutrons
and γ-rays via spallation or fission events. The process of absorption on the nucleus
competes against decay whilst in the orbital. High-Z materials such as HEU and its
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shielding components are more likely to absorb a µ− than low-Z materials. Therefore
the disappearance of a µ− coupled to the detection of either prompt neutrons or γ-
rays represents a strong signature for high density and nuclear materials, which can
distinguish them from lower density clutter. Unlike µ−, µ+ cannot be captured on an
orbital. Upon stopping in a material µ+ will always undergo decay. Muons used for
analysis are those that are recorded in the top set of detectors but not in any subsequent
set. For techniques that require the detection of a secondary, the disappearance of a
muon must be coupled to the subsequent detection of either a prompt neutron or prompt
γ-ray. If multiple muons meet this criteria, the identification of high density materials
is made through ascertaining regions within the inspected volume where multiple muon
disappearances have occurred. It should be noted that all simulations in this Chapter
use GEANT4.9.6-p02 (unless otherwise specified) with the ‘Shielding 2.0’ physics list.
All realistic muons used have been generated using the MGP. A full description of these
two packages has been given in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
4.2 Testing the Validity of GEANT4
The accuracy of GEANT4 for µ− capture and subsequent secondary production has
been tested through measuring the neutron multiplicity and lifetime of muons when
stopping in different elements. Simulation runs generated 10,000 muons at the centre
of 1 cm× 1 cm× 1 cm blocks of different elements. These muons were given an initial
energy of 1 eV so that all stopped within the target material. Both positive and negative
muons were tested with all subsequent particle production that occurred recorded.
4.2.1 Neutron Multiplicity from Muon Capture
In general the process of µ− absorption on a nucleus results in the production of a
neutrino, a secondary residual nucleus and a transfer of energy to the residual nucleus:
µ−+(Z,A)→ (Z−1,A)∗+νµ (4.1)
Bobodyanov [102] has demonstrated that the general trend of υ (= average number of
neutrons per capture) is approximately described by the empirical function given in Eq.
(4.2):
υ = αA1/3 (4.2)
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where Bobodyanov gives α = 0.30 ± 0.02 [102].
However, this increase in the average multiplicity of neutrons is only a rough descrip-
tion. As discussed in section 2.5.3, due to particular nuclear structure effects, the devi-
ations from the smooth line that this formula predicts, can be quite large.
Table 4.1 displays the average neutron multiplicity observed per µ− capture. Simula-
tions were run using GEANT4-9.6p02, where 10,000 µ− were generated at the centre
of 1 cm × 1 cm × 1 cm targets of different density materials. The average multiplicity
calculated using GEANT4 is given along with comparisons to experimental [68] and
theoretical [69, 102] values. Muons were given a starting energy of 1 eV so that all
stopped within the inspected target. The target in which muons were generated was
made into a sensitive volume (GEANT4 detector) so that the production processes of
all secondary neutrons were recorded. Table 4.2 displays the total number of µ− cap-
tures, µ− decays, the total amount of secondary neutrons produced and the total amount
of secondary neutrons produced by µ− capture. Only those neutrons produced directly
via µ− capture were used when calculating the average neutron multiplicity given in
Table 4.1. It should be noted that not all muons will be captured by a nucleus upon
stopping within a material. Some will undergo decay. Therefore, of the 10,000 muons
that stop within a material only a portion of these will capture and produce secondary
neutrons. Other neutron production processes that occur include neutron inelastic scat-
tering, photon inelastic scattering and fission (for nuclear materials).
The average multiplicity of neutrons for 235U and 238U show reasonable agreement be-
tween simulations run in GEANT4.9.6-p02 with the ‘Shielding 2.0’ physics list and
those from literature. For neutron multiplicities of non-nuclear materials, some dis-
crepancy is observed between simulations when compared to literature. Although the
general trend is consistent with values from literature (when taking into account the nu-
clear structure of different elements), there is a systematic underestimation of the num-
ber of neutrons emitted per µ− capture for non-nuclear materials. However, since low
density materials will not undergo neutron production via µ− absorption as frequently
as nuclear materials and due to the accuracy observed for the multiplicities of nuclear
materials, it was concluded that GEANT4.9.6-p02 with the ‘Shielding 2.0’ physics list
would be used. A secondary reason for this is demonstrated in Table 4.3. Table 4.3 dis-
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Table 4.1 A comparison between experimental and GEANT4.9.6-p02 results of the µ−
capture neutron multiplicity when generating 10,000 muons of 1 eV at the centre of 1
cm × 1 cm × 1 cm blocks of various materials. Given are the multiplicities measured
using GEANT4, Eq. (4.2) and found in literature.
Material Mass (A)
Number
Atomic (Z)
Number
GEANT4 Eq. (4.2) Literature
Aluminium 27 13 0.71 ± 0.01 0.90 ± 0.06 1.26 ± 0.06 [68]
Silicon 28 14 0.34 ± 0.01 0.91 ± 0.06 0.86 ± 0.07 [68]
Calcium 40 20 0.24 ± 0.01 1.03 ± 0.07 0.75 ± 0.03 [68]
Iron 56 26 0.96 ± 0.01 1.15 ± 0.08 1.12 ± 0.04 [68]
Silver 108 47 1.33 ± 0.01 1.43 ± 0.10 1.61 ± 0.06 [68]
Gold 197 79 1.19 ± 0.01 1.75 ± 0.12 1.66 ± 0.04 [68]
Lead 207 82 1.31 ± 0.01 1.77 ± 0.12 1.71 ± 0.07 [68]
235U 235 92 2.51 ± 0.01 1.85 ± 0.12 2.4 [69]
238U 238 92 2.33 ± 0.01 1.86 ± 0.12 2.2 [69]
Table 4.2 Total number of µ− captures, µ− decays, secondary neutrons and secondary
capture neutrons when generating 10,000 muons of 1 eV at the centre of 1 cm × 1 cm
× 1 cm blocks of various materials.
Material Stopping Capture Decay Total Neutron muMinusCaptureAtRest
Muons Muons Muons Production Neutrons
Aluminium 10,000 6058 3942 5039 4273
Silicon 10,000 6466 3534 2500 2177
Calcium 10,000 8485 1515 2226 2125
Iron 10,000 9116 884 12687 8704
Silver 10,000 9631 369 20901 12820
Gold 10,000 9726 274 19911 11559
Lead 10,000 9722 278 14289 12736
235U 10,000 9718 282 205290 24351
238U 10,000 9739 261 51517 22670
plays the µ− capture neutron multiplicity of iron, lead, 235U and 238U for the different
versions of GEANT4 available. All other versions of GEANT4 have a discrepancy in
the multiplicities observed for non-nuclear materials and for nuclear materials. There-
fore no other versions of GEANT4 that are available, offer more accurate results than
the version that is used here.
4.2.2 Muon Lifetime Measurements
The average lifetime of an unbound muon is well known to be ≈ 2200 ns. At this time
a muon will undergo decay via Eq. (2.23). For µ− captured onto an atomic orbital the
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Table 4.3 A comparison between the different versions of GEANT4 and experimental
results of the µ− capture neutron multiplicity when generating 10,000 muons of 1 eV
at the centre 1 cm × 1 cm × 1 cm blocks of various materials.
GEANT4 Version Physics List Iron Lead 235U 238U
9.5 0.1 1.48 ± 0.01 1.32 ± 0.01 1.64 ± 0.01 1.52 ± 0.01
9.5 1 1.47 ± 0.01 1.33 ± 0.01 1.65 ± 0.01 1.53 ± 0.01
9.6-p02 0.1 1.43 ± 0.01 1.39 ± 0.01 1.63 ± 0.01 1.51 ± 0.01
9.6-p02 2 0.96 ± 0.01 1.31 ± 0.01 2.51 ± 0.01 2.33 ± 0.01
Literature Results [68], [69] 1.12 ± 0.04 1.71 ± 0.07 2.4 2.2
process of decay competes against µ− absorption by the nucleus. Eq. (4.3) gives the
Bohr radius. The Bohr radius (a0) is equal to the most probable distance between the
proton and electron in a hydrogen atom in its ground state.
a0 =
4πε0h¯2
mee2
(4.3)
where ε0 is the permittivity of free space, h¯ is the reduced Planck’s constant, me is the
electron rest mass and e is the electric charge carried by an electron.
It can be seen that the Bohr radius is dependent on the mass of an electron. Due to the
increased mass of a muon over its electron counterpart, when a µ− becomes captured on
the orbital of a nucleus, this increased mass acts to push its orbit closer to the nucleus.
For electrons a0 = 5.3 × 10−11 m, whereas for muons a0 = 2.56 × 10−13 m. As Z
number increases so does the radius of the nucleus. Due to the ‘pushing’ of the µ− on
its orbital, for some high density materials such as uranium, the ground state (1s) orbital
resides within the nucleus itself. When captured in an outer orbital a µ− will cascade
down the energy levels to the 1s state in ≈ 10−13 s. Since the nuclear radius increases
with Z number, so does the probability of a µ− finding itself within the nucleus when
reaching this state. This in turn increases the probability for µ− absorption by the
nucleus and therefore reduces the characteristic lifetime of a µ−. At some critical value
of Z, the muon Bohr radius will lie inside the nuclear radius. The mean nuclear radius
can be approximated by,
R = R0A1/3 (4.4)
where R is the mean nuclear radius, R0 ≈ 1.2 × 10−15 m and A is the atomic mass
number. The approximate point at which the muon Bohr radius will overlap the mean
nuclear radius is calculated using Eq. (4.3) and Eq. (4.4). This line is demonstrated on
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Fig. 4.1 and occurs at Z ≈ 45. Fig. 4.1 demonstrates the average lifetime of negative
muons when captured on nuclei. The results show a comparison between experimental
measurements [103] and those calculated using GEANT4.9.6-p02. Good agreement is
observed and it is clearly evident that as Z number increases the lifetime of a muon
decreases. Since µ+ will not be captured on the orbit of a material, upon stopping
within a material a µ+ will always decay with a lifetime of ≈ 2200 ns.
Fig. 4.1 Average lifetime of µ− when captured on various nuclei. The results show a
comparison between experiment measurements [103] (trend line) and those calculated using
GEANT4.9.6-p02 (black circles). Also given is the point at which the muon Bohr radius equals
to mean nuclear radius (dashed red line).
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4.3 GEANT4 Simulations on Distinguishing Between Dif-
ferent Density Materials
4.3.1 Simulation Parameters
The following simulations in GEANT4.9.6-p02 involved vertically propagating either
500,000 µ+ or 500,000 µ− through several 10 cm× 10 cm× 10 cm blocks of different
materials. This was done to study the energy distribution of secondary particles with
adequate statistics, both before and after a timing cut of 1 µs was made. The materials
tested were water, iron, lead, 235U and 238U. Both 235U and 238U were tested as they
emit differing levels of neutrons and γ-ray energies that may act as a marker for the
detection of HEU. Detectors have been placed completely around the target so that it
is fully encompassed. These detectors are assumed to be 100% efficient, and detect
any neutrons or γ-rays that are produced within the simulation. The particles have been
tagged as they pass through the detectors with their name, energy, parent, position,
timing, momentum direction and process of production recorded. The target being in-
spected was made into a sensitive volume (GEANT4 detector) so that the production
processes of all secondary neutrons and γ-rays were recorded.
Muons were positioned 1 mm above the target to be inspected and propagated vertically
into the target. Two types of simulation (for both µ+ or µ−) have been conducted. The
first used muon source energies of 0.1 eV, to ensure all 500,000 µ+ or µ− stopped
within the inspected target. The second used muon source energies of the full energy
spectrum. For full energy spectrum generated muons, five million muons were gener-
ated using the MGP discussed in section 3.2.2. This was done so that the full spectrum
with respect to their energies and angles were represented, hence muon source ener-
gies ranged from 100 MeV to 1000 GeV. Of these five million muons with realistic
energies and angular distribution, 500,000 were randomly selected. Their realistic di-
rections were then ignored and instead they were vertically propagated into the target
to be inspected.
4.3.2 Gamma-ray and Neutron Spectra
Secondary neutrons and γ-rays have been analysed for muons with a fixed energy of 0.1
eV and full energy spectrum muons, of both charges. Energy spectra for each of these
four studies, both before and after a timing cut is made have been plotted. A timing cut
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of 1 µs is taken. 1 µs is used as it represents a realistic cut for which prompt neutrons
and γ-rays can be detected when coupled to the disappearance of a muon, whilst also
minimising the probability of an erroneous neutron or γ-ray from the environment,
causing a false reading.
Stopped Muons
The dominant process of neutron production occurs when stopped µ− are absorbed, re-
sulting in µ− induced fission or spallation. As discussed, negative muons will cascade
down the orbital levels to the nucleus on times scales of the order 10−13 s. This cascade
is coupled to the release of Auger electrons and muonic X-rays, which are unique for
different elements. These muonic X-rays are a result of the movement down the energy
levels on an atomic orbital. Fig. 4.2 shows the theoretical and experimental values
expected for muonic X-rays with respect to Z [65] for the 2p1/2 → 1s1/2 and 3d5/2 →
2p3/2 transitions. The high energies are due to the increased mass of the µ− over its
electron counterpart. Due to their intrinsically high energies, muonic X-rays produced
will have no issues in overcoming any self-absorption or shielding present and therefore
their detection represents a clear signal of the material that produces it. The process of
µ− capture is regulated by the ‘muMinusCaptureAtRest’ process in GEANT4.
For µ−, after capture on the orbital the process of absorption on the nucleus competes
against decay in the orbital. As mentioned in section 4.2.2, the probability of a µ− be-
ing absorbed by the nucleus increases as Z number increases. The process of decay can
cause the nucleus to become unstable, with neutrons and γ-rays released through de-
excitation to subsequent spallation products. These ‘de-excitation’ γ-rays are of interest
since they are unique to the elements that produce them. While lower energy γ-rays can
be attenuated by self-shielding or intentional shielding, those with energies greater than
3 MeV have significant energy to penetrate any shielding present. These γ-rays are of
particular interest, since there are no naturally occurring γ-rays of this energy or higher.
Secondary processes that produce neutrons include photo-nuclear and neutron-nuclear
interactions. For example, electrons that are produced from the decay of a µ− in the
orbital, can undergo bremsstrahlung, producing γ-rays. These γ-rays can then interact
with a nucleus resulting in further production of neutrons and γ-rays.
For nuclear materials fission can occur when neutrons interact with the target nuclei,
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Fig. 4.2 Muonic X-rays as a function of Z for theoretical (curved lines) and data (circles) values
[65].
thus creating an additional source of neutrons and γ-rays. After undergoing fission, any
daughter products can also undergo radioactive decay, which adds an additional source
of secondary particles. A final process that can occur is the capture of a neutron onto
a nucleus, which doesn’t result in fission. This process is mitigated by the ‘nCapture’
process in GEANT4 and results with the nucleus being left over in an excited state. Re-
laxation to the ground state will occur through the emission of a γ-ray. An example of
this process is the capture of a neutron onto a 235U nucleus resulting in the production
of 236U in an excited state. 236U will release a γ-ray of energy 6.545 MeV to get back
to the ground state, before undergoing radioactive decay through to 208Pb, where it re-
mains stable. Since radioactive decay can occur over timescales of seconds to years,
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Fig. 4.3 Secondary γ-ray spectrum from 4 MeV - 8 MeV, for stopping µ− in cubes of water
(blue), iron (yellow), lead (black), 235U (red) and 238U (green) after the timing cut is made.
through taking a timing cut of 1 µs most of the signals observed from radioactive decay
are removed.
The 6.545 MeV γ-ray described is demonstrated in Fig. 4.3. Fig. 4.3 displays the γ-ray
spectrum from 4 MeV - 8 MeV, for stopping µ− in cubes of water (blue), iron (yellow),
lead (black), 235U (red) and 238U (green) after the timing cut is made. The 6.545 MeV
line produced in 235U represents an attractive signature for HEU detection. In addition
to this line there is also a γ-ray peak located at 6.035 MeV for both 235U and 238U.
This peak is due to the instantaneous release of muonic X-rays as a µ− cascades down
the energy levels to reach the 1s state. The full γ-ray spectrum for stopping muons is
displayed in Fig. 4.5. Due to their high penetrating power muonic X-rays represent an
attractive signature for HEU detection.
Upon stopping within a material µ+ will not become captured on the orbital of the ma-
terial. Instead µ+ will always undergo decay within the material, which leads to the
production of positrons in the MeV range. These positrons will release γ-rays through
bremsstrahlung and can also interact with nuclei, leading to the production of neutrons
and secondary spallation products. Finally, positrons and electrons can annihilate re-
sulting in the production of two 0.511 keV γ-rays.
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Muons with Full Energy Spectrum
Full energy spectrum muons undergo neutron and γ-ray production through the same
processes as their stationary counterparts. As discussed their initial energies range from
100 MeV to 1000 GeV. Due to their high initial energies fewer stop within each mate-
rial than low energy muons, hence a lower production rate is observed. Both the 6.545
MeV and the 6.035 MeV γ-ray peaks displayed in Fig. 4.3 are observed in the γ-ray
spectrum produced when propagating full energy spectrum µ− through the same ma-
terials. These peaks are produced by via the same processes described for stopping
muons. They have a much lower intensity as fewer µ− will stop in each material. This
is shown in Fig. 4.4.
Fig. 4.4 Secondary γ-ray spectrum from 4 MeV - 8 MeV, for full energy spectrum µ− (range
100 MeV to 1000 GeV) in cubes of water (blue), iron (yellow), lead (black), 235U (red) and
238U (green) after the timing cut is made.
As discussed in section 2.5.1, upon interacting with a target, muons in the energy range
100 MeV to 1000 GeV will primarily undergo energy loss via ionisation with the sub-
sequent release of electrons. The rate of energy loss by muons has been discussed in
section 2.5.1, with this rate described for a number of materials by Fig. 2.17. The en-
ergy loss for muons can be approximated as 2 MeV per g/cm2. For blocks of uranium,
which have a density of 18.95 g/cm3, muons of energy 100 MeV will range out within
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0.0264 cm, whereas muons of energy 1000 GeV require a depth of 264 m.
Electrons released as muons undergo ionisation will have higher energies on average
than those that are produced via the decay of a muon. Gamma-rays produced when
these electrons undergo bremsstrahlung, will have a higher endpoint energy than γ-rays
produced via electron bremsstrahlung from decay muons. This causes a higher endpoint
energy for γ-rays to be observed for cosmic muons over their stopped counterparts.
Gamma-rays can also be produced through muon bremsstrahlung, with this process
more likely to occur in high density materials. Due to the much lower capture rate,
there are fewer neutrons and γ-rays produced when full spectrum muons interact with
target materials, than there are for stopping muons. A secondary process for production
also occurs, which is defined in GEANT4 as ‘muonNuclear’. This is where energetic
muons collide directly with a nucleus resulting in a transfer of energy and subsequent
excitation of the nucleus, from which excess neutrons, γ-rays and spallation products
are produced.
Table 4.4 demonstrates the total number of neutrons produced via each GEANT4 pro-
duction process for both stopping µ− and µ+ and spectrum µ− and µ+. The conclu-
sions of the study presented in section 4.3 are that the dominant source of initial neutron
production come from µ− capture at rest, with this process more apparent for nuclear
materials than those of a lower density. Further neutron production occurs when neu-
trons produced via µ− capture interact with atomic nuclei. For non-nuclear material the
dominant process of secondary neutron production occurs via neutron inelastic scatter-
ing, whereas for nuclear materials secondary neutrons are primarily produced through
fission. For µ+, capture will not occur. Therefore the dominant source of primary neu-
tron production comes from photon inelastic scattering with a nucleus (PhotonInelas-
tic). The increased production rate of neutrons observed for 235U over other materials is
of particular interest as it represents a signal that can be used to distinguish 235U from
other materials. The average neutron energies for muon-induced fission of 235U and
238U have been found to be 2.24 MeV and 2.05 MeV respectively.
Additional signals that can be used to differentiate materials are the characteristic γ-
rays emitted upon µ− capture. Table 4.5 displays a number of these γ-ray peaks along
with their GEANT4 production process. While low energy γ-rays are unfavourable due
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to attenuation via self or intentional shielding, there are multiple high energy muonic X-
rays produced from µ− captured on the orbital of a nucleus. These X-rays are produced
as the captured µ− cascades down the energy levels to the 1s state and represent high
energy, unique signatures for different elements. There has been much experimental
work conducted into deducing the muonic X-ray intensities for different elements. The
energies of muonic X-rays displayed in Fig. 4.5, Fig. 4.6, Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8 are
consistent with values obtained experimentally [104–106]. In each of these figures the
γ-ray and neutron spectra for the materials tested has been superimposed on top of one
another.
As displayed in Fig. 4.5, Fig. 4.6, Fig. 4.7 and Fig. 4.8, given a high resolution
detector, with a large detection area and adequate statistics, the detection of nuclear
materials through measuring these muonic X-rays is apparent. Unfortunately for the
realistic applications discussed in this thesis, the detection of shielded HEU is required
to occur under shorter time scales (5 minutes), with low resolution plastic scintillator
detectors that are currently in use at ports. The inherent resolution of plastic scintillator
detectors prevents the ability to accurately resolve different γ-ray peaks. Instead we
must rely on techniques that measure the disappearance of a muon in coincidence with
the detection of a secondary product. For this there are a number of techniques that can
be considered, given the range of secondaries that are produced. These are:
1. Muon disappearance.
2. Muon disappearance coupled with prompt neutron detection.
3. Muon disappearance coupled with prompt γ-ray detection.
4. Muon disappearance coupled with the detection of a prompt γ-ray of energy > 3
MeV.
5. Muon disappearance coupled with prompt neutron or prompt γ-ray detection.
6. Muon disappearance coupled with the detection of a prompt neutron or prompt
γ-ray of energy > 3 MeV.
Section 4.4.3 will discuss the capability of differentiating between materials using each
of the different techniques available.
In reality the cosmic ray muon spectrum will be around half positive and half negative
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muons. Fig. 4.9 displays the γ-ray and neutron spectra when combining the results of
both full energy spectrum µ− and full energy spectrum µ+ before and after a timing cut
is made. From Fig. 4.9 it is clear that the characteristic γ-ray lines, which represent 235U
and 238U, are still observable. There is also still a higher production rate for neutrons
observed for 235U and 238U over non-nuclear materials.
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4.4 Material Segregation using Realistic Momentum Spread
4.4.1 Simulation Parameters
Muons generated over a 10 m × 10 m area were propagated through a box made of
air that housed a single 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm or 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm block
of different density materials. Muons were generated using the MGP and implemented
so that the full muon energy spectrum and momentum distribution were used. Muon
detectors comprised of gaseous material (65% Argon, 30% CO2 and 5% CF4) were
placed above, below and at two of the sides of the volume to be inspected. Detectors
are 2 cm thick with a distance of 4 m separating the lower most top detector and the
upper most bottom detector. Simulations have been run using five detectors per set with
detectors in each set spaced 25 cm apart. The detectors operate with perfect resolution.
A schematic of the set-up used is shown in Fig. 4.10. Results are given for 5 million
muons, which represents approximately a 5 minute exposure time.
For muon disappearance tomography only those muons that pass through the top set of
detectors, and no subsequent set, are used for analysis. The muons are generated with
a z-position directly above the top detector plane. As the muon plane is implemented
directly above the top detector, a surface area of 10 m × 10 m is large enough for
muons of all angles and energies to meet the initial criteria to be considered for analysis
(passing through the top detector). In this system it is extremely unlikely that muons
with large zenith angles, which pass through the top detector, will also interact with
targets in the inspected volume. This reduces the acceptance of the system for large
zenith angle muons. Muons with large zenith angles typically have energies greater
then overhead muons. Since muon disappearance tomography requires a muon to lose
all its energy and stop within the inspected volume, this process is less likely to occur
for higher energy muons. Therefore the rejection of these muons will have little impact
on the ability to differentiate between materials based on muon disappearance. To
incorporate these muons, an analysis system that also uses muons which pass through
a side detector then disappear, could be used. In such a system the muon plane surface
area would need to be made larger so that large zenith angle muons are not restricted.
All secondary particles produced were recorded in detectors that are placed around the
geometry to be inspected. These detectors are 0.1 mm thick, made out of vacuum and
assumed to be 100% efficient. Upon passing through these detectors the ID, name,
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Fig. 4.10 Standard set-up for the muon tomography system (not to scale). The spacing between
detectors is 25 cm with 5 detectors per set.
process of production, energy, position, parent, time and momentum direction of any
secondary particles are recorded.
4.4.2 Tomographic Reconstruction for Muon Disappearance To-
mography
Reconstruction for the technique described in this section (section 4.4) is done using a
technique similar to a branch of tomography known as algebraic based computed to-
mography [107]. This type of reconstruction technique is used when a large number
of incoming tracks are not available, or when these tracks are not uniformly distributed
over 180◦ or 360◦. For cases involving nuclear detection using stopped cosmic-ray
muons in a defined time limit, both of these criteria are not met, hence reconstruction
is considered using this technique. For simplicity it is demonstrated from a 2D view-
point, before extending the case to 3D. Fig. 4.11 illustrates some target volume f(x, y)
contained within an object area, in which a uniform square grid is superimposed over
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the top of it. To begin with, it is assumed that the target volume f(x, y) is constant in
each cell since in reality we are unaware of where the target may be. We define N as
the total number of pixels, with the jth pixel defined by a constant of value f j.
Fig. 4.11 Illustration of how an object area is sampled when passing muon tracks through it.
For a muon to be considered for analysis it must have been detected in all detectors in
the top set and not detected exiting in any subsequent set. Detectors are located at four
sides of the inspected volume. Any muons that are not detected exiting the volume can
be assumed to have disappeared somewhere within the inspected volume (via decay or
absorption), or exited where no side detectors are located. The rate of absorption or
decay in air surrounding the target will remain fairly constant, independent of target
material. However, since the probability of a µ− being absorbed increases with atomic
number (Z), as target Z increases from low to high, more µ−s that interact with the
target will be absorbed and therefore disappear. Due to the low rate at which muons
cascade upon the Earth, individual muons can be tracked one at a time. For muons that
have disappeared, the top detectors will have recorded an initial position and direction
of the muon track. Incoming muon tracks are reconstructed using a 3D least-square
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regression fit. If it is assumed the muon travels in a straight line we can extrapolate its
path from the top detector, to where it would have exited the volume had it not disap-
peared. In order to reject side-exiting muons at the two sides where no detectors are
located, if the extrapolated track passes out of these sides, then it will be removed from
the analysis in order to remove any biasing towards these areas occurring.
As M muon tracks meet the disappearance criteria and pass through the total volume,
each track will pass through a number of individual voxels. For example, as the ith
track passes through the inspected volume, its fractional path length through each voxel
it passes through is recorded. Each extrapolated muon track can be expressed as a set of
weights (wi j), which represent the fractional path length of the ith track through voxel
j. The fractional path length is defined as the ratio between the distance covered by an
extrapolated muon track in a particular voxel, divided by the maximum distance a track
can cover in each voxel. It is therefore a dimensionless quantity. As each extrapolated
muon track passes through the inspected volume, the fractional path length of the track
in each voxel is recorded. For voxels that have multiple muon tracks passing through
them, all individual fractional path lengths recorded in each voxel are added together.
The final signal represents the total fractional path length recorded for a set of M tracks
passing through an inspected volume of set N voxels. The total fractional path length
is defined as the summation of all fractional path lengths for a set of M muon tracks
in a particular voxel. Cosmic ray muons will lose more energy within voxels of higher
density materials than lower density materials. This in turn will cause more muons to
stop within these volumes of high density materials. Therefore those voxels that have
higher total fractional path lengths will represent volumes where the most muon disap-
pearances have occurred and in turn high density materials.
For techniques that involve the disappearance of a muon plus the detection of a sec-
ondary, only those muon tracks that meet the criteria for each technique are used when
calculating the total fractional path length per voxel. It should be noted that since a
muon path is assumed to travel in a straight line, the reconstruction algorithm fails to
take into account any scatters that may occur along its trajectory. Voxel sizes used for
this study are 5 cm × 5 cm × 5 cm. Voxels of this size have a maximum length in
which a muon track can traverse of 8.66 cm.
(a) Generate an N × N × N grid over the inspected volume and split into L × L ×
L voxels. Establish a cartesian co-ordinate system in three dimensions with z as
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the vertical. Measured data is position (xpos, ypos, zpos) and direction cosines (mx,
my, mz) of each of the incoming (xpos, ypos, zpos, mx, my, mz)in muon tracks (M).
(b) For i:=1 to M tracks that pass through the top detector but are not recorded in any
subsequent detector (lateral or bottom), get incoming ((xpos, ypos, zpos, mx, my,
mz)in)i muon track data.
(c) For each muon track extrapolate its trajectory through the inspected volume had
it not disappeared, using a 3D least-squares regression fit.
(d) Calculate the voxels the extrapolated muon track would have passed through us-
ing Eq. (4.5), Eq. (4.6) and Eq. (4.7).
(e) Calculate the distance travelled by the extrapolated muon track through each
voxel it would have passed through using Eq. (4.8).
(f) Divide the distance calculated by the maximum distance an extrapolated track
could pass through in a single voxel. This quantity if known as the fractional
path length.
(g) Add the calculated fractional path length of each individual voxel to that voxel.
This quantity is known as the total fractional path length.
(h) Repeat steps c - g for all M tracks.
Mathematics of Reconstruction Code
As the total inspected volume is split into a series of voxels, this volume (in which
a muon track passes through) can be thought of as a series of planes that a line may
pass through. To determine the fractional path length in each voxel, we need to find the
position on a plane where a line, with given initial position and direction, intersects. The
amount of distance traversed per voxel is then determined through finding the distance
between two points - the initial point and the point at which the line intersects the plane.
A line is described by all points that are a given direction from an initial point. Thus
the parametric form of a line can be described by any of the two positions (x0 and x1)
along the line:
r(t) = (x0,y0,z0)+ t[(x1− x0),(y1− y0),(z1− z0)] = (x0,y0,z0)+ tu (4.5)
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where t is a real number and u = (x1− x0,y1− y0,z1− z0), represents the direction of
the line. The equation of a plane can be given as:
ax+by+ cz+d = 0 (4.6)
The line will intersect the plane only once at some unique point (Px, Py, Pz) provided
the line and plane are not parallel. This position is determined through substituting the
equation of a line (Eq. (4.5)) into Eq. (4.6), in order to determine t:
a(x0+ tux)+b(y0+ tuy)+ c(z0+ tuz)+d = 0 (4.7)
Since values for (x0, y0, z0) (initial position) and u (direction vectors) are known it is
simply a case of rearranging to determine t. Once t is determined this value is substi-
tuted back into Eq. (4.5), to determine the point of intersection. The distance between
the initial point of the line and where it intersects the plane is then calculated using Eq.
(4.8):
Distance = [(Px− x0)2+(Py− y0)2+(Pz− z0)2]1/2 (4.8)
4.4.3 Material Segregation using Muon Capture
As described in section 4.3.2, material segregation using muon disappearance can be
split into 6 different techniques. Each technique involves the disappearance of a muon
coupled to the detection of various prompt secondaries. The main premise behind each
of these techniques is that as material density increases, more muons will stop within
a target material and more secondaries will be produced. Therefore the disappearance
of multiple muons in coincidence with the detection of a prompt secondary, represents
a clear signature of high density material. Fig. 4.12 displays the fractional number of
decays and absorptions plus various prompt secondaries per muon interaction, when
propagating 5 million muons through a volume that contained 10 cm× 10 cm× 10 cm
or 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm blocks of different density materials.
The ability to differentiate between materials using solely muon disappearance, or any
techniques that involve muon disappearance plus prompt neutron detection is apparent
for either sized blocks. Nuclear materials, its shielding components and low density ma-
terials are all clearly identifiable from one another. However, for techniques involving
detection of prompt γ-rays of any energy or of energies > 3 MeV, only low density ma-
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(a) 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm blocks.
(b) 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm blocks.
Fig. 4.12 Fractional number of decays and absorptions plus various prompt secondaries per
muon interaction in 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm (top) and 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm (bottom)
blocks of different density materials.
4.4 Material Segregation using Realistic Momentum Spread 101
terials can be identified from nuclear or shielding type components (typically medium
or high density). This is due to the high level of γ-rays observed from iron upon µ−
capture, making iron indistinguishable from high density and nuclear materials. The
observed high levels are caused by the effects of self-shielding. Despite more γ-rays
being produced as Z increases, in higher density and higher-Z materials, low energy
γ-rays are more likely to undergo significant energy losses and be reabsorbed by the
target material. If we consider a 3 MeV γ-ray generated at the centre of a block of
size 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm, this γ-ray is required to travel at least 5 cm to exit the
material. The intensity of γ-rays exiting a material is given by:
I = I0e−µx (4.9)
where I is the intensity of γ-rays exiting, I0 is the initial intensity, µ is the mass at-
tenuation coefficient in units cm2/g and x is the depth of material in units g/cm2. For
γ-rays of energy 3 MeV passing out of 5 cm of iron or 238U, Eq. (4.9) gives the fraction
escaping as 24.12% for iron and 1.48% for 238U. Therefore even though more γ-rays
are produced when neutrons interact with 238U, much fewer escape the target to be
available for detection. This effect creates a propensity for the misclassification of nu-
clear material when using techniques that involve the detection of γ-rays. Despite this,
the ability to differentiate between materials is apparent for all techniques that involve
muon disappearance plus secondary detection.
4.4.4 Comparison of Three Block Scenarios
Verification of the muon disappearance algorithm to locate and differentiate between
materials has been tested. Systems involved placing three 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm or
three 50 cm× 50 cm× 50 cm blocks of water (low density), iron (medium density) and
238U (high density) within the inspected volume shown in Fig. 4.10. For the tests it is
assumed that the location of each target material is known a priori. Fifty million muons
were propagated through the inspected volume, with the results presented scaled to 5
million. This represents approximately a 5 minute exposure time. The rest of the in-
spected volume was made of air. Both horizontal and vertical systems have been tested
with blocks separated along with the x-plane or z-plane. For the horizontal system wa-
ter (right) is centred at x = 150 cm, y = 0 cm, z = 0 cm, 238U (middle) at x = 0 cm, y =
0 cm, z = 0 cm and iron (left) at x = -150 cm, y = 0 cm, z = 0 cm. For vertical systems
iron (top) was centred at x = 0 cm, y = 0 cm, z = 80 cm, 238U (middle) centred at x = 0
cm, y = 0 cm, z = -50 cm and water (bottom) centred at x = 0 cm, y = 0 cm, z = -180 cm.
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Analysis is conducted through splitting the total geometry up into 5 cm× 5 cm× 5 cm
voxels. The total fractional path length in each of the voxels occupied by the targets is
calculated and a 3D image plotted. The colour gradient of this image is based on the
total fractional path length.
In addition to techniques that solely rely on muon disappearances, as discussed pre-
viously, upon stopping within a material muons can produce secondary neutrons and
γ-rays. This effect is more likely to occur for higher-Z(A) materials than lower-Z(A)
materials for the same column density and thus represents a strong signature for possi-
ble nuclear materials and its shielding. For the detection of secondary signatures, 100%
detector coverage and efficiency is assumed. In each of these systems the probability
of detecting a background neutron or γ-ray in coincidence with a muon disappearance
is considered to be negligible. Estimations of this background are given at the end of
this section. In total six different techniques that involve muon disappearance coupled
to the detection of a secondary are tested.
For each of the three block scenarios, Table 4.6 gives a description of each of the tech-
niques that were tested. Table 4.7 displays the total number of muons within each target
that met the criteria required to be considered for 3D line extrapolation.
Table 4.6 Description of each of the techniques tested for muon disappearance tomog-
raphy.
Technique
Number
Description
#1 Muon disappearance.
#2 Muon disappearance coupled with prompt neutron detection.
#3 Muon disappearance coupled with prompt γ-ray detection.
#4 Muon disappearance coupled with the detection of a prompt γ-ray
of energy > 3 MeV.
#5 Muon disappearance coupled with prompt neutron or prompt γ-ray detection.
#6 Muon disappearance coupled with the detection of a prompt neutron
or prompt γ-ray of energy > 3 MeV.
Gamma-rays of this energy > 3 MeV were chosen, as there are no naturally occurring
γ-rays whose energies exceed this value. Therefore the subsequent detection of γ-rays
of this energy represents a clear indication that something within the inspected volume
has produced it. The total amount of muon disappearances, coupled to the detection of
a prompt secondary, within the air surrounding the targets is also given. This represents
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a total volume of 10 m × 10 m × 10 m (minus the volume the target occupies) and
is defined in Table 4.7 as ‘Air’. With an approximate muon energy loss of 2 MeV per
g/cm2, muons in air will lose ≈ 0.0025 MeV per cm. This in turn leads to an energy
loss of ≈ 2.5 MeV when traversing 10 m of air (density = 0.001225 g/cm3). There-
fore muons that disappear within the air surrounding the target are unlikely to have lost
sufficient energy to stop but instead will have undergone decay. The error given is the
error on the mean for 50 million muons, scaled down to represent 5 million muons.
Table 4.7 Total number of muon disappearances plus secondary detection in each of the
targets and rest of the inspected volume (air) for 100% detector coverage and efficiency.
See Table 4.6 for a description of each of the techniques tested.
Target Technique 1 Technique 2 Technique 3 Technique 4 Technique 5 Technique 6
10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm horizontal setup
Water 3.8 ± 0.6 0 1.2 ± 0.3 0.2 ± 0.15 1.2 ± 0.3 0.2 ± 0.15
Iron 16.2 ± 1.3 3.8 ± 0.6 11.1 ± 1.1 4.2 ± 0.6 14.9 ± 1.7 8.0 ± 1.2
238U 28.4 ± 1.7 11.4 ± 1.1 12.4 ± 1.1 7.0 ± 0.8 23.8 ± 1.9 18.4 ± 1.9
Air 1860 ± 15 0 195 ± 4 65 ± 3 195 ± 4 65 ± 3
10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm vertical setup
Water 2.6 ± 0.5 0 0.8 ± 0.3 0.2 ± 0.15 0.8 ± 0.3 0.2 ± 0.15
Iron 17.0 ± 1.3 2.7 ± 0.5 11.6 ± 1.1 3.6 ± 0.6 14.3 ± 1.6 6.3 ± 1.1
238U 30.4 ± 1.7 10.8 ± 1.0 12.8 ± 1.1 6.7 ± 0.8 23.6 ± 2.7 17.5 ± 1.8
Air 1860 ± 15 0 200 ± 5 70 ± 3 200 ± 5 70 ± 3
50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm horizontal setup
Water 390 ± 6 1.4 ± 0.4 190 ± 4 40 ± 2 191.4 ± 4.4 41.4 ± 2.4
Iron 1925 ± 15 540 ± 7 695 ± 8 155 ± 4 1235 ± 15 695 ± 11
238U 3510 ± 20 990 ± 10 685 ± 8 180 ± 4 1675 ± 18 1170 ± 14
Air 1860 ± 15 0 195 ± 5 65 ± 3 195 ± 5 65 ± 3
50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm vertical setup
Water 380 ± 6 0.8 ± 0.3 190 ± 4 45 ± 2 190.8 ± 4.3 45.8 ± 2.3
Iron 1920 ± 15 490 ± 7 700 ± 9 160 ± 4 1190 ± 16 650 ± 11
238U 3420 ± 20 970 ± 10 695 ± 8 185 ± 4 1665 ± 18 1155 ± 14
Air 1855 ± 15 0 205 ± 5 70 ± 3 205 ± 5 70 ± 3
50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm blocks in the horizontal set-up
Fig. 4.13 displays visual analysis for the 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm horizontal scenario
for each of the six techniques discussed. Voxels of 5 cm × 5 cm × 5 cm are used
with the total fractional path length calculated for each of the voxels occupied by the
targets. Only those voxels occupied by the targets are plotted. Fig. 4.14 displays the
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total fractional path lengths measured in the voxels occupied by each of the targets, for
each of the six techniques discussed.
Technique 1: Muon disappearance
Reconstruction of the three 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm block horizontal scenario using
muon disappearance is given in Fig. 4.13. This demonstrates the success of the muon
disappearance algorithm to correctly detect volumes where targets are positioned, if the
initial position of the targets is known. The results are supported with Fig. 4.14, which
shows the total fractional path length recorded for each voxel where the 50 cm × 50
cm × 50 cm blocks are located. Different density materials can be differentiated from
one another using the total fractional path length observed per voxel. This demonstrates
the potential of the muon disappearance algorithm to differentiate materials from one
another, if target position is known. In reality the location of any targets within an
inspected volume will not be known. For such a system, a threshold cut on the total
fractional path length will have to be made, where voxels below this cut are not plotted.
As displayed in Fig. 4.14 there is some overlap in the total fractional path length ob-
served in voxels for iron and 238U. In a system where target location is not known, this
may result in occasional misclassification of medium-Z (iron) targets as high-Z (238U).
Technique 2: Muon disappearance coupled with prompt neutron detection
As shown in Table 4.7, for both iron and 238U, multiple muon tracks meet the criteria
of stopping within the material and producing neutrons. These materials are correctly
reconstructed and as shown in Fig. 4.13, can be clearly differentiated from one another.
Water is not reconstructed. This is due to the low number of muons that stop within
water and produce neutrons. From Table 4.7, only 1.4 ± 0.4 muon tracks meets this
criterion. Due to the low probability of neutrons being produced from µ− capture in
water, this target is not identified using this technique. This indicates a potential abil-
ity of this technique to accurately locate nuclear materials, but not those low-density
materials that can make up clutter. From Fig. 4.14 there is once again a large overlap
between the total fractional path length distributions of iron and 238U. In realistic sys-
tems where target location is not known, dependant on the threshold cut taken, this may
lead to the misclassification of medium-Z targets as high-Z.
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Techniques 3 and 4: Muon disappearance coupled with prompt γ-ray detection
(technique 3) of energy > 3 MeV (technique 4)
As shown in Fig. 4.13, there is clear identification of all three targets. However, an is-
sue with these techniques is the inability to differentiate medium density targets (iron)
from high-density targets (238U). This is indicated in both Table 4.7 and Fig. 4.14.
From Table 4.7, the number of muons that have disappeared coupled to the detection of
a prompt γ-ray is similar for iron and 238U. This results in the average total fractional
path length of the voxels occupied by iron, to be similar to those voxels occupied by the
238U target. This effect is due to the self-shielding effects of 238U (described in more
detail in section 4.4.3) and is confirmed when analysing the total fractional path length
observed per voxel in Fig. 4.14. More muons are stopped within 238U than iron and
therefore more γ-rays are produced in total. However, due to the higher density of 238U,
more γ-rays reabsorbed by the target and therefore fewer are available for detection.
The capability to detect the three blocks was also considered when using muon disap-
pearance coupled to the detection of prompt γ-rays with energies > 3 MeV (technique
4). Unlike other techniques the position of water is not clearly defined. This is due
to the smaller number of muon tracks that met the analysis criteria for this technique.
Similar to technique 3, another issue is the inability to differentiate between iron and
238U. This is again due to the self-shielding effects of 238U. A γ-ray will undergo greater
energy losses as it exits 238U than if the same γ-ray exited iron. Therefore many of the
γ-rays generated with energies > 3 MeV in 238U will have lost sufficient energy before
detection to no longer be above the 3 MeV threshold.
Techniques 5 and 6: Muon disappearance coupled with prompt neutron or prompt
γ-ray detection (technique 5) of energy > 3 MeV (technique 6)
Finally, the capability to detect the three targets when both prompt neutrons and prompt
γ-rays can be used as secondaries to detect is tested. Similar to previous techniques that
utilise the detection of either of these secondaries, the positions of iron and 238U are
clearly identified. Unlike techniques that only involve the detection of prompt γ-rays,
due to the inclusion of muon disappearance coupled to prompt neutron detection, this
system is able to differentiate between iron and 238U.
The capability to detect the three targets when both prompt neutrons and γ-rays > 3
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MeV can be used is also considered. As with techniques that use either of these secon-
daries, the ability to locate medium and high-density materials is apparent. However,
due to the inclusion of neutrons both medium and high-density materials can be differ-
entiated from one another.
Once again with these two techniques there is significant overlap between he total frac-
tional path length distributions of iron and 238U, which may cause target misclassifica-
tion in systems where target location is not known a priori.
Other systems
For both horizontal and vertical 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm set-ups, the number of muon
tracks required to pass through the muon disappearance algorithm for each of the tech-
niques for reconstruction to be made, needs to be ≈ 11 or above. From Table 4.7, due
to this criterion water is not reconstructed for any of the techniques. For 10 cm × 10
cm× 10 cm blocks of iron, technique 1 (muon disappearances), technique 3 (muon dis-
appearance coupled to prompt γ-ray detection) and technique 5 (muon disappearance
coupled to prompt neutron or prompt γ-ray detection) have enough muon tracks for re-
construction to be made. The inability of technique 2 (muon disappearance coupled to
prompt neutron detection), technique 4 (muon disappearance coupled to prompt γ-ray >
3 MeV detection) and technique 6 (muon disappearance coupled to prompt neutron or
γ-ray > 3 MeV detection) to reconstruct 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm blocks of iron, is due
to the low number of muon tracks available (less than 11). Finally, it can be seen from
Table 4.7 that for 238U all techniques except technique 4 (muon disappearance coupled
to prompt γ-ray detection > 3 MeV) have enough muon tracks available for detection
to be made in this scenario.
Fig. 4.15 and Fig. 4.16 display the results for each of the techniques discussed when
considering 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm blocks stacked vertically. Similar results to the
horizontal set-up were observed, however water was reconstructed for technique 2. This
is due to the nature of the muon disappearance algorithm, whereby some extrapolated
muon tracks from iron or 238U also pass through where the water target is located, thus
skewing the results. This is discussed in greater detail in the next section. All materials
can be distinguished from one another when using techniques 1, 2, 5 and 6. For tech-
niques 3 and 4 there is again a difficulty in differentiating between iron and 238U. A
difference of note is the reconstruction of 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm blocks of water for
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technique 2 with the vertical scenario, which does not occur for the horizontal scenario.
Since muons arrive from directly overhead, for vertically stacked targets each extrap-
olated muon track is likely to pass close to or even through more than one target. As
additional muon tracks pass through materials, the total fractional path length of each
voxel occupied by a target will increase. This in turn may cause the misclassification
of low or medium density materials as high density. Overall if 100% detector coverage
and efficiencies are assumed (with no background), the ability to detect and distinguish
different materials for a number of techniques using the muon disappearance algorithm
has been demonstrated.
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Potential Issues of the muon disappearance algorithm
For an extrapolated muon track, it is known that the muon will have disappeared some-
where along this track. However since it is unknown where, disappearance is just as
likely to have occurred at the start of the track than at the end. Volumes where multiple
muon tracks meet will indicate more probable regions where a muon has disappeared.
However, this feature will cause a significant amount of blurring to occur around the re-
gions where targets are located. Since muons arrive from directly overhead this blurring
will most predominately occur above and below the volumes where targets are located
and be more apparent for vertical clutter scenarios.
Fig 4.17 illustrates the potential issues connected with the muon disappearance algo-
rithm. Reconstruction of the 50 cm horizontal (top) and 50 cm vertical (bottom) sce-
narios, when voxels with total fractional path lengths < 4 (left), total fractional path
lengths < 8 (middle) and total fractional path lengths < 12 (right) are made transpar-
ent, are presented. These transparency cuts are chosen to remove voxels in volumes
surrounding where targets are located, and to demonstrate what sort of cuts need to be
made in order to discriminate different density materials. For the horizontal scenarios
it is clear that, dependent on the transparency cut made, there is the build-up of erro-
neous voxels around volumes where targets are located. This causes the propensity for
the misclassification of volumes where no targets are located, as medium or even high
density materials.
The issue is even more prevalent in vertical clutter scenarios. Since muons arrive from
directly overhead, for vertically stacked targets, each extrapolated muon track is likely
to pass close to, or even through more than one target. As additional muon tracks pass
through materials, the total fractional path length of each voxel occupied by a target
will increase. This in turn may cause the misclassification of low or medium density
materials as high density. This feature is demonstrated if we consider the detection of
50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm blocks of water. It can be seen for horizontal scenarios that
blocks of water are not reconstructed when voxels with total fractional path lengths less
than 4 are made transparent. However, when considering the vertical scenario, water
is reconstructed when voxels with total fractional path lengths less than 4 and 8 are
made transparent. This demonstrates how different density materials can be built up
and misclassified based on this feature and represents a possible limitation of the 3D
disappearance algorithm, when considering vertical clutter scenarios. In addition to
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this, multiple voxels will be built up in the regions between targets. This can cause the
misclassification of these regions as medium or high density materials. This feature is
demonstrated in Fig. 4.17.
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4.4.5 Three Block Scenarios with Reduced Detector Coverage
In reality, the detection of secondaries will not be done using 100% detector coverage
with 100% efficiencies. For realistic detector coverage, four PVT scintillator detectors
of dimensions 180 cm × 35 cm × 6 cm and eight pressurised 3He tubes of dimensions
2 cm radius and 55 cm length are placed around the inspected volume. Realistic detec-
tor coverage and efficiencies were used and simulations were run to test the capability
of each of the techniques presented, to detect each target in the three block scenar-
ios. Muons were generated over a 10 m × 10 m surface area and propagated through
the inspected volume. 2.52 m2 detector area was taken for γ-ray detection and 0.287
m2 for neutron detection. Despite more efficient neutron detectors being commercially
available for the detection of MeV neutrons (e.g. liquid scintillators), 3He detectors
were used as they represent the primary neutron detectors currently in use at ports. A
GEANT4 schematic of the setup used is demonstrated in Fig. 4.18. Detectors were
located in the x-plane at (± 1.75 m, 0, 0). The same starting random seed was used for
the simulations with realistic detector coverage and efficiencies, as for those run with
100% detector coverage with 100% efficiencies. Neutrons were considered ‘detected’
if the interaction with 3He yielded the production of tritium plus a proton. Gamma-rays
were considered detected if the interaction with the scintillator produced an electron of
any energy.
Table 4.8 displays the total number of muons within each target that met the criteria
for 3D line extrapolation, when using realistic detector coverage and efficiencies. For
neutron detection of all energies this efficiency is equal to ≈ 1.3%. For γ-rays of all
energies detector efficiency is equal to ≈ 67%. For both horizontal and vertical 10
cm × 10 cm × 10 cm set-ups, the number of muon tracks required to pass through
the muon disappearance algorithm for each of the techniques for reconstruction to be
made, needs to be ≈ 11 or above. It is apparent for 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm block
systems, no technique that requires the detection of a secondary is capable of detecting
any of the targets present when using the detector coverage and efficiencies described
earlier in this section. From Table 4.8, when the detection of a secondary is not required
(technique 1), both iron and 238U are able to be reconstructed for both horizontal and
vertical scenarios. These results suggest that given simple scenarios, 10 cm × 10 cm
× 10 cm blocks of 238U are able to be identified and distinguished from other density
materials by using muons that disappear within the target volume. No techniques that
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Fig. 4.18 GEANT4 schematic of the inspected volume. Two PVT γ-ray detectors and four
3He neutron detectors are located at the sides of the targets to be inspected. Muon detectors are
located above, below and at two of the sides of the volume to be inspected.
require the detection of a secondary are able to detect any density material.
For both horizontal and vertical 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm set-ups, the number of muon
tracks required to pass through the muon disappearance algorithm for each of the tech-
niques for reconstruction to be made, also needs to be ≈ 11 or above. From Table 4.8
it is apparent that when the detection of a secondary is not required (technique 1) all
targets are able to be identified and distinguished from one another. For 50 cm × 50
cm × 50 cm horizontal scenarios, when techniques require the detection of a prompt
secondary, no techniques are able to detect blocks of water or iron. For blocks of 238U
only muon disappearance coupled to the detection of a prompt γ-ray (technique 3 and
technique 5) has enough associated muon tracks for detection to be made. Similar to the
horizontal scenario, for 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm vertical scenarios, when techniques
require the detection of a prompt secondary, no techniques are able to detect blocks of
water. For blocks of iron or 238U only muon disappearance coupled to the detection of
a prompt γ-ray (technique 3 and technique 5) has enough associated muon tracks for
detection to be made.
Table 4.9 shows the amount of detector coverage needed for each technique that re-
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Table 4.8 Total number of muon disappearances plus secondary detection in each of
the targets and rest of the inspected volume (Air) for realistic detector coverage and
efficiency. See Table 4.6 for a description of each of the techniques tested.
Target Technique 1 Technique 2 Technique 3 Technique 4 Technique 5 Technique 6
10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm horizontal setup
Water 3.8 ± 0.6 0 0 0 0 0
Iron 16.2 ± 1.3 0 0 0 0 0
238U 28.4 ± 1.7 0 0 0 0 0
Air 1860 ± 15 0 1.1 ± 0.3 0.7 ± 0.3 1.1 ± 0.3 0.7 ± 0.3
10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm vertical setup
Water 1.6 ± 0.5 0 0 0 0 0
Iron 17.0 ± 1.3 0 0 0 0 0
238U 30.4 ± 1.7 0 0 0 0 0
Air 1860 ± 15 0 1.6 ± 0.4 0.4 ± 0.2 1.6 ± 0.4 0.4 ± 0.2
50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm horizontal setup
Water 390 ± 6 0 1.2 ± 0.3 0.2 ± 0.15 1.2 ± 0.3 0.2 ± 0.15
Iron 1925 ± 15 0 10.1 ± 1.0 1.9 ± 0.4 10.1 ± 1.0 1.9 ± 0.4
238U 3510 ± 20 0 15.2 ± 1.2 2.1 ± 0.5 15.2 ± 1.2 2.1 ± 0.5
Air 1860 ± 15 0 1.2 ± 0.3 0.4 ± 0.2 1.2 ± 0.3 0.4 ± 0.2
50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm vertical setup
Water 380 ± 6 0 1.3 ± 0.4 0.3 ± 0.2 1.3 ± 0.4 0.3 ± 0.2
Iron 1920 ± 15 0 21.2 ± 1.5 3.2 ± 0.6 21.2 ± 1.5 3.2 ± 0.6
238U 3420 ± 20 0 28.4 ± 1.4 4.1 ± 0.6 28.4 ± 1.7 4.1 ± 0.6
Air 1855 ± 15 0 1.1 ± 0.3 0.3 ± 0.2 1.1 ± 0.3 0.3 ± 0.2
quires the detection of a secondary (either neutron or γ-ray), to accurately locate each
50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm target, when using realistic detector efficiencies. The cov-
erage is given in m2. From Table 4.8, for both 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm horizontal
and vertical systems, techniques that involve solely the detection of neutrons, or γ-rays
with energies > 3 MeV, or combinations of the two, are not capable of detecting any
of the targets when using realistic detectors. This indicates that these techniques will
not work under realistic detector coverage and efficiencies. Furthermore, no amount of
detector coverage will allow the detection of water using these techniques. When con-
sidering the detection of a secondary neutron, in order to detect iron a detector coverage
of 3.3 m2 is required. To detect 238U, a detector coverage of 2.2 m2 is required. For
techniques that require the detection of γ-rays with energies > 3 MeV, the detection of
iron requires a coverage of 69.8 m2 for horizontal scenarios and 47.1 m2 for vertical
scenarios. For the detection of 238U, a detector coverage of 47.1 m2 is required for the
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horizontal setup, whereas 40.5 m2 is required for the vertical.
For those techniques that involve the detection of prompt γ-rays there are a number of
muon tracks associated with this. However, due to the low number of muons avail-
able to pass to the muon disappearance algorithm, only blocks of 50 cm × 50 cm ×
50 cm 238U can be identified for the horizontal scenario. Both iron and 238U can be
identified for the vertical scenario. While this appears to be a promising result for this
technique, for realistic scenarios that involve the detection of shielded nuclear materi-
als in cargo containers, nuclear targets of this size will not be available. Secondly there
will be many more additional muon disappearances coupled to the detection of prompt
γ-rays that will act to mask this signal. These additional signatures are due to muons
that stop within the cargo container walls and components of the lorry. Finally, it has
already been demonstrated in section 4.4.3 that techniques which involve the detection
of prompt γ-rays, struggle to differentiate between medium and high-density materials.
For these reasons this technique will not be considered under realistic conditions. To
detect iron in the horizontal scenario a detector coverage of 3.0 m2 is needed, whereas
water cannot be reconstructed even with 100% detector coverage.
Table 4.9 Detector coverage area (in m2) required for the detection of each target, when
using a technique that requires the detection of a secondary. See Table 4.6 for a descrip-
tion of each of the techniques tested.
Target Technique 2 Technique 3 Technique 4 Technique 5 Technique 6
50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm Horizontal Setup
Iron 3.3 3.0 69.8 3.0 (γ-ray) 69.8 (γ-ray)
238U 2.2 2.5 47.1 2.5 (γ-ray) 47.1 (γ-ray)
50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm Vertical Setup
Iron 3.3 2.2 47.1 2.2 (γ-ray) 47.1 (γ-ray)
238U 2.2 1.8 40.5 1.8 (γ-ray) 40.5 (γ-ray)
Background Calculation
The background rate of neutrons and γ-rays at sea level has been calculated using
GEANT4.9.6-p02. The primary source of background neutrons comes from cosmic-
rays. 50 million cosmic-ray neutrons, generated over a 10 m × 10 m surface area
were propagated through the inspected volume. This inspected volume contained four
PVT γ-ray scintillators and eight 3He neutron detectors, configured like radiation portal
monitors. The total neutron count was measured in the neutron detectors for 50 million
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cosmic-ray neutrons. This was then converted to a count rate, which represents a 5
minute exposure time. From CRY [49], a 5 minute exposure time is equal to 850,000
cosmic-ray neutrons, generated over a 10 m × 10 m surface area. Table 4.10 displays
the total amount of neutrons detected in all detectors and the amount of neutrons de-
tected in each individual detector, for both 50 million cosmic-ray neutrons and 850,000
cosmic-ray neutrons. The error given is that of the mean for 50 million, scaled to
850,000. Since ≈ 2000 muon disappearances occur within the inspected volume every
5 minutes, there are 2000, 1 µs windows after a muon has disappeared for an erroneous
neutron to be detected. From Table 4.10 the number of background neutrons detected
within a 5 minute exposure time is 41.1 ± 0.8. For realistic detector coverage and effi-
ciency this count rate results in the total amount of background neutrons detected in a
1 µs window after a muon disappearance as ≈ 0.0003.
Table 4.10 Number of neutrons detected in each 3He detector, when propagating 50
million cosmic-ray neutrons through the inspected volume.
Detector Number in 50 million Number for 5 min exposure
1 260.0 ± 16.1 4.4 ± 0.3
2 324.0 ± 18.0 5.5 ± 0.3
3 278.0 ± 16.7 4.7 ± 0.3
4 354.0 ± 18.8 6.0 ± 0.3
5 290.0 ± 17.0 4.9 ± 0.3
6 310.0 ± 17.6 5.3 ± 0.3
7 298.0 ± 17.3 5.1 ± 0.3
8 306.0 ± 17.5 5.2 ± 0.3
Total 2420.0 ± 50.0 41.1 ± 0.8
For γ-rays the primary source of background radiation comes from 238U and 232Th nu-
clei decay, in the Earth’s surface. The amount of each radioisotope present within the
Earth’s surface varies with location. When calculating the background γ-ray rate, it is
assumed there are 1 ppm of 238U and 6 ppm of 232Th present in the surface [108]. Sim-
ulations placed four PVT γ-ray scintillators and eight 3He neutron detectors, configured
like radiation portal monitors, above 1000 cm× 1000 cm× 20 cm of rock. In the rock,
238U and 232Th nuclei were randomly positioned. These nuclei then underwent radioac-
tive decay, with γ-rays that penetrate to the surface detected by the PVT scintillators.
One billion disintegrations of 238U and 232Th nuclei were simulated, with the results
then scaled to the equivalent of a 5 minute exposure time. The error given is that of the
mean for 1 billion disintegrations, scaled to the number of disintegrations that represent
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5 minutes.The amount of disintegrations that represents a 5 minute exposure time is
given by Eq. (4.10), where N is the number of disintegrations required, m is the mass
of rock in kg, t is the time of exposure in seconds and dNdt represents the activity of each
isotope in the soil.
N = m× t× dN
dt
(4.10)
The density of rock is 2.7 g/cm3. Therefore the mass of rock is equal to: (2.7 g/cm3 ×
1000 cm × 1000 cm × 20 cm) = 54,000 kg. The time of exposure is 5 minutes. For
238U, 1 Bq/kg of 238U = 81 ppb 238U. Therefore, 1 ppm of 238U is equal to 12.35 Bq/kg.
From Eq. (4.10) the number of 238U disintegrations, which represents a 5 minute expo-
sure time is 2.0007 · 108. For 232Th, 1 Bq 232Th/kg = 246 ppb 232Th. Therefore 6 ppm
of 232Th is equal to 24.4 Bq/kg. From Eq. (4.10) the number of 232Th disintegrations,
which represents a 5 minute exposure time is 3.9528 · 108. Table 4.11 displays the
number of γ-rays detected in each of the PVT scintillators for this amount of disinte-
grations, for each isotope. From Table 4.11 the total amount of background γ-rays, for
a 5 minute exposure time is equal to 300,170 ± 430. For realistic detector coverage
and efficiency this count rate results in the total number of background γ-rays detected
in a 1 µs window after a muon disappearance as ≈ 2. These results would indicate the
background is not in fact negligible, therefore any techniques that would look to use
muon disappearance coupled to the detection of a prompt secondary would have to be
shielded from background neutrons and γ-rays.
Table 4.11 Number of γ-rays detected in each PVT scintillator when propagating 2.0007
· 108 disintegrations of 238U and 3.9528 · 108 disintegrations of 232Th through the
inspected volume.
Detector Number of γ-rays for Number of γ-rays for
2.0007 · 108 3.9528 · 108
disintegrations of 238U disintegrations of 232Th
1 26,320 ± 70 45,550 ± 135
2 27,690 ± 70 48,340 ± 140
3 26,210 ± 70 46,530 ± 135
4 27,130 ± 75 51,950 ± 140
Total 107,800 ± 150 192,370 ± 280
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4.5 Summary
This chapter has discussed the initial concept of muon induced fission and how it can
be applied to nuclear threat detection. The main premise of the technique is that as ma-
terial density increases, muons are more likely to lose sufficient energy to stop. Upon
stopping in a material, µ−’s can be captured onto the orbit of a nucleus. This capture
will result in the production of multiple neutrons and γ-rays, with the effect more ap-
parent for high-Z materials. Therefore the disappearance of a muon, coupled to the
detection of either prompt neutrons or γ-rays represents a clear signature of possible
high density material. Simulations have been conducted that demonstrate the valid-
ity of GEANT4.9.6-p02 with the ‘Shielding 2.0’ physics list for this process. Neutron
and γ-ray spectra have been measured when propagating 500,000 µ− and µ+ through
different density materials. These spectra illustrate the characteristic γ-rays unique to
235U and 238U that can be detected when attempting to ascertain the presence of HEU.
Of primary interest for this are muonic X-rays, which occur when µ− are captured on
the orbital of a nucleus. Muonic X-rays are emitted as the captured µ− cascades down
the orbital levels to the nucleus. For the applications discussed in this thesis, detector
coverage is required to be representative of the realistic coverage currently in use at
ports. This involves placing four plastic scintillators and eight pressurised 3He tubes
around the inspected target. The inherent resolution of plastic scintillator detectors is
not good enough to resolve different γ-ray peaks accurately. Instead we must rely on
techniques that measure the disappearance of a muon in coincidence with the detection
of a secondary product. For this approach six different techniques were tested.
The creation and performance of a new type of 3D muon disappearance algorithm in
differentiating materials has been discussed. Muon disappearance tomography repre-
sents a new technique in detecting high density materials, such as shielded HEU. Six
techniques are available for this approach. Each technique involves the disappearance
of a muon, coupled to the detection of either prompt neutrons or prompt γ-rays. For
each of the six techniques, muons that meet the required criteria have their initial track
extrapolated through the volume, to where the track would have exited had disappear-
ance not occurred. The identification of high density materials is made through ascer-
taining regions within the inspected volume where multiple muon disappearances have
occurred. For 100% detector coverage and efficiency, the ability of all six techniques to
detect different sized, different density targets in simple geometries is apparent, as long
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as background neutrons and γ-rays are accounted for. Upon the introduction of realistic
detectors, only muon disappearance is capable of detecting different density targets in
simple geometries.
Due to the nature of the 3D muon disappearance algorithm, there is the propensity for
volumes surrounding targets to be misclassified as high density materials. Since it is
unknown where a muon has disappeared within the inspected volume, disappearance is
just as likely to have occurred at the start of the track than at the end. Regions where
multiple tracks meet, represent volumes where targets are located. This results in the
build-up of multiple voxels in the volumes that surround targets. Due to the nature of
the cosmic-ray muon spectrum, this effect is more apparent in the vertical direction.
For vertical clutter scenarios multiple voxels are built up in the regions between targets.
This can cause the misclassification of these regions as medium or high density mate-
rials. Since muons arrive from above, for vertically stacked targets each extrapolated
muon track is likely to pass close too, or even through more than one target. This effect
may result in the misclassification of low density materials as medium or high density.
Chapter 5
Material Segregation using
Cosmic-Ray Muons for Empty Cargo
Container
This chapter discusses the capability of using cosmic-ray muons to detect shielded HEU
in otherwise empty cargo containers. Section 5.1 presents simulation parameters inher-
ent to all simulations in this chapter. Section 5.2 discusses the capability of muon
scattering tomography to detect five shielded HEU targets in realistic empty cargo con-
tainers. The dependence of the detector capability to detect high-Z targets in empty
cargo containers, on spatial resolution has been studied. A number of different resolu-
tions representative of gaseous and scintillator detectors are tested. The development
of a new secondary analysis algorithm that is applied to the reconstructed PoCA points
is discussed. This algorithm efficiently ascertains clusters of voxels with high aver-
age scattering angles to identify ‘areas of interest’ within the inspected volume. Using
this approach the effect of other parameters, such as the distance between detectors
and the number of detectors per set, on material detection is discussed. This results in
an optimum set-up being established. Using this optimum setup, section 5.3 displays
the capability of the muon disappearance algorithm to correctly detect five shielded
HEU targets in empty cargo containers. Section 5.4 shows the capability of detecting
five shielded HEU threats in an empty cargo container when using both muon scatter-
ing tomography and muon disappearance tomography in conjunction with one another.
Section 5.5 will summarise the work discussed.
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5.1 Simulation Parameters
Each simulation attempted to detect five 10 kg spheres (5 cm radius) of 20% enriched
uranium (20% 235U and 80% 238U) placed randomly in a cargo container of dimensions
6.058 m × 2.438 m × 2.591 m. HEU was surrounded by either lead or steel shielding.
Five million muons generated over a 10 m× 10 m area are passed through the inspected
geometry, which is equivalent to a 5-minute exposure time. The validity of this size
muon surface area is described in section 3.2.4. The thickness of the shielding was
enough to attenuate the characteristic 1.001 MeV γ-ray line emitted by 234mPa (in the
238U decay chain). A calculation for the amount of shielding required in given in section
5.1.1.
5.1.1 Shielding Calculation
When looking to detect shielded HEU the most prominent signal detected is the 1.001
MeV γ-ray emitted via radioactive decay of 238U. Therefore the concentration of 238U
within the threat material will have an effect on the amount of shielding required. 238U
emits 81 γ-rays per second per gram at 1.001 MeV [109]. The amount of shielding
required to mask this signal is dependent on a number of factors including detector
area (A), detector efficiency (ε), and background noise. The distance between detector
and target will also influence the amount of shielding, as after certain distances the
solid angle subtended (P) by the detector is likely to reduce the signal as much as any
reasonable amount of shielding would. The total signal received at the detector is a
convolution of these factors and is given by,
S = NGFP. (5.1)
N is the total number of 1.001 MeV γ-rays emitted by the target, G is a factor that
represents the fraction of γ-rays that have not scattered from self-shielding, F is a factor
that represents the fraction of γ-rays that have not scattered from intentional shielding
and P is the path loss.
Signals emitted by HEU below the background can be detected when the total counts
due to the signal exceeds the fluctuations in the background. If a source is present,
the size of fluctuations in the background grows with the square root of time, while the
signal grows linearly with time. If S is the signal received at the detector and t is the time
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over which counts are integrated, then Sεt will be the counts due to the signal, while the
standard deviation of fluctuations in the background will be proportional to (Abεt)1/2.
Therefore the signal can be detected when the average signal exceeds a multiple, m, of
standard deviations of the background,
Sεt > m(Abεt)1/2. (5.2)
Where b is the background level for 1.001 MeV photons received by the detector. The
background level for 1.001 MeV photons, for a typical (0.3 m2) sodium iodide detector,
has been measured to be 860 m−2 s−1 [109]. This value takes into account the energy
resolution (10%) and detector efficiency (0.57) of the detector. From Eq. (5.2) for a 5
minute exposure time (t = 300 s), identification of a threat will be made once the total
signal detected is greater than 630.
Monte Carlo simulations have been conducted to determine the amount of shielding
required to attenuate the characteristic 1.001 MeV γ-ray line emitted from HEU down
to background levels. Five minute exposure times were considered for both lead and
steel shielding. Simulations were run using GEANT4, where a 5 cm radius, 10 kg
sphere of 20% enriched uranium, was shielded by different thickness of either lead
or steel and placed 50 cm from a 0.3 m2 sodium iodide detector. Fig. 5.1 shows a
schematic of the simulation. For a 5 minute exposure time, 10 kg of 20% enriched
uranium will emit 1.944 · 108 γ-rays of energy 1.001 MeV. This many γ-rays were
randomly generated within the HEU sphere. Each γ-ray had a random direction and
was propagated through the target volume. The thickness of external shielding required
was enough so that detection could not be made within 5 minutes at 3 standard deviation
level. As demonstrated by Eq. (5.2), this requires the total signal received by the
detector to be less than 630. For lead shielding this requires a thickness of 7 cm whereas
for steel shielding, a thickness of 11 cm is needed. Since the background measurement
was made with 10% energy resolution, all γ-rays with energies from 0.95 - 1.05 MeV
were considered as 1.001 MeV γ-rays.
5.1.2 Simulation Package and Muon Generator
The muon energy spectrum at sea level is calculated using the parameterisation pro-
posed by Gaisser [99] modified for large zenith angles and muon decay in the atmo-
sphere (Modified Gaisser Parameterisation - MGP). Muons have been generated over a
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Fig. 5.1 Schematic of GEANT4 simulation to determine the amount of shielding required to
attenuate the characteristic 1.001 MeV line emitted by 238U down to background levels.
10 m × 10 m surface area, which is implemented into the simulations so that the true
distribution of cosmic-ray muons with respect to their energies and zenith angles at sea
level are represented. Muon energies generated using the MGP range from 100 MeV
- 1000 GeV. Muons generated from the MGP are interfaced with GEANT4, which has
been used to simulate and track the passage of particles through the inspected volume
and detectors. For these simulations GEANT4.9.6-p02 is used with the ‘Shielding 2.0’
physics list.
5.1.3 Target Geometry
A standard setup for the muon tomography system implemented in GEANT4 is dis-
played in Fig. 5.2. Detectors comprised of either scintillator or gaseous material, are
placed above, below and at the sides of the volume to be inspected. These detectors are
2 cm thick with a distance of 4 m separating the lower most top detector and the upper
most bottom detector. Scintillators have an average density of 1.032 g/cm3 and a chem-
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ical makeup of C9H10. Gaseous detectors have an average density of 0.00203 g/cm3
and consist of 65% Argon, 30% CO2 and 5% CF4. Simulations have been run using
either three or five detectors per set with detectors in each set spaced 10 cm, 25 cm
or 50 cm apart. The volume to be inspected is a lorry containing five shielded nuclear
materials in an empty cargo container.
Fig. 5.2 Standard set-up for the muon tomography system (not to scale) in which the inspected
volumes will be placed. The lorry is expected to drive into the inspected volume. The spacing
between detectors is 10 cm, 25 cm or 50 cm and there can be 3 or 5 detectors per set. The
inspected volume is a lorry pulling a shipped cargo container housing shielded HEU.
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5.2 Techniques for Muon Scattering
5.2.1 Muon Tracking
Only muons that are tracked through two sets of detectors (top-bottom, top-lateral),
and recorded within all detectors in a set, are considered for track reconstruction. Since
vehicles are required to enter and exit the inspection volume, it cannot be completely
encompassed by detectors. As such not all muons passing through the volume will
be eligible for reconstruction. Incoming and outgoing muon tracks are reconstructed
using a 3D least-square regression fit (LSR). Spatial resolution is simulated via simul-
taneously smearing the x and y co-ordinates for muons detected in the top and bottom
sets, and the x and z co-ordinates for those in the lateral detector sets. Simulations run
to mimic gaseous detector resolutions use Gaussian widths (σ ) of 0.2 mm, 1 mm and
2 mm. Those run for scintillator resolutions use Gaussian widths of 1 cm, 2 cm and 3
cm. The detectors are assumed to be 100% efficient with each detector plane having a
coverage of 7 m× 4 m. Muon scattering between the two sets of detectors has been as-
sumed to occur at a single point. This point of muon scattering has been reconstructed
using the PoCA algorithm described in section 3.2.3.
5.2.2 Analysis Algorithm
A new analysis approach has been developed that attempts to locate ‘areas of inter-
est’, which represent regions of high-Z or nuclear materials. Upon reconstruction of
the incoming and outgoing muon tracks using LSR, the PoCA algorithm presented in
Chapter 3 is used to determine the muon scatter point. As discussed previously, PoCA
points tend to form dense clouds around high-Z materials. Therefore high-Z materials
are characterised by multiple muon tracks with high scattering angles, reconstructed
within a particular volume. Our analysis takes advantage of this through using a sec-
ondary algorithm that builds upon the traditional PoCA algorithm. The geometry is
split into voxels, with the average scattering angle of all PoCA points within each voxel
calculated. Identification of clusters of voxels with high average scattering angles is
then made. By identifying dense clusters of voxels, only those volumes that have had
several muons undergo scatters with materials within the inspected volume, are used
for analysis. This approach removes voxels that are not attributed to any targets within
the inspected volume. The approach discussed, as well as all parameters presented are
calculated assuming a target size of 10 kg sphere HEU, surrounded by either 7 cm of
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lead or 11 cm of iron.
The total geometry is split into 5 cm × 5 cm × 5 cm voxels, with voxels retained for
further analysis if they have 3 or more PoCA’s reconstructed within it. Fig. 5.3 shows
an example of this, where the total lorry is clearly identified. All muons reconstructed
Fig. 5.3 Image reconstruction of the total geometry where voxels have 3 or more PoCA’s re-
constructed within it.
in voxels that are outside the cargo container are removed from the analysis. This is
demonstrated in Fig. 5.4, where it can be seen that only the voxels attributed to the
cargo container remain. The remaining volume is split into four equal sections along
the z-axis. Each section is then split up into 20 cm slices. Every 20 cm slice is analysed
so that no threats are potentially missed. For example, if the first 20 cm slice runs from
voxels 1 to 5 along the z-axis, the next slice runs from voxels 2 to 6. Fig. 5.5 displays an
example of one of these 20 cm slices, in which 5 shielded nuclear materials have been
placed where the red circles are. All voxels that have been reconstructed using solely
a PoCA algorithm are plotted. Fig. 5.5 demonstrates the limitations of techniques that
solely rely on the PoCA algorithm, as multiple voxels with high average scattering an-
gles are reconstructed in volumes where no targets are located. This is evident in Fig.
5.5 by the number of voxels plotted with high average scattering angles (red voxels in
Fig. 5.5). For targets much smaller than 20 cm × 20 cm × 20 cm, the same approach
can be used but with an alteration to the calculated optimum parameters. For example,
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Fig. 5.4 Image reconstruction of total geometry after the removal of all muons reconstructed
outside the cargo container.
instead of using 5 cm × 5 cm × 5 cm and 20 cm slices, 2 cm × 2 cm × 2 cm voxels
and 10 cm slices could be used. Such an approach would require a recalculation of
the optimum reconstruction parameters and longer CPU time, but the general sequence
described would be the same.
Every group of sixty-four voxels within each 20 cm slice is analysed using a set of
reconstruction parameters. Optimum parameters have been calculated for each of the
four sections. The total volume of hidden threat plus shielding drives the choice of 64
voxels in each group: 20 cm in each dimension. The volumes highlighted by red circles
in Fig. 5.5 represent regions where shielded nuclear materials were positioned. Due
to additional voxel build-up, these volumes are difficult to identify with certainty using
solely the PoCA algorithm. To clearly ascertain ‘areas of interest’ a second analysis
algorithm is used to locate volumes of closely related voxels with high average scatter-
ing angles. The algorithm analyses every group of sixty-four voxels within each 20 cm
slice. Groups of sixty-four voxels have a total size of 4 voxels × 4 voxels × 4 voxels
which is 20 cm × 20 cm × 20 cm. The first group of 64 voxels analysed are always in
the top left corner of the slice. This group represents voxel numbers 1 - 5 in all dimen-
sions. So that no groups of voxels are missed, if the first group of sixty-four runs from
voxels 1 - 5 (in all dimensions), the next group of sixty-four voxels analysed will run
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Fig. 5.5 Image reconstruction of one of the slices to be analysed, when propagating 5 million
muons through an empty cargo container housing 5 shielded threat materials. The red circles
represent volumes where shielded HEU were located.
from voxels 1 - 5 in two dimensions and voxels 2 - 6 in the other dimension. Fig. 5.6
shows an example of the analysis algorithm identifying the ‘areas of interest’ present in
Fig. 5.5.
Upon reconstruction for each group of sixty-four voxels within each 20 cm slice, there
are three parameters in the analysis algorithm that can be optimised. These are the min-
imum number of muons, R, reconstructed within a particular voxel to become eligible
for analysis, the number of voxels, V (out of the sixty-four), with an average scattering
angle bigger than the plane average and the plane average multiplied by some factor, M.
The parameters listed in Table 5.1 have been calculated as the optimum for detecting
all nuclear materials present in each of the sixteen simulations run for cargo containers
housing low-Z clutter (discussed in Chapter 6). These parameters give the lowest false
positive and false negative rates assuming a perfect resolution. A description of how
these parameters are calculated is given in section 5.2.3
The optimum reconstruction parameters generally increase with depth in the cargo.
Since the PoCA algorithm assumes scattering to take place at a single point, if a muon
undergoes multiple scatters this reconstructed point will be weighted towards the ele-
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Fig. 5.6 Image reconstruction of all volumes that have been extracted using the analysis algo-
rithm when propagating 5 million muons through an empty cargo container housing 5 shielded
threat materials. Those circled in red are threat materials whereas those circled in blue can be
attributed to the cargo walls.
Table 5.1 Optimum parameters determined for the detection of shielded HEU in each
section.
Section R V M
1 3 16 / 64 1.5
2 3 17 / 64 1.3
3 3 22 / 64 1.3
4 4 16 / 64 1.5
ment that caused the greatest degree of scattering to occur. The degree of scattering
depends on the target and the momentum of the muon. Upon reaching targets lower in
the cargo, muons will have already undergone multiple interactions resulting in a loss
of energy. Due to this energy loss, upon interacting with a material lower in the cargo, a
muon will undergo a greater degree of scattering than if the same muon had interacted
with the same material higher up. Furthermore, if a muon interacts with a material
lower in the cargo, it has less additional material to then pass through before exiting
the lorry. If there is less material left for the muon to pass through, the probability of
interaction with any other material is reduced. This in turn reduces the probability of
the muon undergoing a large deflection that influences the position where scattering is
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assumed to have occurred.
The combination of these two reasons cause more muons in total to be reconstructed
lower in the cargo. This is why the minimum number of muons required to be re-
constructed within a voxel, R, increases with depth. It also results in more accurate
reconstructions occurring at lower depths in the cargo and therefore why the number of
voxels with large scattering angles, V, increases with depth.
The two anomalies in this rule are: when V equals 16 / 64 for section 4 and when M
equals 1.5 for section 1. The first abnormal result (V in section 4) is due to the increase
in the minimum number of muons, R. As this quantity (R) increases, the total number
of voxels, V, required for a positive identification will decrease, as an extra muon track
per voxel is required as compared to the previous sections. The second abnormal result
(M in section 1) is most likely due to low statistics available for that section. When cal-
culating optimum parameters, 80 shielded HEU targets were placed randomly within
the cargo container. Due to the weight of shielded HEU, it is unlikely to be placed
towards the roof of the cargo, as it would need to be stacked upon something heavy.
Cargo containers for transport require an even weight distribution of the cargo. This is
unlikely to occur if two particularly heavy items are stacked together. Therefore of the
80 shielded threat materials, only 2 were placed in section 1.
(a) Generate an N × N × N grid over the inspected volume and split into L × L
× L voxels. Establish a cartesian co-ordinate system in three dimensions with z
as the vertical. Measured data is position (xpos, ypos, zpos) and direction cosines
(mx, my, mz) of each of the incoming (xpos, ypos, zpos, mx, my, mz)in and outgoing
(xpos, ypos, zpos, mx, my, mz)out muon tracks (M).
(b) For i:=1 to M muons get incoming ((xpos, ypos, zpos, mx, my, mz)in)i and outgoing
((xpos, ypos, zpos, mx, my, mz)out)i muon track data for each detector.
(c) For i:=1 to M muon reconstruct their muon track using a 3D least-squares regres-
sion fit.
(d) For each muon track calculate the PoCA point using Eq. (3.2), Eq. (3.3), Eq.
(3.4) and Eq. (3.5).
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(e) Add the calculated scatter angle to the PoCA voxel it resides within.
(f) Calculate the average scatter angle for all scatter points that reside in the calcu-
lated voxel.
(g) Repeat steps c - f for all M tracks.
(h) Remove all voxels that have less than 3 muon PoCA points reconstructed within
it.
(i) Remove all voxels located outside where the cargo container is positioned.
(j) Split the remaining voxels into 4 equal sections along the z-axis.
(k) For each of the 4 sections, split into every possible 20 cm slice along the z-axis.
For example, if the first 20 cm slice runs from voxels 1 to 5 along the z-axis, the
next slice runs from voxels 2 to 6.
(l) Analyse every possible group of sixty-four voxels within each 20 cm slice of
each section, with a set of optimum parameters that have been calculated for that
section. This will include groups of 64 voxels that partially overlap other groups
of 64 voxels.
(m) Repeat step h - k for all sections.
5.2.3 Description of how the Optimum Parameters were Calcu-
lated
Any optimum parameters that are given in this thesis have been calculated using the
following approach:
(a) Sixteen simulations have been run where shielded HEU was placed randomly in
cargo containers filled with various clutter. A full description of these scenarios
is discussed in Chapter 6 and Appendix A.
(b) For each configuration the reconstruction parameters (R, V and M) were varied to
determine which combination was most efficient in identifying all shielded HEU,
with the minimum number of erroneous voxel build-up. Since the position of
the threats were known a priori, an erroneous voxel is defined as a reconstructed
voxel not located where a threat is positioned.
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(c) Each of the four sections was analysed with R varied from 2 - 12, V varied from
20 - 64 and M varied from 0.8 - 2.2 (in steps of 0.1). All combinations of these
ranges were tested.
(d) Since the location of threats in each of the sixteen configurations are known, any
voxels not reconstructed (for a particular set of parameters) where the threats are
located are considered erroneous.
(e) The total amount of erroneous reconstructed voxels, for all sixteen configurations,
for each set of parameters is then calculated. This is done separately for each
section.
(f) The total amount of erroneous voxels is compared to the total amount of false
negatives observed, for all sixteen configurations, for each set of parameters.
(g) The set of parameters that gives the lowest false negative rate coupled to the low-
est erroneous voxel build-up, for each section, is then established as the optimum
set of parameters for that section.
(h) Steps d - f are done separately for each section.
5.2.4 Results for Cargo Container Housing 5 Shielded Threats
The ability to detect shielded HEU in empty cargo containers as a function of detector
resolution, detector spacing and number of detectors per set using the analysis algorithm
presented in section 5.2.2 has been studied. All results presented here use the cargo
configuration shown in Fig. 5.7. This consists of placing five 5 cm radius spheres
of 20% enriched uranium surrounded by 11 cm of steel (targets 1, 2, 3) or 7 cm of
lead (targets 4, 5) at random locations in the cargo container. Due to this each threat
is not necessarily aligned with the centre of a voxel. All shielded threat materials are
located on the floor of the container. This places the threat materials in section 4 of the
inspected volume. The total geometry is split into 5 cm × 5 cm × 5 cm voxels. The
average scattering angle is taken from all muon tracks that are reconstructed within a
particular voxel. As shown in Table 5.1, for detection of materials located in section 4,
the analysis algorithm requires 16 voxels per each set of 64 analysed to have 4 or more
muons reconstructed within it. These voxels must have an average scattering angle
greater than 1.5× that of the slice as a whole (see Table 5.1 for optimum parameters).
Upon undergoing analysis via the process described in section 5.2.2, 3D images are
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plotted with a colour gradient based on the scattering angle observed. All voxels with
an average scattering angle of less than 1◦ are made transparent. The transparency of
voxels then increases uniformly until all voxels with an average scattering angle greater
than 5◦ are completely solid.
Fig. 5.7 Schematic of the empty cargo configuration. The five materials are 5 cm radius spheres
of 20% enriched uranium surrounded by 11 cm of steel (targets 1, 2, 3) or 7 cm of lead (targets
4, 5).
5.2.5 Effect of Detector Spacing
To monitor the effects of detector spacing, simulations were run with three detectors per
set. The inspected volume is displayed in Fig. 5.7. The ability to detect five shielded
threat materials for all spatial resolutions (0.2, 1, 2, 10, 20 and 30 mm) for detectors
spaced at 10 cm, 25 cm and 50 cm has been analysed. Fig. 5.8 shows the effect of in-
creasing the distance between detectors on the average scattering angle for each threat
material and the plane as a whole. Using the analysis algorithm with the reconstruction
parameters defined in Table 5.1, Table 5.2 shows the number of voxels that meet the se-
lection criteria defined, in the volumes where each threat was located. This represents
the number of voxels used to calculate the average scattering angle displayed in Fig.
5.8. The smallest threats (HEU shielded by lead) have diameters of 24 cm. Since every
20 cm slice in the z-axis is analysed, each threat will reside very close to the centre of
one of these slices. Every group of 64 voxels is then analysed for each 20 cm slice.
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Since each group of 64 voxels represents an analysis size of 20 cm × 20 cm × 20 cm,
there will be a set of 64 voxels in which the threat is very close to the centre. It is this set
of 64 voxels that are selected and analysed for the results in Table 5.2. Threats where
very few voxels are used in calculating the average scattering angle (Fig. 5.8 - Threat
5 - 1 cm and 2 cm resolution and threat 1 - 2 cm resolution) can result in unexpectedly
high average scattering angles, as erroneously large scatters are not as well incorporated
into the average.
From Table 5.2 and Fig. 5.8, for all detector spacing scenarios, as spatial resolution be-
comes worse the average scattering angle for each shielded nuclear material increases
and becomes comparable to that of the plane average. Secondly, the number of muon
tracks reconstructed in volumes where the threats are located reduces. As shown in
Table 5.2, these reasons result in a reduction of the number of voxels found where the
threats are positioned, causing the threat to become more difficult to detect. Increasing
spacing between each individual detector increases the accuracy of reconstructed muon
tracks. This improves material detection capabilities as due to the increased accuracy,
fewer tracks are reconstructed in volumes where no materials are located, with more
tracks correctly reconstructed within targets. As the distance between each individual
detector increases (from 10 cm to 25 cm to 50 cm) the total average scattering angle ob-
served in the inspected slice reduces. This is shown in Fig. 5.8. However, the average
scattering angle for each threat stays approximately the same. This further increases
material detection capabilities as the threats become more clearly observed above the
background.
The combined results in Fig. 5.8 and Table 5.2 indicate that for all detector spacing
tested, the ability to detect all shielded HEU using the analysis algorithm for 0.2 mm,
1 mm and 2 mm spatial resolutions is apparent. The average scattering angle of each
threat material is clearly above that of the plane average. Sufficient numbers of voxels
clustered together in regions where threats are located, are observed to allow positive
threat detection. Due to the low number of muon tracks reconstructed where the threats
are located and the inability to observe the threat materials above the plane average, no
system with 3 cm position resolution will allow the reconstruction of nuclear targets.
The same can be concluded for 1 cm and 2 cm position resolution where detectors are
spaced at 10 cm and 25 cm. For 50 cm detector spacing it would appear from Fig.
5.8 that threat materials can clearly be observed above the background. However, due
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Fig. 5.8 Mean scattering angle vs spatial resolution for a configuration with 3 detectors per
plane. The five materials are 5 cm radius spheres of 20% enriched uranium surrounded by 11
cm of steel (threat 1, 2, 3) or 7 cm of lead (threat 4, 5). Detector planes are separated by 10 cm
(top), 25 cm (middle) and 50 cm (bottom). Any empty peaks that are observed are caused by no
voxels meeting the reconstruction criteria in the volume where the threat material is located.
5.2 Techniques for Muon Scattering 139
to the low number of muon tracks reconstructed in volumes where the targets are lo-
cated, material detection cannot be made. For this scenario there are not enough voxels
clustered together in the volumes where targets are located with an average scattering
angle higher than 1.5× the planes average. Therefore any voxels measured with large
scattering angles could be erroneous points, as opposed to evidence of threat materi-
als. For 10 cm detector spacing and 3 cm position resolution the plane average appears
greater than the average scatter in each threat. This is due to the low number of muon
tracks reconstructed where each threat is located. Therefore an accurate estimation of
the scatter in each threat cannot be made.
In general the average scatter observed decreases with increasing detector spacing. The
increased distance between detectors will result in is less error being associated with the
path reconstruction, as there is a smaller angle through which the track can be recon-
structed. This smaller angle will in turn reduce the calculated average scatter of a muon
and hence a reduction in the average scatter observed as detector spacing increases (for
the same resolution) is observed. It should be noted that while further increases in
spacing would continue to increase the accuracy of track reconstruction, as the distance
between each individual detector increases, fewer muons are likely to pass through all
detectors in a particular set. This reduces the total number of muons eligible for track
reconstruction. Furthermore, increasing detector spacing will increase the overall size
of the detector system, thus making it less practical. Finally any empty peaks that are
observed in Fig. 5.8 are caused by no voxels meeting the reconstruction criteria in the
volume where the threat material is located.
5.2.6 Number of Detector Planes
The effect of increasing the number of detector planes for each set of detectors (top,
bottom or sides) on material detection has also been analysed. For these simulations
five planes were used per set instead of three. These detector planes were separated by
25 cm and therefore covered the same total area as simulations run with three planes
spaced 50 cm apart. The inspection volume displayed in Fig. 5.7 was used. Planes
separated by 10 cm were not considered due to poor material detection in comparison
to 25 cm and 50 cm spacing when using three planes. Five detectors with spaces of 50
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Table 5.2 Number of voxels out of 64 passing the selection criteria given in Table 5.1,
using the analysis algorithm in the volumes where each threat is located.
Spacing Resolution Threat 1 Threat 2 Threat 3 Threat 4 Threat 5
10 cm 0.2 mm 36 50 44 53 57
10 cm 1.0 mm 23 29 27 37 39
10 cm 2.0 mm 22 15 19 25 23
10 cm 1.0 cm 1 5 4 5 2
10 cm 2.0 cm 1 1 3 2 2
10 cm 3.0 cm 0 1 5 3 2
25 cm 0.2 mm 37 48 49 57 56
25 cm 1.0 mm 28 38 39 45 48
25 cm 2.0 mm 22 32 31 36 43
25 cm 1.0 cm 5 3 7 11 12
25 cm 2.0 cm 2 5 6 3 1
25 cm 3.0 cm 0 4 5 0 2
50 cm 0.2 mm 34 45 54 53 56
50 cm 1.0 mm 29 36 48 46 52
50 cm 2.0 mm 31 36 43 46 44
50 cm 1.0 cm 7 11 10 13 9
50 cm 2.0 cm 2 7 6 3 2
50 cm 3.0 cm 0 3 0 4 2
cm were not considered either, as they would act to increase the inspection range by a
further 2 m making it less practical. Fig. 5.9 shows the effect that increasing the number
of detector planes per set has on the average scattering angle of the threat materials and
the slice in which they are located. Table 5.3 shows this effect on the number of voxels
passing the selection criteria defined in Table 5.1, in volumes where targets are located.
In general increasing the number of detectors per set results in an increase in the num-
ber of voxels that meet the reconstruction criteria in volumes where threats are located.
For 2 cm and 3 cm position resolutions there are still not enough voxels grouped to-
gether where the nuclear materials are located, with an average scattering angle higher
than 1.5× the plane average, for clear detection to be made. However, for 1 cm spatial
resolution there is a rise in the number of voxels that meet these criteria, in particular
for HEU shielded with lead. Hence nuclear material detection is more apparent for the
system of five detectors with 25 cm distance between each detector, than the system of
three detectors spaced 50 cm apart. This is due to the additional two detector planes
that record the muons trajectory. Multiple Coulomb scattering will occur between de-
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Table 5.3 Number of voxels identified out of 64 passing the selection criteria given in
Table 5.1, using the analysis algorithm in the volumes where each threat is located.
Spacing Resolution Threat 1 Threat 2 Threat 3 Threat 4 Threat 5
3 Detectors per set
50 cm 0.2 mm 34 45 54 53 56
50 cm 1.0 mm 29 36 48 46 52
50 cm 2.0 mm 31 36 43 46 44
50 cm 1.0 cm 7 11 10 13 9
50 cm 2.0 cm 2 7 6 3 2
50 cm 3.0 cm 0 3 0 4 2
5 detectors per set
25 cm 0.2 mm 31 52 51 49 52
25 cm 1.0 mm 33 47 44 50 50
25 cm 2.0 mm 33 47 42 40 47
25 cm 1.0 cm 10 13 15 16 17
25 cm 2.0 cm 6 5 7 4 6
25 cm 3.0 cm 3 4 3 1 3
tectors. The introduction of additional detectors will limit the effect this has on the track
reconstruction as additional positions along the muon trajectory will be known. This
in turn makes muon track reconstruction more accurate. In addition to the increase in
number of voxels that meet the criteria, there is a slight decrease in the plane average.
This results in reducing the noise from erroneous scatters and increases the potential
for nuclear material detection.
5.2.7 Results for Cargo Containing 5 Shielded Nuclear Materials
with no Clutter
The capability of observing five shielded nuclear materials located randomly in an
empty cargo container has been studied. Following the results obtained from simu-
lations conducted for detector spacing and numbers of detectors per set, simulations are
only run for detectors spaced 25 cm apart with five detectors per set. All resolutions
representative of gaseous detectors (0.2 mm, 1 mm, and 2 mm) are considered. For
resolutions representative of scintillator bars only 1 cm position resolutions are consid-
ered. The inspection volume is the same as that displayed in Fig. 5.7. Fig. 5.10 shows
the capability of the analysis algorithm developed to identify dense clusters of voxels,
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Fig. 5.9 Mean scattering angle vs spatial resolution for a configuration with three detectors
per set (top) and five detectors per set (bottom). Detector planes are separated by 50 cm when
three detectors are used and 25 cm when five detectors are used. Simulations are run using the
same detectors and nuclear materials as with Fig. 5.8. Any empty peaks that are observed are
caused by no voxels meeting the reconstruction criteria in the volume where the threat material
is located.
using the parameters given in Table 5.1.
For perfect, 0.2 mm, 1 mm and 2 mm spatial resolutions all nuclear materials are clearly
identified. This demonstrates the capability of the new analysis algorithm developed, to
correctly extract dense clusters of voxels that are attributed to shielded HEU. For spatial
resolutions of 0.2 mm and 1 mm there is also the build-up of two false positives, located
just inside the cargo, next to the walls. A false positive is defined as a region of high-Z
material identified by the analysis algorithm, where no shielded HEU was placed. This
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is caused by muons that have been scattered by the walls of the cargo container, but
reconstructed just inside these walls. In a realistic scenario, potential threat materials
can be placed close to the wall. It would therefore be unknown whether these regions
represent shielded nuclear materials, or false positives due to the cargo container walls.
This indicates a potential limitation of muon scattering tomography with the analysis al-
gorithm, to clearly detect high-Z materials attributed to shielded HEU, from occasional
build-ups due to the cargo container itself. As detector spatial resolution becomes worse
those voxels identified, which are attributed to the cargo container walls, are no longer
observed. As detector spatial resolution decreases the plane average scatter increases.
This results in multiple muon tracks associated with the cargo wall to no longer meet
the criteria of being 1.5× above the plane average. Therefore the number of voxels with
an average scattering angle greater than 1.5× the plane average reduces. The number
of voxels becomes less than the number required by the analysis algorithm for material
detection, hence the false positives are no longer identified.
For 10 mm spatial resolution only HEU shielded with lead are correctly identified. This
is due to the same reasons described above, when discussing the disappearance of false
positives associated with cargo container walls. As spatial resolution gets worse, there
is a decrease in the number of muon tracks correctly reconstructed in volumes where
the threats are located. These muon tracks are subsequently reconstructed in regions
where no threats are located. This results in a decrease in threat detection, as fewer
voxels with high scattering angles are located close together where nuclear materials
are present. This demonstrates a limitation of the analysis algorithm when using spatial
resolutions representative of scintillator detectors.
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5.2.8 Comparison Between Four 5 cm × 5 cm × 5 cm Voxels and
a Single 20 cm × 20 cm × 20 cm Voxel to Detect 5 Shielded
Nuclear Materials in a Cargo Container Housing 5 Shielded
Threats
For the analysis discussed in section 5.2.3, the analysis algorithm grouped together 4
× 4 × 4 voxels of size 5 cm × 5 cm × 5 cm. This represents a total volume of 20 cm
× 20 cm × 20 cm. An interesting study can be made to see whether splitting the total
geometry into voxels of size 20 cm × 20 cm × 20 cm will allow an efficient detection
of shielded HEU. Unlike for the analysis algorithm with 5 cm × 5 cm × 5 cm voxels,
a single voxel now covers each 20 cm × 20 cm × 20 cm volume analysed. Therefore
the number of voxels, V (out of the 64), with an average scattering angle larger than
the plane average, can no longer be considered. Instead, the only parameters available
to optimise are the minimum number of muons, R, reconstructed within a particular
voxel, and the plane average multiplication factor, M. Due to the increase in voxel size
the number of muons reconstructed per voxel increases. The capability of observing five
shielded nuclear materials located randomly in an empty cargo container has again been
studied. The inspection volume is displayed in Fig. 5.7. All resolutions representative
of gaseous detectors (0.2 mm, 1 mm, and 2 mm) are considered, as are 1 cm spatial
resolutions representative of scintillator bars. Analysis was conducted as before, except
the voxels analysed for each 20 cm slice were now of size 20 cm × 20 cm × 20 cm.
Fig. 5.11 shows a colour map of the inspected volume of the the volumes identified
when using the analysis algorithm with 20 cm × 20 cm × 20 cm voxels for the empty
cargo scenario, for perfect resolution. Optimum parameters for detecting the threat
materials with the lowest false positive rate were obtained. This involved using 160
reconstructed scatter points per voxel (R), with a factor (M) of 1.3. All voxels with an
average scattering angle less than 3◦ have been made transparent. A description of how
optimum parameters are calculated is given in section 5.2.3.
All volumes where shielded HEU are located have been accurately identified. There is
also the build-up of two additional volumes. As with analysis conducted for 5 cm × 5
cm × 5 cm sized voxels, one of these false positives is attributed to the cargo container
walls. However, unlike the analysis for 5 cm × 5 cm × 5 cm sized voxels, there is a
second false positive built up in a volume where no materials are located. Due to the
size of the voxels, any voxels that are reconstructed have to be considered high-density
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materials. The build-up of a false positive where no threats are located is particularly
concerning. This demonstrates a drawback of this algorithm that is not present for
smaller sized voxels. Consequently voxel sizes of 5 cm × 5 cm × 5 cm will be used
when aiming to detect shielded HEU in all future scenarios with clutter. Results with
0.2 mm, 1 mm and 2 mm resolutions were equivalent to those in Fig. 5.11, whereby
all nuclear materials were correctly identified along with two additional volumes. For
1 cm spatial resolutions only HEU shielded by lead were reconstructed.
Fig. 5.11 Illustration of those voxels identified using the analysis algorithm with 20 cm × 20
cm × 20 cm sized voxels for perfect resolution. Voxels with red circles represent volumes
where shielded threat materials were located. Voxels with blue circles represent false positives
identified with the analysis algorithm. The colour scale is based in the average scattering angle
observed per voxel.
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5.3 Techniques for Stopping Muons
5.3.1 Muon Tracking
Muons considered for analysis must pass through all detectors in the top set, but do not
pass through any subsequent set. A schematic for the simulated system is displayed
in Fig. 5.2. The geometry inspected is displayed in Fig 5.7. Any muons that are not
detected exiting the volume can be assumed to have disappeared somewhere within the
inspected volume, or exited where no detectors are located. For 5 million muons ≈
500,000 muons in total will pass through the sides where no detectors are located. For
muons that have disappeared, the top detectors will have recorded an initial position
and direction of the muon track. If it is assumed that the muon travels along a straight
line, then its path from the top detector to where it would have exited the volume had
it not disappeared can be extrapolated. Muons that meet the disappearance criteria of
not being detected exiting the inspected volume, are passed to the muon disappearance
algorithm outlined in section 4.4.2, with a 3D tomographic image built up based on the
total fractional path length calculated per voxel. Voxels of size 5 cm × 5 cm × 5 cm
are used.
5.3.2 Results for Cargo Container Housing 5 Shielded Threats us-
ing Muon Disappearance Tomography
Analysis is made along the same process as muon scattering tomography. The total
fractional path length in each voxel is determined before splitting the total geometry
into four equal sections along the z-axis. Every 20 cm slice within each section is anal-
ysed using the set of parameters given in Table 5.4. The general trend observed in these
parameters is that the number of reconstructions required per voxel, (R), and the num-
ber of voxels greater than the plane average (V) times some factor, M, decreases with
depth in the cargo. This is to be expected since fewer extrapolated muon tracks will
pass through voxels that are lower within the cargo. Clusters of voxels that meet the
criteria given in Table 5.4 for each section are then plotted. The ability of the muon
disappearance algorithm presented in section 4.2.2 to detect shielded HEU in otherwise
empty cargo containers (with perfect resolution), is demonstrated in Fig. 5.12.
Red circles represent volumes where threat materials are located in Fig. 5.12. As it
can be seen, the volumes where threat materials are located have been clearly iden-
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tified using the muon disappearance algorithm. However, similar to the three block
systems tested in Chapter 4, there is also the build-up of multiple voxels surrounding
the volumes where each threat material is located. This build-up makes the accurate
localisation of the threat materials problematic and may result in the misclassification
of volumes where no threats are located, as high-Z materials. In addition to these is-
sues, there is also the build-up of multiple additional voxels in volumes located far
away from threat materials. These voxels have total fractional path lengths similar to
that of the threat materials. The additional reconstructed voxels are attributed to muons
that have disappeared in the components of the lorry and the lorry container that house
the shielded threat materials. In particular the build-up towards the front of the cargo
container is in part due to muons that have stopped within the engine and battery of
the lorry. The inability to sufficiently distinguish between these different components
represents a limitation of the muon disappearance algorithm to detect shielded nuclear
materials in an empty cargo container. However, since threat materials are identified us-
ing this technique, it may be used as a secondary technique to enhance muon scattering
tomography systems, which look to detect the same threat materials. Similar results are
found for all other spatial resolutions (0.2 mm, 1 mm and 2 mm) tested, whereby there
is the build-up of multiple additional voxels that act to mask the detection of shielded
HEU.
Table 5.4 Optimum parameters determined for the detection of shielded HEU in each
section for muon disappearance tomography. A description of how optimum parameters
are calculated is given in section 5.2.3
Section R V M
1 16 26 / 64 1.4
2 15 26 / 64 1.4
3 15 22 / 64 1.3
4 13 22 / 64 1.3
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(a) Full reconstruction.
(b) Reconstruction centered in z-slice where threats are located.
Fig. 5.12 Image reconstruction for 3D line disappearance algorithm of the empty cargo sce-
nario. Reconstruction for both the full lorry and the z-slice where the threats are located are
given. The scale gives the total fractional path length calculated for each voxel.
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5.4 Results for Cargo Container Housing 5 Shielded Threats
using Muon Disappearance and Muon Scattering
Tomography
Firstly, using muon scattering tomography with the new analysis algorithm, volumes
assumed to be high-Z materials are identified. These volumes are labelled as ‘areas
of interest’. Further analysis is then made using muon disappearance tomography, to
confirm whether or not these materials are indeed high-Z materials. Muons that have
disappeared within the inspected volume are identified and passed through the muon
disappearance algorithm. This in turn is used to build-up a 3D image of the inspected
volume. An example of this is displayed in Fig. 5.12. Instead of inspecting the to-
tal volume with the muon disappearance algorithm, further analysis is made via taking
20 cm thick slices along the z-axis, centred on the ‘areas of interest’ identified using
muon scattering tomography. All other areas built-up using the muon disappearance
algorithm are ignored. Fig. 5.13 displays the voxels identified by the muon disappear-
ance algorithm along the slices taken. From Fig 5.13, all five ‘areas of interest’ that
are attributed to the shielded threat materials are reconstructed. The volumes identified
from muon scattering tomography that represented the false positives have not been re-
constructed. The additional voxels reconstructed, shown within the blue circles of Fig.
5.13, represent volumes that have been built up just inside the walls of the cargo con-
tainer, using the muon disappearance algorithm. However, since these volumes were
not identified in the muon scattering analysis, they can be ignored. For an ‘area of inter-
est’ to be confirmed as possible high density material, the criterion is used that it must
be identified with both muon scattering and muon disappearance techniques. In this
scenario, this requirement results in the positive detection of all five-threat materials
and the removal of those areas that are not due to the threat materials. Table 5.5 and Ta-
ble 5.6 display the false positives that are associated with both the muon scattering and
muon disappearance techniques for all resolutions. As it can be seen, when using muon
disappearance, no false positives identified using muon scattering tomography are re-
constructed. This displays the advantage of using muon disappearance in conjunction
with muon scattering tomography in being able to correctly ascertain which volumes
reconstructed using muon scattering tomography, represent high-Z materials and which
volumes are false positives. This therefore has the advantage over techniques that rely
on solely one of these methods.
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Table 5.5 Location, reconstruction parameters and average scattering angle observed
for each false positive identified for muon scattering tomography of the empty cargo
scenario.
Resolution R V M x (m) y (m) z (m) Avg Scatter (Deg)
Perfect 3 18 1.3 -3 0.95 0 3.12 ± 0.22
Perfect 3 17 1.3 -3 -1.15 0 3.19 ± 0.19
0.2 mm 3 18 1.3 -3 0.95 0 3.16 ± 0.26
0.2 mm 3 17 1.3 -3 -1.15 0 3.28 ± 0.22
1 mm 3 17 1.3 -3 0.95 0 4.95 ± 0.69
1 mm 3 17 1.3 2.8 1.05 0.3 3.62 ± 0.32
Table 5.6 Location, reconstruction parameters and average total fractional path length
observed for each false positive identified for muon disappearance tomography of the
empty cargo scenario for slices where ‘areas of interest’ are located.
Resolution R V M x (m) y (m) z (m) Avg Total Path Length
Perfect 15 26 1.4 0.4 -1.15 0 5.69 ± 0.15
Perfect 15 28 1.4 2.8 -1.1 0 5.78 ± 0.15
Perfect 15 27 1.4 2.85 0.8 0 5.82 ± 0.12
0.2 mm 15 28 1.4 2.8 0.8 0 5.76 ± 0.16
0.2 mm 15 27 1.4 2.85 0.8 0 5.83 ± 0.12
1 mm 15 27 1.4 2.8 0.8 0 5.77 ± 0.15
1 mm 15 26 1.4 2.85 0.8 0 5.82 ± 0.12
2 mm 15 26 1.4 2.8 -1.1 0 5.79 ± 0.16
2 mm 15 26 1.4 2.85 0.8 0 5.84 ± 0.12
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Fig. 5.13 Top: Image reconstruction using PoCA and a density based clustering algorithm, of
the empty cargo scenario to identify areas of interest. The scale gives the average scattering
angle calculated per each voxel (degrees). Bottom: Image reconstruction using the 3D line
disappearance algorithm for the empty cargo scenario for the areas of interest identified using
the PoCA algorithm. The scale gives the total fractional path length calculated for each voxel.
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5.5 Summary
Results of Monte Carlo simulations for muon scattering in different types of target ma-
terials have been presented. The effectiveness of a new analysis algorithm that identifies
dense clusters of voxels with high scattering angles has been demonstrated. Using this
new analysis algorithm, the effect of the detector configuration and spatial resolution
on detecting high-Z targets in empty cargo containers has been studied. This involves
different scenarios where the detector spacing and number of detector planes per set
were varied. An optimum set-up of 5 detectors per set, located 25 cm apart has been
established. One may have expected the optimum setup (of those tested) to be 50 cm
spacings. However, only 3 detectors spaced 50 cm apart were considered. Therefore
5 detectors spaced 25 cm apart will cover the same area as 3 detectors spaced 50 cm
apart. The additional two detector planes will yield a more accurate reconstruction of
the muon track. The optimum setup (5 detectors spaced 25 cm apart) requires spatial
resolutions of 2 mm or better to detect shielded HEU in empty cargo containers. Reso-
lutions representative of scintillator detectors (2 cm and 3 cm), are unable to accurately
detect all types of shielded HEU in empty cargo containers. Spatial resolutions of 1 cm
are only capable of accurately locating HEU shielded by lead. Therefore resolutions
representative of scintillator detectors (1 cm, 2 cm, 3 cm) will not be considered for
realistic clutter scenarios.
The technique of muon disappearance has been applied to detecting shielded HEU in
empty cargo containers. The optimum detector configuration (5 detectors planes spaced
25 cm apart) obtained with muon scattering tomography has been used. The same
analysis algorithm applied to muon scattering tomography, was applied to muon dis-
appearance tomography, in attempt to identify dense clusters of voxels with large total
fractional path lengths. Although capable of detecting shielded HEU in empty cargo
containers, there is also the build-up of other additional voxels due to the lorry and
container itself. This makes accurate detection of shielded HEU unlikely, when solely
using muon disappearance. However, since the build-up of shielded HEU does occur,
it has been demonstrated that this technique can be used as a supplementary technique
to muon scattering tomography to help enhance overall detection capabilities. This is
done through first identifying ‘areas of interest’ using muon scattering tomography be-
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fore confirming whether they are threats with the muon disappearance algorithm.
Finally, it is also possible that anyone attempting to smuggle shielded HEU may use
smaller component sizes than those that have been considered here. While unable to
detect smaller objects with the given parameters, these parameters can be altered given
different scenarios. For detector efficiencies less than 100%, the validity of the algo-
rithm is not compromised, but just means a larger amount of data will be required to
ascertain the results given. Larger exposure times may require an increase in the amount
of shielding to avoid passive detection, thus the efficiency of the muon tomography may
not be compromised. While longer exposure times will work up until a point, there will
eventually be a cut-off point in which the longer exposure times will no longer be able
to identify smaller objects. This is due to inherent error always associated with the
tracking angular resolution.
Chapter 6
Material Segregation using
Cosmic-Ray Muons for Cargo
Containers with Clutter
This chapter analyses the feasibility of using muons to correctly detect shielded HEU
when placed in a cargo container, filled with different levels of clutter. Two types of
clutter scenario are considered. Ones where shielded HEU is surrounded by low-Z
clutter and ones where shielded HEU is surrounded by medium-Z clutter. The ability
to detect shielded HEU in each of these scenarios is considered using muon scattering
tomography, muon disappearance tomography and the two techniques in conjunction
with one another. For each low-Z and medium-Z clutter scenario, twenty different clut-
ter configurations have been interrogated. The ability of each muon analysis technique
when applied to one of these clutter configurations is presented in detail. The analysis
approach described in detail is repeated for all twenty configurations for each clutter
scenario, before all the results are discussed.
Section 6.1 introduces the simulation parameters that are used in all simulations in this
Chapter. A description of the clutter configuration (for both low-Z and medium-Z clut-
ter) is given for the configuration that will be analysed in detail. Section 6.2 discusses
the capability of muon scattering tomography with the new analysis algorithm, muon
disappearance tomography with the new analysis algorithm, and using the two in con-
junction with one another, to correctly detect shielded HEU in a cargo container filled
with low-Z clutter. Detailed analysis is given for each processing technique when ap-
plied to the configuration described in section 6.1. False positive and false negative
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rates are given for all twenty configurations. Section 6.3 has the same layout as section
6.2, except shielded HEU is housed within medium-Z clutter. Section 6.4 summarises
the findings of the Chapter.
6.1 Simulation Parameters
In a realistic scenario the cargo container will be filled with some materials to be trans-
ported together with HEU or similar. Twenty different clutter configurations have been
simulated for both low-Z and medium-Z clutter scenarios. Of these twenty configu-
rations, sixteen contain five shielded HEU threats. The remaining four have no threat
materials within them. Each of the configurations places the clutter and shielded HEU
in different locations. The maximum gross mass for a 20-foot cargo container is 24,000
kilograms. Subtracting the tare mass of the container itself, the maximum amount of
cargo allowed is reduced to approximately 21,600 kilograms. This mass restriction has
been considered when developing the different configurations tested. The combination
of clutter and hidden threat materials have been evenly distributed around the container.
In general, particularly heavy items of clutter have been placed in crates at the bottom
of the container and towards the centre, so that the mass remains evenly distributed
throughout the whole container.
Five million muons generated over a 10 m × 10 m surface area, which correspond to
a 5-minute exposure time, are transported through the inspected volume. The validity
of this muon surface area size is discussed in section 3.2.4. Due to the ability to accu-
rately detect shielded HEU in an empty cargo container for 0.2 mm, 1 mm and 2 mm
spatial resolutions, simulations have been conducted for all of these resolutions as well
as 0.1 mm. Simulations for 10 mm spatial resolution have not been considered since
only HEU shielded with lead was identified when using this resolution in empty cargo
scenarios. Gaseous detectors that cover a total size of 7 m × 4 m are used. There are
five detector planes per set. Detectors are located 25 cm apart and assumed to be 100%
efficient. A schematic of the set-up is displayed in Fig. 4.10. There is a distance of
4 m separating the top detector from the bottom detector. This distance is chosen as
it represents the approximate height of a lorry plus cargo container. In reality muon
detection efficiency may not be 100%. If this is the case then longer exposure times
will be needed to observe the determined results, provided the tracking system does not
have any redundancy. If longer exposure times are required, the amount of shielding
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surrounding any nuclear material will need to be increased, so that detection by passive
means is avoided. This will in turn make the detection of high density materials using
muons more efficient, provided shielding is placed directly around the HEU.
6.1.1 Description of the Scenario Tested
As discussed, twenty clutter configurations have been conducted for each of different
clutter type scenario. Each section will present in detail one of the configurations that
has been simulated for all resolutions tested, for each of the muon analysis techniques.
The analysis approach described for this one configuration, is applied to all twenty
configurations conducted for each clutter scenario. For sixteen of the twenty configu-
rations, five shielded HEU targets have been placed per configuration. The remaining
four configurations (out of the twenty) have no shielded HEU placed in them. Optimum
reconstruction parameters for threat identification have been calculated using the six-
teen configurations that contain threat materials. As the parameters are optimised with
the same configurations that will be tested, there is the propensity for the parameters
to be overtrained for the clutter configurations used in this thesis. The 4 configurations
where no threats are placed are extremely important as they allow the testing of these
optimum parameters, as no material should be built up in these configurations. The
total amount of false positives and false negatives (out of 80) for all configurations is
also presented. A false positive is defined as a region of high-Z material identified by
the analysis algorithm where no shielded HEU was placed. A false negative is defined
as the inability to reconstruct one shielded HEU target within each configuration. There
can be more than one false positive or false negative per configuration. A schematic of
the setup that is to be analysed in detail, is displayed in Fig. 6.1.
In order to practically train the algorithm for many more cargo configurations, the opti-
mum parameters calculated would need to be tested on realistic containers that contain
hidden threat materials, in unknown locations. This would need to be done for hun-
dreds of cargo configurations to be able to fully refine the parameters. The focus of
this Chapter is to present how the analysis algorithm that has been developed would be
applied to nuclear materials detection, upon determination of suitable parameters.
Table 6.1 displays the positions and dimensions of the different items of clutter, which
were placed in the cargo container in Fig. 6.1. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter con-
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Fig. 6.1 Schematic of side and top views of the lorry filled with clutter. Two shielded nuclear
materials are located in the upper set of crates (4, 5) and three in the lower set (1, 2, 3). The
crates are randomly filled with air, polystyrene, carbon, aluminium, gravel or sand for low-Z
clutter scenarios. For medium-Z scenarios the crates are filled with different sized blocks of
aluminium, weathering steel, stainless steel and iron.
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figurations are described. It is this clutter configuration described in Table 6.1 and Fig.
6.1 that will be analysed in detail. The clutter consists of eleven wooden crates of size
1.1 m × 1.1 m × 1.1 m placed in the cargo container. Each crate is filled with different
sized blocks of either low-Z or medium-Z materials. For low-Z clutter configurations
the crates are filled with various sized blocks of aluminium, carbon, polystyrene, gravel,
sand and air. For medium-Z clutter configurations the crates are filled with various sized
blocks of aluminium, weathering steel, stainless steel and iron. Table 6.2 displays the
densities and elemental composition of all materials that have been used as clutter. The
crates are at most stacked two crates high and placed in random locations. All twenty
configurations simulated have this same general set-up. It is the location of shielded
HEU, the location and amount of clutter and the type of clutter material that varies for
each configuration. Of the twenty configurations, sixteen contain five 10 kg spheres (5
cm radius) of 20% enriched uranium (20% 235U and 80% 238U) surrounded by either
lead or steel shielding placed randomly amongst the clutter. The remaining four config-
urations have no nuclear materials present. A description of all clutter configurations
for both low-Z and medium-Z scenarios in given in Appendix A.
Table 6.1 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
in Fig. 6.1. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Aluminium Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-1.55 -0.56 0.412
Polyethylene Weathering Steel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
0 0 0.512
Air Sand Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
90 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.5
Sand Aluminium Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 101.9 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33
cm × 33 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Sand Iron Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 50.5 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm
× 33 cm
-0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Gravel Stainless Steel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 101.9 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33
cm × 33 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
0.8 0.56 -0.608
Gravel Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Carbon Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 100 cm × 100 cm × 70
cm
-0.8 0.56 -0.608
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Table 6.2 Description of densities and chemical composition of all materials that have
been used as clutter in both low-Z and medium-Z configurations.
Material Density (g cm−3) Chemical Composition
Polyethylene 0.94 100% C2H4
Carbon 2.26 100% C
Sand 1.60 100% SiO2
Concrete 2.20 16% H2O, 6% Air, 11% Portland Cement, 41% Gravel, 26% Sand
Gravel 1.52 46.6% O, 27.72% Si2, 9.13% Al, 5.41% Fe, 3.63% Ca, 2.83% Na, 2.59% K, 2.09% Mg
Aluminium 2.70 100% Al
Weathering Steel 7.85 96.965% Fe, 0.875% Cr, 0.65% Ni, 0.5% Si, 0.4% Cu, 0.35% Mn, 0.12% C, 0.11% P, 0.03% S
Stainless Steel 8.03 66.595% Fe, 20.0% Cr, 10.5% Ni, 2% Mn, 0.75% Si, 0.08% C, 0.045% P, 0.03% S
Iron 7.87 100% Fe
6.2 Shielded HEU Placed within Low-Z Clutter
6.2.1 Results using Muon Scattering Tomography
Analysis for a Single Configuration
Using muon scattering tomography with the analysis algorithm presented in section
5.2.2, the capability to detect 20% enriched uranium shielded by either steel or lead in
realistic low-Z clutter scenarios for multiple detector resolutions has been studied. Op-
timum parameters for the detection of shielded HEU in these configurations have been
calculated for perfect resolution. These parameters are given in Table 5.1. Fig. 6.2
shows the capability of muon scattering tomography, when applying these parameters
to accurately locate shielded HEU for the configuration displayed in Fig. 6.1. The po-
sition of each of the threat materials, along with the average scattering angle per voxel
is given in Table 6.3.
The ability to identify dense clusters of voxels that represent shielded HEU is appar-
ent. Since the parameters given in Table 5.1 were defined to give optimum detection
capabilities under perfect resolution, all shielded threat materials are clearly identified
for perfect resolution. This demonstrates the success of muon scattering tomography,
to identify dense clusters of voxels with high average scattering angles that represent
shielded HEU. Table 6.4 lists the false positives and false negatives observed in Fig.
6.2. As spatial resolution decreases, there is an occurrence of a false negative for all
spatial resolutions representative of gaseous detectors (0.1 mm, 0.2 mm, 1 mm, 2 mm).
This false negative represents HEU shielded by steel and is located within the 3rd sec-
tion of the inspected cargo at position (2.1 m, 0.56 m, -0.408 m). The build-up of this
false negative represents a concern of the analysis algorithm in being able to correctly
detect shielded HEU with the given parameters that have been calculated for perfect
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resolution.
The false negative is caused by the number of voxels (V) above the plane average (times
1.3), being less than the amount required for detection to be made. Table 6.3 displays
the average scattering angle per voxel observed for each of the threat materials, the
average scattering angle observed in the plane where each threat is located and the re-
constructed ratio for each of the threat materials. The reconstructed ratio is defined as
the total number of muons that have interacted with the target and been correctly re-
constructed where the target is located, divided by the total amount of muons that have
interacted with the target and are available for reconstruction. It can be seen that the
average scattering angle per voxel observed in the false negative, is lower than other
threat materials located within the same section. A lower average scattering angle per
voxel will mean fewer voxels are greater than the minimum required by Table 5.1, to
be considered as a threat material.
Furthermore, as resolution decreases the accurate reconstruction of a muon track also
decreases. This causes muon scattering points, which should be located in volumes
where threat materials are located, to be located in other volumes. The reconstructed
ratio gives a numerical value to this feature. It can be seen that the reconstructed ratio
for this threat material (F.N.1), is systematically lower than the other threat materials
located within the same section. A smaller reconstructed ratio means fewer muons that
have interacted with a threat material, have their muon scattering point located in the
volume where the threat is located. This in turn may cause the number of voxels (V)
that meet the criteria for detection to be made, to be lower than that required in Table
5.1. The low reconstructed ratio observed for this threat may be due to two reasons.
Firstly, a block of sand has been placed around the threat. Muons that interact with the
threat will also pass through this large item of clutter. This clutter causes the muon to
undergo large additional scattering, which results in the muon scattering point being
located outside the volume where the threat is located. Secondly this threat is located
towards the front of the cargo container. Outside the front of the container is the engine
and battery of the lorry, which are effectively large blocks of iron and lead. Therefore
some muons that are scattered by the threat material may also be scattered by the engine
or battery, thus reducing the accuracy of the muon scattering point.
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Table 6.4 False positives and false negatives observed for the different resolutions using
parameters determined for perfect resolution.
Type Figure I.D Resolution Section R V M Avg Scatter
(degrees)
x (m) y (m) z (m) Cause
False
Positive
F.P.1 Perfect 2 3 20 1.3 3.56 ± 0.17 -1.55 -0.56 0.412 Block of Aluminium
of dimensions 101.9
× 101.9 × 50 cm
False
Positive
F.P.1 0.1 mm 2 3 19 1.3 3.36 ± 0.08 -1.55 -0.56 0.412 Block of Aluminium
of dimensions 101.9
× 101.9 × 50 cm
False
Positive
F.P.1 0.2 mm 2 3 17 1.3 3.58 ± 0.14 -1.55 -0.56 0.412 Block of Aluminium
of dimensions 101.9
× 101.9 × 50 cm
False
Positive
F.P.1 1 mm 2 3 17 1.3 3.65 ± 0.21 -1.55 -0.56 0.412 Block of Aluminium
of dimensions 101.9
× 101.9 × 50 cm
False
Positive
F.P.1 2 mm 2 3 17 1.3 4.65 ± 0.20 -1.55 -0.56 0.412 Block of Aluminium
of dimensions 101.9
× 101.9 × 50 cm
All other false positives for all resolutions (F.P.2 - F.P.3) are volumes that have been built up just inside where the cargo container walls are located.
False
Negative
F.N.1 0.1 mm 3 3 18 1.3 2.67 ± 0.24 2.1 0.56 -0.408 Not identified with the
analysis algorithm
False
Negative
F.N.1 0.2 mm 3 3 18 1.3 2.67 ± 0.25 2.1 0.56 -0.408 Not identified with the
analysis algorithm
False
Negative
F.N.1 1 mm 3 3 16 1.3 2.82 ± 0.31 2.1 0.56 -0.408 Not identified with the
analysis algorithm
False
Negative
F.N.1 2 mm 3 3 15 1.3 3.02 ± 0.31 2.1 0.56 -0.408 Not identified with the
analysis algorithm
In addition to a false negative, a number of false positives are also observed for the dif-
ferent resolutions. These false positives are listed in Table 6.4. For perfect resolution,
there is the detection of two false positives. F.P.1 represents the misclassification of a
block of aluminium of size 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm × 50 cm and position -1.55 m, -0.56
m, 0.412 m as high-Z material. This false positive has been observed for all resolutions
and represents a limitation of muon scattering tomography to correctly differentiate
shielded HEU from blocks of aluminium. As discussed previously, one way to coun-
teract this is to consider the scattering width per unit length. In addition to the block
of aluminium, for perfect and 0.1 mm spatial resolutions there is also the build up of
false positives (F.P.2 and F.P.3) located just inside where cargo walls are located. These
false positives are due to muons that have scattered within the cargo container walls. As
resolution decreases, these false positives disappear. This is for the same reasons why a
false negative is observed, whereby as resolution becomes poorer so does the accurate
reconstruction of a muon track. Consequently fewer reconstructed muon scatter points
will be accurately reconstructed, meaning the required criteria for a set of 64 voxels to
be classified as high-Z material will not be met.
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(a) Perfect spatial resolution. (b) 0.1 mm spatial resolution.
(c) 0.2 mm spatial resolution. (d) 1 mm spatial resolution.
(e) 2 mm spatial resolution.
Fig. 6.2 Image reconstruction of Fig. 6.1 when using muon scattering tomography, for the
low-Z clutter configuration. Displayed are perfect resolution (a), 0.1 mm resolution (b), 0.2
mm resolution (c), 1 mm resolution (d) and 2 mm resolution (e). Red circles represent shielded
HEU that have been identified. Blue circles represent false positives attributed to the clutter or
cargo. Yellow circles represent volumes where shielded HEU was located, but not identified.
All volumes identified have been numbered.
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Analysis for all Twenty Configurations
The analysis approach described for the single configuration with muon scattering to-
mography, has been applied to the other fifteen configurations for shielded HEU con-
tained within low-Z clutter and four configurations with just low-Z clutter. Similar to
Table 6.3, Appendix B gives an example table of data for one of these twenty con-
figurations. These tables show the position, average scattering angle per voxel and
reconstructed ratio for each of the threats materials. Also given is the average scatter
per voxel of the plane the threat material is located within. Table 6.5 describes the total
amount of false positives (f.pos) and false negatives (f.neg) observed for all configu-
rations with different resolutions, when applying the set of parameters given in Table
5.1. At maximum there are 5 false negatives per configuration. For some configura-
tions more than one false positive or false negative has been observed. Since four of
the configurations out of each twenty had no threat materials located within them, total
false positive rates are taken from all twenty configurations conducted, whereas false
negatives rates are taken from sixteen configurations conducted. The percentage of con-
figurations observed to have a false positive or false negative is also given.
As resolution worsens the number of false positives decreases. This is expected, as
when resolution becomes poorer so does the accurate reconstruction of a muon track.
Consequently fewer muon scattering points will be correctly reconstructed. For 0.1
mm and 0.2 mm spatial resolutions the false positive rate is particularly high (35% of
configurations reconstruct a false positive). However, the majority (7 out of 9) of these
false positives are caused by the presence of large blocks of aluminium. Therefore if a
secondary process can be introduced that accounts for these blocks, the false positive
rate will drop significantly. Despite this the analysis algorithm has shown to be efficient
in removing volumes that are attributed to other low-Z materials (carbon, sand, gravel,
concrete etc).
Detection Rates when Altering Parameters for only Detecting HEU Shielded with
Lead
As resolution worsens the number of false negatives increases. From the results it
would appear that when applying optimum parameters calculated for perfect resolution
to all resolutions, the false negative rate becomes too high to be reasonable. This is
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Table 6.5 False positive and false negative rates for the detection of shielded HEU in
cargo containing low-Z clutter, with different resolutions, using parameters given in
Table 5.1. There are twenty different configurations. Sixteen of the twenty contain 5
shielded HEU threats. The remaining four have no shielded HEU placed within them.
Resolution Total f.pos % of Total f.neg % of
configurations configurations
with f.pos with f.neg
Perfect 8 35% 1/80 6.25%
0.1 mm 9 35% 5/80 31.5%
0.2 mm 9 35% 5/80 31.5%
1.0 mm 8 35% 11/80 50%
2.0 mm 2 10% 16/80 75%
expected since fewer muon tracks are accurately reconstructed and therefore materials
can be missed (same reasons as the false positives). However, all false negatives are
HEU shielded by steel. As discussed previously, the reconstruction parameters have
been calculated as the minimum conditions needed to detect all threat materials with
the lowest false positive rate for perfect resolution. The main driver of these parame-
ters is the detection of HEU when shielded by steel. Therefore an interesting case can
be made. If we alter the optimum parameters so that we only attempt to detect HEU
shielded by lead, then the optimum parameters given in Table 6.6 can be determined.
Table 6.7 demonstrates the false positive and false negative rates for the different reso-
lutions when using parameters optimised to only detect HEU shielded by lead.
Table 6.6 Optimum reconstruction parameters altered to detect only shielded HEU
shielded by lead.
Section R V M
1 3 16 / 64 1.5
2 3 20 / 64 1.3
3 3 29 / 64 1.3
4 4 21 / 64 1.5
The main change in the reconstruction parameters is the increase in the number of vox-
els, V, which the threat needs to occupy. Due to the higher threshold of the number of
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Table 6.7 False positive and false negative rates for the different resolutions when using
parameters optimised to only detect HEU shielded by lead.
Resolution Total f.pos % of Total f.neg % of
configurations configurations
with f.pos with f.neg
Perfect 3 15% 0 0%
0.1 mm 0 0% 0 0%
0.2 mm 1 5% 0 0%
1 mm 1 5% 3 18.75%
2 mm 0 0% 3 18.75%
voxels required with a greater mean scattering angle then that of the plane, the num-
ber of false positives is significantly reduced. Only resolutions of the order of 1-2 mm
result in an elevated false negative rate.
Detection Rates when Tuning the Detection Parameters for each Resolution
As stated previously the parameters used for reconstruction have been optimised as-
suming a perfect resolution. Due to increasing false negative rates as the resolution
worsens, the analysis parameters have been tuned for each resolution. After analysing
the results gathered for each different resolution when applying perfect conditions, new
conditions have been calculated for each resolution that detect all nuclear materials
with the lowest false positive rate. Table 6.8 show the new conditions calculated. Table
6.9 gives the false positive and false negative rates observed, when applying these new
parameters.
Table 6.8 New conditions optimised for each resolution to be applied to the systems
where shielded HEU is placed in a cargo container with low-Z clutter.
Resolution Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4
R V M R V M R V M R V M
Perfect 3 16 1.5 3 17 1.3 3 22 1.3 4 16 1.5
0.1 mm 3 16 1.5 3 16 1.3 3 22 1.3 4 15 1.5
0.2 mm 3 16 1.5 3 15 1.3 3 22 1.3 4 15 1.5
1 mm 3 16 1.5 3 14 1.3 3 22 1.3 4 14 1.5
2 mm 3 14 1.5 3 12 1.3 3 22 1.3 4 13 1.5
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Table 6.9 False positive and false negative rates for the different resolutions using new
parameters described in Table 6.8.
Resolution Total f.pos % of Total f.neg % of
configurations configurations
with f.pos with f.neg
Perfect 8 35% 1/80 6.25%
0.1 mm 11 45% 1/80 6.25%
0.2 mm 11 45% 1/80 6.25%
1 mm 13 55% 2/80 12.5%
2 mm 13 55% 2/80 12.5%
Upon changing the parameters the false negative rate becomes lower but the false pos-
itive rate increases. Since the parameters for threat detection have been lowered, more
false positives will be observed, as more will be above the detection threshold. Table
6.10 shows the false negatives produced for each of the different configurations, along
with the cause of each particular false negative.
Table 6.10 False negatives produced for each of the different configurations, along with
the cause of each particular false negative. All represent HEU shielded by steel.
Resolution Configuration
Number
Section R V M x (m) y (m) z (m) Cause
Perfect 16 3 3 18 1.3 -2.40 0.26 -0.41 2
0.1 mm 15 3 3 18 1.3 2.10 0.56 -0.41 1
0.2 mm 15 3 3 18 1.3 2.10 0.56 -0.41 1
1mm 15 3 3 18 1.3 2.10 0.56 -0.41 1
1mm 16 3 3 18 1.3 -2.40 0.26 -0.41 2
2 mm 15 3 3 18 1.3 2.10 0.56 -0.41 1
2 mm 16 3 3 18 1.3 -2.40 0.26 -0.41 2
1. The cause of the false negative in configuration 15 is due to surrounding the threat with a
block of sand 80 cm thick plus location towards front of lorry.
2. The cause of the false negative in configuration 16 is because it has a block of 101.9 cm x
101.9 cm x 80 cm concrete directly below it.
All of the false negatives are located within the 3rd section. For each resolution, when
altering the parameters to decrease the number of false negatives, the parameters used
in reconstructing the 3rd section were not altered. A reduction of the parameters to the
lowest point in which these nuclear materials could be correctly reconstructed, results
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in an extremely large buildup of false positives in that section.
As shown in Table 6.10 there are a total of seven false negatives for the different res-
olutions, all located in the 3rd section. These false negatives occur in two different
configurations. The false negative that is found in configuration number 15 (Table 6.10,
rows 2, 3, 4 and 6) can be explained by the location of the clutter surrounding it. Muons
that pass through the threat also pass through the block of 80 cm thick sand surrounding
it. When a muon is in the lower sections of the cargo it will have a lower momentum due
to previous interactions with other materials and therefore the degree of scatter caused
by any subsequent materials will be greater than if the muon had encountered the same
material higher up. Since the PoCA algorithm assumes scattering to have occurred at a
single point, the muon track is more likely to be reconstructed below the threat material.
The second reason for this threat to be less likely reconstructed is due to its position to-
wards the front of the cargo. In addition to passing through the cargo and subsequent
clutter, muons that pass through threats located towards the front of the lorry may also
pass through the engine compartment of the lorry, that in addition to other things holds
the engine (made from predominantly iron) and the battery (made from predominantly
lead). These higher density materials can cause any muons that pass through them to
undergo large deflections. The false negative found within configuration number 16
(Table 6.10, rows 1, 5 and 7) has a block of concrete 80 cm thick for any muons that
pass through the target to also pass through. The threats have been not correctly recon-
structed for the same first reason as discussed above.
The location of the false positives varies evenly within the different sections and po-
sitions in the cargo; therefore little conclusion can be made upon the dependence of
reconstruction of these materials, upon its location within the cargo. As for results with
previous parameters, it appears that the majority of false positives are a result of large
blocks of aluminium. Table 6.11 shows the false positive rate if those false positives
caused by large blocks of aluminium are excluded.
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Table 6.11 False positive and false negative rates for the different resolutions using
new parameters described in Table 6.8, if we assume blocks of aluminium have been
excluded.
Resolution Total f.pos % of Total f.neg % of
configurations configurations
with f.pos with f.neg
Perfect 2 5% 1/80 6.25%
0.1 mm 2 5% 1/80 6.25%
0.2 mm 2 5% 1/80 6.25%
1.0 mm 1 5% 2/80 12.5%
2.0 mm 1 5% 2/80 12.5%
6.2.2 Discussion of the Muon Disappearance Algorithm
The capability of muon disappearance tomography to correctly detect shielded HEU
amongst low-Z clutter scenarios (given in Fig. 6.1) is discussed. Optimum parameters
calculated for the detection of shielded HEU with the lowest false positive build-up
have been used. These parameters are given in Table 5.4 and have been calculated
as the same for each resolution tested. Fig 6.3 displays dense clusters of voxels that
have been extracted when using this technique for perfect resolution. It is clear that
when solely using this technique, no shielded HEU can be clearly distinguished from
the background clutter. This is due to other muons that have disappeared in the clutter
and the cargo container itself. As with the empty lorry scenarios, all shielded HEU
have been reconstructed, but they are masked due to additional voxel build-up. Similar
results are observed for all other resolutions tested, whereby shielded HEU is identi-
fied, but unable to be distinguished from the additional voxels that are built up from
muons that have disappeared in the lorry and clutter. Due to the nature of the algorithm,
multiple voxels above and below the threats have also been reconstructed. This further
indicates the issues the muon disappearance algorithm has with vertical clutter systems.
These limitations demonstrate why the muon disappearance algorithm should only be
used as a secondary technique to help enhance muon scattering tomography.
The same results have been observed in all of the twenty configurations conducted,
whereby all shielded HEU is indistinguishable from background clutter. For those con-
figurations that have no shielded HEU present, there is the build-up of multiple voxels
due to clutter, when using the parameters given in Table 5.4. This further confirms
the inability of the muon disappearance algorithm to clearly detect shielded HEU with
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a low false positive rate. Thus techniques involving solely the muon disappearance
algorithm in medium-Z clutter scenarios have not been considered.
Fig. 6.3 Image reconstruction of Fig. 6.1 using the muon disappearance tomography with the
analysis algorithm (discussed in section 5.3) for low-Z clutter scenario. Displayed are all voxels
identified assuming perfect detector resolution.
6.2.3 Results using Muon Scattering and Muon Disappearance To-
mography
Analysis for a Single Configuration
The capability of using the muon disappearance algorithm in conjunction with muon
scattering tomography, to enhance overall detection capabilities is discussed. The premise
of this technique is that muon scattering tomography is used to identify ‘areas of inter-
est’, which may or may not represent shielded HEU. Upon identification of these ‘areas
of interest’, the muon disappearance algorithm is then used to confirm whether they
are indeed high-Z materials. The criterion is made that for a reconstructed volume to
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be confirmed as high-Z material, it must be determined as such by both muon scat-
tering tomography and muon disappearance tomography. Optimum parameters for the
detection of shielded HEU, with the lowest false positive rate for muon disappearance
tomography, are given in Table 5.4. Fig. 6.4 displays the volumes identified as ‘ar-
eas of interest’ by muon scattering tomography for the low-Z clutter scenario given in
Fig. 6.1, for perfect resolution. Fig. 6.4 also displays the volumes identified using just
muon disappearance tomography when analysing the z-slices where areas of interest
were located with muon scattering tomography. Table 6.12 displays the average total
path length of each of the threats identified with muon scattering tomography and con-
firmed as such using muon disappearance tomography.
Table 6.12 Position and average total path length per voxel of each of the threats mate-
rials identified by applying muon disappearance tomography, to the ‘areas of interest’
obtained using the muon scattering algorithm.
Target I.D Resolution x (m) y (m) z (m) Muons
Disappearances
(Target)
Average Total Path
Length
Average Total
Path Length of
Plane
(1) Perfect 2.1 0.56 -0.408 247 10.30 ± 0.29 7.09 ± 0.02
(2) Perfect -0.6 -0.36 -0.408 268 12.75 ± 0.36 7.09 ± 0.02
(3) Perfect -2.4 0.26 -0.408 220 10.11 ± 0.25 7.09 ± 0.02
(4) Perfect -1.75 -0.36 0.85 119 13.20 ± 0.36 6.58 ± 0.02
(5) Perfect 0.8 0 0.2 118 10.30 ± 0.27 7.00 ± 0.02
(2) 0.1 mm -0.6 -0.36 -0.408 268 12.75 ± 0.35 7.09 ± 0.02
(3) 0.1 mm -2.4 0.26 -0.408 220 10.11 ± 0.25 7.09 ± 0.02
(4) 0.1 mm -1.75 -0.36 0.85 119 13.21 ± 0.36 6.59 ± 0.02
(5) 0.1 mm 0.8 0 0.2 118 10.30 ± 0.27 7.00 ± 0.02
(2) 0.2 mm -0.6 -0.36 -0.408 268 12.76 ± 0.35 7.09 ± 0.02
(3) 0.2 mm -2.4 0.26 -0.408 220 10.11 ± 0.25 7.09 ± 0.02
(4) 0.2 mm -1.75 -0.36 0.85 119 13.21 ± 0.36 6.59 ± 0.02
(5) 0.2 mm 0.8 0 0.2 118 10.29 ± 0.27 7.00 ± 0.02
(2) 1 mm -0.6 -0.36 -0.408 268 12.79 ± 0.35 7.09 ± 0.02
(3) 1 mm -2.4 0.26 -0.408 220 10.09 ± 0.26 7.09 ± 0.02
(4) 1 mm -1.75 -0.36 0.85 119 13.24 ± 0.36 6.59 ± 0.02
(5) 1 mm 0.8 0 0.2 118 10.24 ± 0.25 7.00 ± 0.02
(2) 2 mm -0.6 -0.36 -0.408 268 12.81 ± 0.35 7.09 ± 0.02
(3) 2 mm -2.4 0.26 -0.408 220 10.06 ± 0.25 7.09 ± 0.02
(4) 2 mm -1.75 -0.36 0.85 119 13.30 ± 0.36 6.58 ± 0.02
(5) 2 mm 0.8 0 0.2 118 10.19 ± 0.25 7.00 ± 0.02
As it can be seen in Fig. 6.4, all areas of interest that are attributed to shielded HEU have
been correctly reconstructed using the muon disappearance algorithm. This in turn con-
firms them as high-Z materials. F.P.1 for muon scattering tomography is caused by a
large block of aluminium. This false positive has has also been reconstructed when
using muon disappearance tomography (F.P.3). This represents a limitation of this
technique to aid in differentiating blocks of aluminium from shielded HEU. Similar
to the empty clutter scenarios, the false positives reconstructed using muon scattering
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Fig. 6.4 Image reconstruction of Fig. 6.1 using muon scattering tomography (top) and muon
disappearance tomography (bottom). Displayed are all voxels identified under perfect resolu-
tion. Red circles represent shielded HEU that have been identified. Blue circles represent false
positives attributed to the clutter or cargo.
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tomography (F.P.2), which are attributed to volumes just inside the walls of the cargo
container, have not been reconstructed using the muon disappearance algorithm. This
again reiterates the success of the muon disappearance algorithm in being able to cor-
rectly remove these volumes. The same results are observed for all resolutions whereby:
all threat materials identified using muon scattering tomography are confirmed by the
muon disappearance algorithm.
The false positive caused by aluminium in muon scattering tomography (F.P.1) is re-
constructed for all other resolutions, for both muon scattering tomography and muon
disappearance algorithm. Table 6.13 gives the average total path length observed per
voxel and the minimum reconstruction parameters of this false positive for each reso-
lution tested. There are a number of other false positives reconstructed by the muon
disappearance algorithm in the z-planes analysed (F.P.1, F.P.2, F.P.4, F.P.5). These false
positives are caused by the other blocks of clutter listed in Table 6.1. However, since
they were not originally identified by muon scattering tomography, they can be ignored
and assumed to be some type of clutter that has been built up.
There is the build up of a false negative for muon scattering tomography at 0.1 mm, 0.2
mm, 1 mm and 2 mm resolutions. This false negative is identified when using muon
disappearance tomography. However, since this volume is not identified using muon
scattering tomography it is assumed to be some erroneous clutter.
Table 6.13 List of false positives identified with the muon disappearance algorithm, that
have been identified as ‘areas of interest’ from muon scattering tomography.
Type Resolution Section R V M Avg Total Path Length (cm) x (m) y (m) z (m)
False Positive Perfect 2 15 45 1.4 13.66 ± 0.09 -1.55 -0.56 0.412
False Positive 0.1 mm 2 15 45 1.4 13.70 ± 0.09 -1.55 -0.56 0.412
False Positive 0.2 mm 2 15 45 1.4 13.97 ± 0.09 -1.55 -0.56 0.412
False Positive 1 mm 2 15 45 1.4 13.64 ± 0.09 -1.55 -0.56 0.412
False Positive 2 mm 2 15 45 1.4 13.71 ± 0.09 -1.55 -0.56 0.412
The cause of all these false positives is a block of aluminium of dimensions 101.9 × 101.9 × 50 cm.
Analysis for all Twenty Configurations
The analysis applied to the single configuration has also been applied to the other nine-
teen configurations, whereby the muon disappearance algorithm is used to analyse the
‘areas of interest’ identified with muon scattering tomography. Similar to Table 6.12,
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Appendix C gives an example table of data for one of these twenty configurations.
These tables show the position and average total path length per voxel of each of the
threats materials identified by applying the muon disappearance algorithm. The pri-
mary use of the muon disappearance algorithm was to attempt to reduce the number of
false positives observed with muon scattering tomography. Optimum parameters have
been given in Table 5.4, which display the parameters required to detect all shielded
HEU within each configuration, with the lowest false positive rate. From section 6.3,
the total amount of false positives that have been observed when using muon scattering
tomography with the analysis algorithm for each resolution, is given in Table 6.9. In ad-
dition to these false positives there is also the build-up of multiple false positives located
just inside the walls of the cargo container. These are due to muons that have scattered
within the cargo container walls. The muon disappearance algorithm has already been
shown to be very efficient in removing these volumes as false positives. Therefore
when considering the capability of the muon disappearance algorithm, results are only
discussed for those false positives that are due to clutter. The false positives due to the
walls of the cargo container, were found to be removed 100% of the time with the muon
disappearance algorithm.
Table 6.14 lists all the false positives due to clutter found using muon scattering tomog-
raphy, with parameters optimised for each resolution. It also displays whether these
false positives are removed by the muon disappearance algorithm, and the minimum
parameters that would be required for them to be removed. As it can be seen the muon
disappearance algorithm is unable to remove any of the false positives observed using
muon scattering tomography. Most of these false positives are caused by large blocks
of aluminium and an increase in the parameters to the point where these blocks would
no longer be observed, would result in multiple threat materials also being lost. This
presents a limitation of muon disappearance tomography to drastically enhance muon
scattering tomography techniques through removal of ‘areas of interest’ attributed to
clutter within the cargo. Despite this, the removal of ‘areas of interest’ associated with
the walls of the container has been found to be efficient, which demonstrates a success
of this new type of algorithm.
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6.3 Shielded HEU Placed within Medium-Z Clutter
6.3.1 Results using Muon Scattering Tomography
Analysis for a Single Configuration
The capability of muon scattering tomography was applied to detecting shielded HEU
in cargo containers filled with medium-Z clutter. This clutter generally consists of dif-
ferent sized blocks of aluminium, weathering steel, stainless steel and iron. Twenty
different types of setup have been simulated. This section will discuss in detail one
of these configurations. A schematic of the scenario is displayed in Fig 6.1. A list of
the clutter is given in Table 6.1. Fig. 6.5 displays the capability of muon scattering
tomography to detect shielded HEU in the scenario described, for all resolutions tested
(perfect, 0.1 mm, 0.2 mm, 1 mm, 2 mm). The parameters have been calculated as opti-
mum for the detection of shielded HEU in low-Z clutter scenarios for each resolution.
These parameters are listed in Table 6.8. As can been seen in Fig. 6.5 muon scattering
tomography with the analysis algorithm struggles to detect shielded HEU when housed
with medium-Z clutter. For all resolutions there are a number of false positives and
false negatives identified. A list of these false positives and false negatives is given in
Table 6.15.
Analysis into low-Z clutter scenarios have demonstrated the inability of muon scatter-
ing tomography to distinguish blocks of aluminium from threat materials. Given blocks
of the same dimensions, it is reasonable to expect that all blocks with a density higher
than aluminium will be reconstructed as threats by muon scattering tomography. From
Table 6.15, for each resolution, all blocks with densities higher than aluminium (weath-
ering steel, stainless steel, iron) have been identified as false positives. However, unlike
for low-Z clutter scenarios, blocks of clutter made of aluminium have not been misclas-
sified as high-Z volumes. The analysis algorithm compares the average scattering in
each voxel to the plane average. As the density of the blocks in each plane increases, so
will the average total scattering angle of the plane. This can be seen through comparing
the average scattering angle of each 20 cm plane where the threats are located for low-Z
clutter scenarios (Table 6.3) and medium-Z clutter scenarios (Table 6.16). An increase
in the average scattering angle of the plane that voxels are compared to will result in
fewer voxels being above the criteria required for detection to be made. This in turn
will result in lower density materials not having enough voxels above the criteria for
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detection to be made. In addition to the false positives caused by clutter, there is again
multiple false positives that occur just inside the cargo container walls. These are due
to muons that scatter within the container walls. It can be seen that as resolution de-
creases the number of false positives detected increases. This is due to the reduction in
parameters required for a volume to be identified as high-Z material. This reduction is
required so that shielded HEU are detected.
The cause of false negatives is the same as for blocks of aluminium not being identified
as threats. The average scattering angle observed for each voxel with a threat material,
does not significantly vary for low-Z clutter and medium-Z clutter scenarios. However
since the plane average does increase, this results in the number of voxels with an av-
erage scattering angle greater than the plane average (times some factor) to be below
that required for detection to be made. Secondly the reconstructed ratio is much lower
for threat materials in this scenario than compared to its low-Z clutter counterpart. As
fewer muons that have interacted with the threat are reconstructed within the threat,
the positive identification of these volumes as possible high-Z materials will reduce.
A 4th false negative (F.N.4) occurs as resolution decreases. The decrease in resolution
reduces the accurate reconstruction of a muon track, therefore the reconstructed muon
scattering point can end up outside where the threat is located. This in turn prevents the
criteria for detection to be made given in Table 6.8, from being met.
The build-up of false positives and false negatives demonstrates a limitation of muon
scattering tomography, when applied to medium-Z clutter scenarios. A reduction in
parameters so that all nuclear materials are detected has not been considered. Such a
reduction will cause the detection of multiple false positives in low-Z clutter scenarios,
thus making the algorithm no longer effective for this type of scenario.
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(a) Perfect spatial resolution. (b) 0.1 mm spatial resolution.
(c) 0.2 mm spatial resolution. (d) 1 mm spatial resolution.
(e) 2 mm spatial resolution.
Fig. 6.5 Image reconstruction of Fig. 6.1 using muon scattering tomography for the medium-Z
clutter scenario given in Fig. 6.1. Displayed are perfect resolution (top left), 0.1 mm resolution
(top right), 0.2 mm resolution (middle left), 1 mm resolution (middle right) and 2 mm resolution
(bottom). Red circles represent shielded HEU that have been identified. Blue circles represent
false positives attributed to the clutter or cargo. Yellow circles represent volumes where shielded
HEU was located, but not identified.
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Analysis for all Twenty Configurations
Similar to Table 6.16, Appendix D gives an example table of data for one of these
twenty configurations. These tables show the position, average scattering angle per
voxel and reconstructed ratio for each of the threats materials. Table 6.17 describes the
total amount of false positive (f.pos) and false negatives (f.neg) observed for all twenty
configurations with different resolutions when applying the set of parameters given in
Table 6.8. These parameters were calculated as being optimum for each resolution for
the detection of shielded HEU in low-Z clutter scenarios. There are at maximum 5
false negatives per each individual configuration. For some configurations more than
one false positive or false negative has been observed. Since four of the configurations
had no threat materials located within them, total false positive rates are taken from all
twenty configurations conducted, whereas false negatives rates are taken from sixteen
configurations conducted. The percentage of configurations observed to have a false
positive or false negative is also given.
Table 6.17 False positives and negative rates for the different resolutions in the medium-
Z clutter scenarios, using parameters described in Table 6.8.
Resolution Total f.pos % of Total f.neg % of
configurations configurations
with f.pos with f.neg
Perfect 81 100% 21/80 81.25%
0.1 mm 81 100% 23/80 81.25%
0.2 mm 80 100% 24/80 81.25%
1.0 mm 76 100% 26/80 87.5%
2.0 mm 68 100% 27/80 87.5%
As it can be seen all configurations result in the build-up of at least one false positive.
This is expected when we consider the results for the low-Z clutter scenarios. Since
the analysis algorithm applied to low-Z clutter scenarios fails to differentiate blocks of
aluminium, then it will also be unable to remove blocks of higher density materials.
For medium-Z clutter scenarios, the different materials used as clutter are aluminium,
stainless steel, weathering steel and iron. Most blocks of iron, weathering steel or
stainless steel in each configuration are reconstructed by the analysis algorithm. Due
to the increase in each plane’s average scattering angle per voxel, not all blocks of
aluminium within each configuration are reconstructed. The number of false positives
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decreases with resolution. This is again due to the decrease in resolution preventing the
accurate reconstruction of a muon track. This in turn causes the muon scattering point
to be reconstructed outside the volume where the clutter is located, thus causing the
volume to be below the criteria required for a positive detection to be made. In addition
to these false positives, there are also multiple additional voxels built up close to the
cargo container walls.
A large percentage of configurations observe at least one false negative. The number
of false negatives increases as resolution decreases. The is due to the same reason as
for a decrease in false positives. The increase in false negatives when compared to the
low-Z clutter scenarios is due to the increase in average plane scatter and the reduction
in the number of correct reconstructions (reconstructed ratio). Table 6.18 displays the
minimum parameters required to detect all shielded HEU. The reduction in parameters
required for positive detection to be made, results in the build-up of many more false
positives due to clutter for all configurations, in addition to multiple voxels in volumes
where no threats are located. The effect of this displays a limitation of muon scattering
tomography to detect shielded HEU in medium-Z clutter environments.
Table 6.18 New conditions optimised for each resolution to be applied to the systems
where shielded HEU is placed in a cargo container with low-Z clutter.
Resolution Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4
R V M R V M R V M R V M
Perfect 3 14 1.4 3 10 1.2 3 22 1.1 4 12 1.2
0.1 mm 3 11 1.4 3 10 1.2 3 19 1.1 4 11 1.2
0.2 mm 3 10 1.4 3 10 1.2 3 19 1.1 4 11 1.2
1 mm 3 8 1.4 3 8 1.2 3 13 1.4 4 11 1.2
2 mm 3 9 1.1 3 7 1.3 3 10 1.4 4 15 1.4
6.3.2 Results using Muon Scattering and Muon Disappearance To-
mography
Analysis for a Single Configuration
Fig. 6.6 displays the ‘areas of interest’ identified using muon scattering tomography
(top) and the volumes identified by the muon disappearance algorithm (bottom) when
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analysing the z-slices where the ‘areas of interest’ are located. The configuration tested
is that shown in Fig. 6.1. As it can be seen the two threat materials identified when
using muon scattering tomography, have been missed when using muon disappearance
tomography. This is a major concern as it not only fails to enhance muon scattering
tomography, but actually decreases detection capabilities. All false positives that are
attributed to clutter in muon scattering tomography (F.P.1, F.P.2, F.P.3, F.P.4) have also
been reconstructed by the muon disappearance algorithm (F.P.1, F.P.2, F.P.3, F.P.4).
There is also the build-up of a 5th false positive from the muon disappearance algorithm
(F.P.5). This false positive is located in the volume between F.P.3 and F.P.4 and is due
to muons that have disappeared in each of these clutter items. However, since it is not
identified as an ‘area of interest’ with muon scattering tomography it can be ignored.
The groups of reconstructed voxels that represent the items of clutter accurately reflect
the actual object size of the false positive. Similar to the low-Z clutter scenarios, all
false positives that are attributed to the walls of the cargo container have been removed
by the muon disappearance algorithm.
Analysis for all Twenty Configurations
The analysis described for the single configuration was applied to all other fifteen con-
figurations for shielded HEU in containers housing medium-Z clutter and four config-
urations with just medium-Z clutter. Appendix E gives an example table of data for
one of the twenty medium-Z clutter configurations. These tables show the position
and average total path length per voxel of each of threats identified by the muon dis-
appearance algorithm. As with the analysis discussed for the single configuration, no
false positives that are attributed to clutter are removed by the muon disappearance al-
gorithm. The majority of these false positives are caused by blocks of stainless steel,
weathering steel or iron. There are multiple instances where shielded HEU identified by
muon scattering tomography, are missed by the muon disappearance algorithm. These
results demonstrate the inability of the muon disappearance tomography algorithm to
enhance traditional muon tomography methods for medium-Z clutter scenarios. Since
some shielded threat materials identified by muon scattering tomography are not con-
firmed by the muon disappearance algorithm, it actually reduces the effectiveness of
muon scattering tomography techniques for this type of scenario. As with the low-Z
clutter scenarios, 100% of false positives that are caused by muons scattered in the
cargo container walls have been removed.
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Fig. 6.6 Image reconstruction of Fig. 6.1 using the muon scattering tomography (top) and
the muon disappearance algorithm (bottom). Displayed are all voxels identified under perfect
resolution. Red circles represent shielded HEU that have been identified. Blue circles represent
false positives attributed to the clutter or cargo. Yellow circle represent volumes where shielded
HEU was located, but not identified.
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6.4 Summary
The efficiency to detect shielded HEU amongst different clutter scenarios using muon
scattering tomography and the muon disappearance algorithm have been evaluated.
Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter scenarios have been tested. For each scenario,
twenty different clutter configurations were run. Sixteen of the twenty configurations,
attempted to detect shielded HEU hidden amongst the clutter, whereas four had no
shielded HEU placed within them. Systems that solely used muon scattering tomog-
raphy with the analysis algorithm described in section 5.2.2, have been shown to be
efficient in detecting shielded HEU in amongst low-Z clutter scenarios. Parameters
tuned for each resolution display a low false negative build-up. The concern with this
system is the build-up of false positives in over 50% of the configurations. These false
positives are mainly large blocks of aluminium, therefore any secondary process that
could account for these blocks will greatly enhance detection capabilities. However,
the removal of other low-Z clutter items demonstrates the success of the algorithm to
remove materials such as concrete, sand, carbon, polyethylene and gravel. Other false
positives that are located close to the walls of the cargo container are also reconstructed.
These volumes represent muons that have undergone scatters in the walls of the cargo
container. The addition of the muon disappearance algorithm does not act to remove
any false positives that are due to clutter, but does act to remove false positives caused
by the cargo container walls. This therefore will enhance overall detection capabilities
for shielded HEU in low-Z clutter environments. It has been confirmed that techniques
which solely use muon disappearance tomography are unable to clearly detect shielded
HEU with a low false positive rate.
For the scenarios discussed in this thesis that involve medium-Z clutter, muon scattering
tomography has shown to be inefficient in detecting shielded HEU with a low enough
false negative and false positive rate. The addition of the muon disappearance algorithm
does not remove any of the false positives identified with muon scattering tomography
but instead acts to remove some of the threats that have been identified. This acts to re-
duce detection efficiency. Therefore it is concluded that both techniques, whether used
in conjunction or on their own, struggle to detect shielded HEU in medium-Z clutter
scenarios.
Chapter 7
Material Segregation using
Cosmic-Ray Neutrons
In this chapter a discussion about the feasibility of using cosmic-ray neutrons to detect
shielded HEU is given. The concept behind this process is discussed in section 7.1.
Section 7.2 displays the validity of using GEANT4.9.6-p02 when applied to neutron
interactions with matter. The multiple physical processes that occur when neutrons
stop in different density materials have been investigated using GEANT4.9.6-p02 with
the ‘Shielding 2.0’ physics list. A discussion of the secondaries produced for different
materials then concludes this section. Section 7.3 analyses the total amount of excess
neutrons and γ-rays produced when cosmic-ray neutrons interact with different materi-
als. Under idealised conditions of 100% detector coverage and efficiencies a discussion
is made into whether, through counting these excess neutrons and γ-rays, we can dif-
ferentiate between materials. The chapter is concluded in section 7.4, with a study into
whether cosmic-ray neutrons can be used to detect shielded HEU in an empty lorry
scenario. Section 7.5 summarises the results presented.
7.1 Concept
As mentioned in section 2.4.3, cosmic-ray neutrons are produced when primary cosmic
rays undergo interactions in the Earths atmosphere. After muons, neutrons represent
the most abundant particle produced by cosmic-ray interactions that reach the surface.
Due to the wide energy range in which cosmic-ray neutrons span, there is always the
possibility that these neutrons will interact with the nucleus of the target they are pass-
ing through, resulting in the production of excess neutrons and γ-rays via fission (for
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nuclear material) or spallation (for other material). Detection is established through
measuring the gross count rate of neutrons and γ-rays over a defined time interval. The
count rate from background neutrons and γ-rays will remain roughly the same over
time. Upon the introduction of shielded HEU (or similar) gross count rates are again
taken over the same time interval. Fissionable materials such as HEU will produce
many more excess neutrons and γ-rays via fission then non-fissionable materials do via
spallation. High-Z materials, such as the shielding components will produce excess
neutrons and γ-rays via spallation. This process is more likely to occur in high-Z ma-
terials then low-Z materials [41]. Through measuring a sufficiently elevated rate above
the background, detection of SNM can be established. This has the advantage over
active interrogation methods of no interrogation source, hence there will be no harm to
people or materials. Simulations run in this chapter have used GEANT4.9.6-p02 with
the ‘Shielding 2.0’ physics list [97, 98]. All cosmic-ray neutrons have been generated
using CRY [49]. A full description of CRY is given in section 7.2.1. As with cosmic-ray
muon techniques, exposure times of 5 minutes are tested.
7.2 GEANT4 Simulations on Differentiating Between
Different Density Materials
The validity of GEANT4.9.6-p02 to accurately represent neutron interactions with mat-
ter and subsequent secondary production, has been tested through measuring the neu-
tron multiplicity observed when neutrons interact with 235U and 238U. Simulations in-
volved propagating 500,000 neutrons of monochromatic energy through 1 cm × 1 cm
× 1 cm blocks of both uranium isotopes. Energies chosen were 0.025 eV, 1 MeV, 1.5
MeV, 2 MeV, 2.5 MeV, 3 MeV, 3.5 MeV, 4 MeV, 4.5 MeV, 5 MeV, 7.5 MeV, 10 MeV,
12.5 MeV and 15 MeV. Detectors were placed all around the volume to be inspected,
with all neutrons recorded. Multiplicities measured for these two isotopes over the
range of neutron energies tested, along with values obtained from literature [110–115]
are given in Fig. 7.1. These results show good agreement and confirm the accuracy of
GEANT4.9.6-p02 with ‘Shielding 2.0’ physics list.
7.2.1 Simulation Parameters
Before conducting realistic scenarios, simulations were run to show the ability to dif-
ferentiate materials using cosmic-ray neutrons. Characteristic signatures that are emit-
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ted for each material have been measured. Cosmic-ray neutrons were generated using
CRY [49], with their full range of energies and angular distributions. Their angular
distributions were then ignored and instead all cosmic-ray neutrons were given a di-
rection of vertically straight down. Simulations have been run in GEANT4.9.6-p02
[97, 98], which involved propagating 500,000 cosmic-ray neutrons, with a vertical di-
rection, through several 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm blocks of different materials. This
was done to study the energy distribution of secondary particles with adequate statistics.
The materials tested were water, iron, lead, 235U and 238U. Both 235U and 238U were
tested as they emit differing numbers of neutrons and γ-rays that may act as a marker
for the detection of shielded HEU. Detectors were placed fully surrounding the target.
They are set to be 100% efficient and detect any neutrons or γ-rays produced within the
simulation.
The cosmic-ray neutron spectrum for all simulations was generated using CRY (Cosmic-
ray shower library). CRY is a software package that creates cosmic-ray particles (muons,
γ-rays, neutrons, protons, electrons and pions) at different elevations above sea-level (0
m, 2100 m, 11300 m). Energy spectra can be produced for all or just one of the sec-
ondary particles. These spectra are generated on a specified surface area up to 300 m×
300 m, with their positions on this ‘plane’ also being recorded. The time of arrival and
zenith angle of the particles are also recorded [49]. Fig. 7.2 shows the CRY generated
neutron spectrum at sea level and at latitude 51.1295◦ (the latitude of Dover), in addition
to a number of experimental measurements and other parameterisations for comparison
[57–59]. The spectrum generated using CRY displays a decreased neutron rate at lower
energies when compared to the spectra taken from literature. At higher energies the
CRY spectrum agrees well with both experimental data and other parameterisations.
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(a) 235U neutron multiplicity.
(b) 238U neutron multiplicity.
Fig. 7.1 Neutron multiplicity observed for 235U (top) and 238U (bottom) over a range of energies
using GEANT4.9.6-p02 with the ‘Shielding 2.0’ physics list when compared to literature values
[110–115].
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7.2.2 Gamma-ray and Neutron Spectra
Secondary neutrons and γ-rays produced when cosmic-ray neutrons interact with tar-
get materials have been analysed. Neutron and γ-ray energy spectra for this study are
displayed in Fig. 7.3. Table 7.1 displays a number of the γ-ray peaks emitted upon
neutron interaction with the target material, along with their cause and GEANT4 pro-
cess. The dominant process of neutron and γ-ray production occurs when neutrons
undergo inelastic scattering within the target material. During this interaction a neutron
will transfer some of its kinetic energy to the nucleus, causing the nucleus to go to an
excited state. This will cause the incoming neutron to lose speed and change direc-
tion. Since part of the neutron kinetic energy is used to place the nucleus in an excited
state, the total kinetic energy of the outgoing neutron and nucleus is less than the ki-
netic energy of the original incoming neutron. Relaxation of the nucleus to the ground
state occurs through the emission of γ-rays. Secondary processes that produce γ-rays
involve the capture of a neutron by the nucleus of a material. This process is mitigated
by the ‘nCapture’ process in GEANT4. It results in the nucleus rearranging its internal
structure and being left over in an excited state. De-excitation occurs via the emission
of γ-rays.
For nuclear materials, fission can occur when neutrons interact with the target nuclei,
thus creating additional neutrons and γ-rays. After neutron inelastic scattering it is the
2nd most dominant source of neutron production that occurs within nuclear materials.
Upon undergoing fission many of the daughter products undergo radioactive decay in
timescales ranging from seconds to years. This again adds an additional source of sec-
ondaries. Once a neutron interacts with the target, the target itself becomes a particle
within the simulation. This means for 235U and 238U once a neutron has interacted with
it, they can both start to undergo radioactive decay through to lead. This process takes
millennia to occur. Two examples of secondary γ-rays produced by the radioactive de-
cay of 235U and 238U are given in Table 7.1. For 235U the 2.614 MeV line, and 238U the
2.2 MeV line observed in the γ-ray spectra, are caused by γ-rays emitted as part of the
236U and 238U decay chains respectively.
As displayed in Fig. 7.3 given a high resolution detector, large detector area and ade-
quate statistics, the detection of different materials through measuring their γ-ray spec-
tra is apparent. Unfortunately for the applications discussed in this thesis, whereby the
detection of shielded HEU occurs under short timescales with low resolution plastic
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scintillators and 3He neutron detectors, such conditions are not available. Instead de-
tection of shielded HEU has to be made via measuring the gross count rate of neutrons
or γ-rays overtime and comparing this rate to the background count rate. Only if the
count rate is sufficiently above the background can detection be determined. The fol-
lowing section will discuss the capability of differentiating between materials using the
number of neutrons and γ-rays detected. Finally the ability to detect shielded HEU in
realistic empty lorry scenarios, through measuring the gross count rate of neutrons and
γ-rays over time is presented.
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(a) Secondary γ-ray spectrum.
(b) Secondary neutron spectrum.
Fig. 7.3 Secondary γ-ray (top) and neutron (bottom) energy spectra. The results are for 500,000
cosmic-ray neutrons propagated vertically into 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm cubes of water (blue),
iron (yellow), lead (black), 235U (red) and 238U (green).
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7.3 Material Segregation using Cosmic-Ray Neutrons
7.3.1 Material Segregation for a Single Block Scenario
Cosmic-ray neutrons are generated over a 10 m × 10 m surface area and implemented
so that their true distribution of energies and zenith angles at sea level are represented.
These neutrons are interfaced with GEANT4.9.6-p02 and propagated through the in-
spected volume displayed in Fig. 7.4 (not to scale). The targets to be inspected are
blocks of different sizes. These are 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm and 50 cm × 50 cm × 50
cm blocks of low density (water, polyethylene, concrete), medium density (iron) and
high density (lead, 238U) materials. Detectors are placed completely around the system
so that all neutrons and γ-rays are detected. These detectors are assumed to be 100% ef-
ficient. The total amount of excess neutrons and γ-rays that are produced in a 5 minute
exposure time are recorded. This is done to determine whether different density mate-
rials can be distinguished from one another. Table 7.2 gives the total number of excess
neutrons and γ-rays that are produced, along with their uncertainties. It is assumed that
there are no background neutrons or γ-rays detected. The error given is that calculated
on the mean.
Table 7.2 Total amount of excess neutron and γ-ray observed when propagating 850,000
cosmic-ray neutrons, implemented with their true distribution of energies and zenith
angles at sea level, through each one block configuration tested. Detector coverages
and efficiencies are 100%. It is assumed that there are no background neutrons or γ-
rays.
10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm blocks 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm blocks
Material Neutrons Detected γ-rays Detected Neutrons Detected γ-rays Detected
Water 15.9 ± 0.5 26.3 ± 0.7 995 ± 4 2875 ± 7
Polyethylene 12.3 ± 0.5 21.3 ± 0.6 1210 ± 4 2600 ± 7
Concrete 29.2 ± 0.7 47.6 ± 0.9 2170 ± 6 3885 ± 8
Iron 144.8 ± 1.6 150.1 ± 1.6 9890 ± 13 4980 ± 9
Lead 330.1 ± 2.3 80.8 ± 1.2 23505 ± 20 3760 ± 8
238U 1200 ± 5 325.4 ± 2.4 67850 ± 34 13380 ± 15
For either sized block, as density increases so does the number of excess neutrons emit-
ted. A sufficiently elevated rate of neutrons over other density materials is observed for
238U. This increased rate is due to fission events. Sufficient levels of neutrons are also
observed for medium and high-density materials (iron, lead, 238U), that separate them
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Fig. 7.4 Standard set-up for the cosmic-ray neutron inspection volume system (not to scale).
from low density materials (water, polyethylene, concrete). In a shielding scenario both
nuclear and high-Z material, or nuclear and medium-Z materials will be used in tandem
with one another. This acts to increase the total number of neutrons being produced over
low-Z materials (of the same size) and hence this signal should become even clearer. In
general as density increases so does the number of excess γ-rays observed.
In a 5 minute exposure time there are ≈ 850,000 cosmic-ray neutrons generated over a
10 m × 10 m surface area. If these neutrons are evenly distributed there would be 2125
cosmic-ray neutrons over a 0.5 m × 0.5 m surface area and 85 cosmic-ray neutrons
over a 0.1 m × 0.1 m surface area. These numbers represent a minimum amount of
cosmic-ray neutrons one would expect to interact with 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm and 10
cm × 10 cm × 10 cm targets respectively. On average 4300 ± 65 cosmic-ray neutrons
will interact with 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm sized targets in a 5 minute exposure time.
This is significantly more than for 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm sized targets, where only
175 ± 15 will interact over the same time length. The increased number of interactions
result in more neutrons and γ-rays being produced for all different materials. As shown
200 Material Segregation using Cosmic-Ray Neutrons
in Table 7.2 this again allows low-density and medium/high-density materials to be dif-
ferentiated from one another.
An interesting feature observed is the number of additional γ-rays detected for iron over
lead, for both 10 cm × 10 cm × 10 cm and 50 cm × 50 cm × 50 cm sized blocks. This
increased amount is due to the self-shielding effects of lead. More γ-rays are produced
in total through neutron interactions with lead. However, due to the higher density of
lead, more γ-rays are reabsorbed by the target and therefore fewer are available for de-
tection. If we consider a 1 MeV γ-ray generated at the centre of a block of size 10 cm
× 10 cm × 10 cm, this γ-ray is required to travel at least 5 cm to exit the material. The
intensity of γ-rays exiting a material is given by:
I = I0e−µx (7.1)
where I is the intensity of γ-rays exiting, I0 is the initial intensity, µ is the mass at-
tenuation coefficient in units cm2/g and x is the depth of material in units g/cm2. For
γ-rays of energy 1 MeV passing out of 5 cm of iron or lead, Eq. (7.1) gives the fraction
escaping as 9.45% for iron and 1.77% for lead. Therefore even though more γ-rays are
produced when neutrons interact with lead, much fewer escape the target to be available
for detection. Therefore even though more γ-rays are produced when neutrons interact
with lead, much fewer escape the target to be available for detection. This feature may
cause concerns when attempting to detect shielded HEU through observing an elevated
γ-ray rate, in medium-Z clutter scenarios.
From Table 7.2 it is evident large amounts of nuclear materials produce more neutrons
or γ-rays, which distinguishes them from low-density clutter materials. Due to the re-
sults observed, further investigation into this area is made, which accounts for both
detector capabilities, more complex geometries and the background. These results are
discussed in section 7.3.2.
7.3.2 Lorry Scenario
The ability to detect shielded HEU in realistic empty cargo containers has been inves-
tigated using GEANT4.9.6-p02 with the ‘Shielding 2.0’ physics list. Three different
types of cargo configuration were run: one where the cargo container was empty with
no shielded HEU; one where the cargo container was empty except for HEU shielded
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by iron; one where the cargo was empty except for HEU shielded by lead. So that
adequate statistics were gathered, each type of configuration was simulated for 50 mil-
lion cosmic-ray neutrons. Results have been scaled down to 850,000 neutrons, which
represents a 5 minute exposure time are presented. We have used 20% enriched ura-
nium (20% 235U and 80% 238U) with 7 cm lead shielding or 11 cm iron shielding. This
amount of shielding is used as it is enough to attenuate the characteristic 1.001 MeV
γ-ray line, so passive detection could not be made within 5 minutes at 3 standard devia-
tion level. Around the volume to be inspected we placed four PVT γ-ray detectors (size
180 cm× 35 cm) and eight 3He neutron detectors (radius 2 cm and length 55 cm) in the
same set-up as that used currently at ports. The efficiency for of 3He detectors for ther-
mal neutrons is 77% [41]. For the applications discussed in this chapter the efficiency
of neutron detectors for all energies was calculated as ≈ 1.3%. The efficiency was
calculated through propagating 50 million cosmic-ray neutrons through the inspected
volume setup described in Fig. 7.5 (but with no lorry). For γ-rays of all energies de-
tector efficiency is equal to ≈ 67%. This efficiency was calculated via propagating
γ-rays produced via radioactive decay of 238U and 232Th through 180 cm × 35 cm ×
6 cm at random angles. A γ-ray was considered detected if interaction with the γ-ray
detector yielded an electron. An example GEANT4 schematic is displayed in Fig. 7.5.
The background level for neutrons and γ-rays have been calculated using GEANT4. A
description of how this background level is ascertained is given in section 4.4.5. There
are on average 41.1 ± 0.8 background neutrons and 300,170 ± 430 background γ-rays
detected by the current set-up for a 5 minute exposure time.
The total amount of neutrons and γ-rays detected for each type of configuration is given
in Table 7.3. As it can be seen from Table 7.3, for 5 minute exposure times with realis-
tic detector coverage and efficiency, an elevated rate of neutrons is not observed for the
configurations where shielded HEU is present. This indicates that under these condi-
tions shielded HEU would struggle to be detected. For γ-rays there is a slight increase
in the number observed when shielded HEU is present. However, this level is not suf-
ficiently above the number of γ-rays observed when no HEU is present, for definitive
detection to be made. An elevated rate is not observed due to the low detector coverage
and the low number of neutrons that interact with the target. For HEU shielded by iron,
on average 925 ± 5 neutrons pass through with the target. For HEU shielded by lead
on average 520 ± 3 neutrons pass through with the target. This number includes both
cosmic-ray neutrons and neutrons produced when cosmic-ray neutrons undergo inter-
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Fig. 7.5 GEANT4 schematic of the inspected volume. Two PVT γ-ray detectors and four 3He
neutron detectors are located at the sides of the lorry to be inspected.
actions with the components of the lorry. Roughly a thousand times this many neutrons
pass through the cargo container and components of the lorry. It is the neutrons and
γ-rays produced from interactions with the components of the lorry, which primarily
constitute those neutrons and γ-rays that are detected. The inability to detect shielded
HEU in empty cargo containers means more complex configurations have not been con-
sidered.
If it is assumed that by doubling the detector area given in Table 7.3 twice as many
secondaries will be detected, a basic estimation can be made to determine the amount
of detector coverage required to detect shielded HEU at the 5 sigma level. This cover-
age is calculated assuming neutron and γ-ray detector efficiencies given in this thesis.
Fig. 7.6 displays the amount of neutron or γ-ray detector coverage required to get a
certain sigma level of detection for HEU shielded by iron or lead. From Fig. 7.6, ≈ 13
m2 neutron detector coverage is required to identity HEU shielded by lead, ≈ 22 m2
neutron detector coverage is required to identity HEU shielded by iron,≈ 215 m2 γ-ray
detector coverage is required to identity HEU shielded by lead and ≈ 240 m2 γ-ray
detector coverage is required to identity HEU shielded by iron.
Table 7.4 displays the average amount of neutrons and γ-rays observed for 100% de-
7.3 Material Segregation using Cosmic-Ray Neutrons 203
tector coverage and efficiency. From Table 7.4 it is clearly evident that given a large
enough detector coverage, HEU shielded by either iron or lead, can be discriminated
from when there is no HEU present.
Table 7.3 Average neutron and γ-ray counts observed when propagating 50 million
cosmic-ray neutrons through each configuration tested, where HEU is placed in a cargo
container. Results have been scaled down to 850,000 neutrons as this represents a 5
minute exposure time. Realistic detector coverage and efficiencies have been used.
Detector No Threat Iron Shielding Lead Shielding
3He 1 14.2 ± 0.5 15.1 ± 0.5 14.7 ± 0.5
3He 2 17.0 ± 0.5 17.1 ± 0.5 16.5 ± 0.5
3He 3 15.4 ± 0.5 15.4 ± 0.5 15.5 ± 0.5
3He 4 17.3 ± 0.5 18.0 ± 0.6 17.9 ± 0.6
3He 5 14.9 ± 0.5 14.7 ± 0.5 15.4 ± 0.5
3He 6 16.4 ± 0.5 17.5 ± 0.5 17.5 ± 0.5
3He 7 15.5 ± 0.5 15.5 ± 0.5 15.6 ± 0.5
3He 8 17.8 ± 0.6 16.4 ± 0.5 17.0 ± 0.5
Total Neutron 128.5 ± 1.5 129.7 ± 1.5 130.1 ± 1.5
PVT 1 73,680 ± 35 73,700 ± 35 73,700 ± 35
PVT 2 77,855 ± 35 77,870 ± 35 77,895 ± 35
PVT 3 74,550 ± 35 74,540 ± 35 74,550 ± 35
PVT 4 80,915 ± 35 80,950 ± 35 80,925 ± 35
Total γ-ray 307,000 ± 70 307,060 ± 70 307,070 ± 70
Table 7.4 Average neutron and γ-ray counts observed when propagating 50 million
cosmic-ray neutrons through each configuration tested, where HEU is placed in a cargo
container. Results have been scaled down to 850,000 neutrons as this represents a 5
minute exposure time. 100% detector coverage and efficiency is assumed.
Detector No Threat Iron Shielding Lead Shielding
Neutron Detector 23,392,100 ± 630 23,445,000 ± 630 23,450,300 ± 630
γ-ray Detector 37,570,200 ± 800 37,585,400 ± 800 37,581,300 ± 800
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Fig. 7.6 The amount of neutron or γ-ray detector coverage required to observe HEU shielded
by iron or lead when placed in a empty cargo container. The detectors used have realistic
efficiencies and the detector coverage m. For γ-rays of all energies detector efficiency is equal
to ≈ 67%. The efficiency of neutron detectors for all energies was calculated as ≈ 1.3%.
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7.4 Summary
This section has discussed the capability of cosmic-ray neutrons to detect shielded
HEU. Simulations were run that propagated 500,000 cosmic-ray neutrons into different
materials. Neutron and γ-ray spectra have been analysed. These spectra demonstrate
that given a large detector area with high efficiency, signatures unique to nuclear mate-
rials can be measured. For the applications discussed in this thesis, detector coverage
is required to be similar to the realistic coverage currently in use at ports. This involves
placing four plastic scintillators and eight pressurised 3He tubes around the inspected
target. Current detection techniques rely on measuring the gross count rate of neutrons
and γ-rays over time. If a sufficiently elevated rate above the background level is ob-
served, then it may indicate the presence of nuclear material.
Simulations have been run that show for simple geometries with 5 minute exposure
times, when given a large enough detector area and efficiency, different density mate-
rials can be distinguished from one another when measuring the excess neutrons or γ-
rays produced. Upon the introduction of more realistic settings, whereby shielded HEU
is placed within an empty cargo container, this technique struggles to detect shielded
HEU under realistic detector conditions. Either extremely large detector coverages with
realistic detector efficiencies or the use of 100% detector coverage and efficiency are
required to allow the detection of shielded HEU.

Chapter 8
Conclusions
Current passive techniques have been shown to struggle to detect shielded nuclear ma-
terial, in particular shielded HEU [25]. Cosmic-ray muons are a relatively new applica-
tion towards aiding the detection of nuclear materials, particularly shielded HEU. The
use of cosmic-ray muons has the advantage over active interrogation methods of being
naturally occurring and therefore do not irradiate the cargo. Many groups have investi-
gated the use of cosmic-ray muons for this application [2, 3, 83, 88, 90]. Studies focus
on the advancement of analysis algorithms and the experimental testing of algorithms
that are being developed. Most algorithms that use cosmic-ray muons focus on the mul-
tiple Coulomb scattering they undergo in materials. The average amount of scattering
a muon undergoes is dependent on the Z of a material. High-Z materials such as HEU
and its possible shielding components cause muons to scatter more than low-Z materi-
als. Therefore through calculating the average scattering of multiple muons that pass
through an inspected volume, different materials can be identified.
This thesis has presented the development of two new types of algorithm that aim to
enhance muon scattering tomography. In Chapter 5 we presented the development of a
new density based clustering algorithm that utilises multiple Coulomb scattering. The
algorithm splits the inspected volume into sections. Each section is analysed using a set
of parameters optimised to that section. An advantage of this type of approach is that
it accounts for the energy losses that occur as a muon passes through an inspected vol-
ume. This new analysis algorithm has shown promise in being able to detect shielded
HEU when placed in empty cargo containers. This new algorithm has also shown to be
able to efficiently detect shielded HEU in low-Z clutter scenarios by removing clutter
made of materials such as sand, concrete, gravel, carbon and polyethylene. The main
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issue with the analysis algorithm is the inability to remove large blocks of aluminium or
materials with densities greater than this. Secondly there are a number of false positives
built up, which are due to the walls of the cargo container.
In addition to scattering, muons lose energy and can stop within a target material. We
have developed an analysis algorithm based on muon disappearances within the in-
spected volume, to help enhance more traditional muon scattering tomography meth-
ods. Chapter 4 presented the initial concept of using muons that stop within an inspected
volume. Initial tests of simple scenarios demonstrate the capability of this algorithm to
distinguish different sized blocks of different density materials. Upon testing this al-
gorithm in more realistic settings (empty cargo containers) this type of algorithm is
shown to be able to detect shielded HEU, but also results in the build up of multiple
false positives associated with the container itself. For this reason it is primarily used as
a secondary analysis algorithm, to help enhance muon scattering tomography methods.
The addition of the muon disappearance algorithm to muon scattering tomography has
been shown to enhance muon scattering tomography through efficiently removing the
false positives caused by muons that scatter within the cargo container walls.
Upon stopping in a material, negative muons can be captured, resulting in the produc-
tion of excess neutrons and γ-rays. Chapter 4 presented a study of the feasibility of
using these secondaries to detect different materials, under realistic detector and tim-
ing conditions. It is found that given a high enough detector resolution and area, these
secondaries can be used to detect different density materials. However, under realistic
detector coverage and efficiencies, these techniques become unfeasible.
Chapter 7 presented a study where cosmic-ray neutrons are used to detect shielded
HEU. The time frame for our tests is 5 minutes. It has been determined that under real-
istic detector efficiencies and coverages these cosmic-ray neutrons offer no additional
support when attempting to detected shielded HEU.
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Appendix A
Clutter Description for all
Configurations Tested
Given are tables which describe the different types of clutter placed within all cargo
containers for both low-Z and medium-Z clutter scenarios. They have the same format
as Table 6.1.
Table A.1 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 1. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Aluminium Weathering Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 -0.858
Aluminium Weathering Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
-2.1 -0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
-2.1 0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Weathering Steel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 0.512
Carbon Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
0 0.56 0.512
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Table A.2 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 2. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Aluminium Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 -0.858
Aluminium Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.708
Polyethylene Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
-2.1 -0.56 0.612
Polyethylene Weathering Steel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
-2.1 0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
0 -0.56 0.512
Carbon Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 0.56 0.512
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Table A.3 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 3. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Aluminium Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 -0.858
Aluminium Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-2.1 -0.56 0.712
Polyethylene Weathering Steel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
-2.1 -0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Stainless Steel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 0.512
Carbon Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
0 0.56 0.512
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Table A.4 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 11. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Gravel Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 -0.858
Concrete Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.608
Sand Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
-2.1 -0.56 0.512
Gravel Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
-2.1 0.56 0.512
Sand Weathering Steel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Aluminium Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
0 0.56 0.512
Table A.5 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 12. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Sand Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Sand Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Gravel Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
0 0 0.512
Carbon Weathering Steel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
0.8 0.56 -0.608
Gravel Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Carbon Aluminium Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 70 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm ×
33 cm
-0.8 0.56 -0.5
Aluminium Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-1.55 -0.56 0.512
Sand Iron Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 50 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm ×
33 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.5
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Table A.6 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 13. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Polyethylene Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Gravel Weathering Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Carbon Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Aluminium Iron Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
0 0 0.512
Sand Stainless Steel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
0.8 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Gravel Aluminium Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 70 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm ×
33 cm
-0.8 0.56 -0.5
Concrete Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-1.55 -0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Stainless Steel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 50 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm ×
33 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.5
Table A.7 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 14. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Gravel Weathering Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 -0.858
Concrete Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.708
Sand Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
-2.1 -0.56 0.612
Gravel Iron Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
-2.1 0.56 0.512
Sand Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Aluminium Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
0 -0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 0.56 0.512
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Table A.8 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 15. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Aluminium Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-1.55 -0.56 0.412
Polyethylene Weathering Steel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
0 0 0.512
Air Sand Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
90 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.5
Sand Aluminium Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 101.9 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33
cm × 33 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Sand Iron Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 50.5 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm
× 33 cm
-0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Gravel Stainless Steel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 101.9 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33
cm × 33 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
0.8 0.56 -0.608
Gravel Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Carbon Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 100 cm × 100 cm × 70
cm
-0.8 0.56 -0.608
Table A.9 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 16. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Concrete Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-1.55 -0.56 0.412
Aluminium Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
0 0 0.512
Polyethylene Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
90 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.5
Polyethylene Stainless Steel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 101.9 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33
cm × 33 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Gravel Stainless Steel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 50.5 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm
× 33 cm
-0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Carbon Weathering Steel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 101.9 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33
cm × 33 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Sand Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
0.8 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Carbon Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 100 cm × 100 cm × 70
cm
-0.8 0.56 -0.608
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Table A.10 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 17. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Gravel Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 -0.858
Concrete Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.608
Sand Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-2.1 -0.56 0.712
Gravel Stainless Steel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
-2.1 -0.56 0.512
Sand Weathering Steel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Aluminium Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
0 0.56 0.512
Table A.11 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 18. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Sand Iron Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 101.9 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33
cm × 33 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Sand Weathering Steel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 50.5 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm
× 33 cm
-0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Gravel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 80.5 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm
× 33 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
0 0 0.512
Carbon Iron Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
0.8 0.56 -0.608
Gravel Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Carbon Iron Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 50 cm and inner dimensions 29 cm × 29 cm ×
29 cm
-0.8 0.56 -0.5
Carbon Stainless Steel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 50 cm and inner dimensions 29 cm × 29 cm ×
29 cm
-1.55 -0.56 0.412
Sand Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
20 cm
2,1 -0.56 -0.5
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Table A.12 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 19. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Polyethylene Weathering Steel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 101.9 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33
cm × 33 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Gravel Stainless Steel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 50.5 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm
× 33 cm
-0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Carbon Iron Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 80.5 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm
× 33 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Aluminium Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
0 0 0.512
Sand Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
0.8 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Gravel Iron Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 50 cm and inner dimensions 29 cm × 29 cm ×
29 cm
-0.8 0.56 -0.5
Concrete Stainless Steel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 50 cm and inner dimensions 29 cm × 29 cm ×
29 cm
-1.55 -0.56 0.412
Polyethylene Weathering Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
20 cm
2,1 -0.56 -0.5
Table A.13 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 20. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Aluminium Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 -0.658
Aluminium Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-2.1 -0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Iron Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
-2.1 0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Weathering Steel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 0.512
Carbon Gravel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
0 0.56 0.512
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Table A.14 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 21. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Gravel Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 -0.658
Concrete Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.608
Sand Weathering Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-2.1 -0.56 0.512
Gravel Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
-2.1 0.56 0.512
Sand Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Aluminium Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Sand Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
0 0.56 0.512
Table A.15 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 22. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Sand Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
20 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Sand Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
20 cm
-0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Gravel Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
15 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
0 0 0.512
Carbon Gravel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
0.8 0.56 -0.608
Gravel Stainless Steel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 70 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm ×
33 cm
0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Carbon Iron Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 70 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm ×
33 cm
-0.8 0.56 -0.5
Carbon Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
10 cm
-1.55 -0.56 0.662
Sand Aluminium Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 50 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm ×
33 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.5
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Table A.16 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 23. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Polyethylene Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
20 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Gravel Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
20 cm
-0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Carbon Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
15 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Aluminium Weathering Steel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
0 0 0.512
Weathering
Steel
Sand Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
0.8 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Iron Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 70 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm ×
33 cm
0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Gravel Iron Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 70 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm ×
33 cm
-0.8 0.56 -0.5
Concrete Gravel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
10 cm
-1.55 -0.56 0.662
Polyethylene Sand Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 50 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm ×
33 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.5
Table A.17 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 24. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Aluminium Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 -0.858
Aluminium Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
-2.1 -0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Iron Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
-2.1 0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Stainless Steel Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 0.512
Aluminium Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
0 0.56 0.512
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Table A.18 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 25. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Sand Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 -0.858
Concrete Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.608
Carbon Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
-2.1 -0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Iron Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
-2.1 0.56 0.512
Sand Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Stainless Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 0.512
Aluminium Weathering Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
0 0.56 0.512
Table A.19 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 27. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Aluminium Weathering Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 -0.658
Aluminium Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-2.1 -0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
-2.1 0.56 0.512
Sand Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Aluminium Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Carbon Sand Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
25 cm
0 -0.56 0.512
Polyethylene Aluminium Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
50 cm
0 0.56 0.512
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Table A.20 Description of the different types of clutter placed within the cargo container
for Run 28. Both low-Z and medium-Z clutter configurations are described.
Material
(low-Z)
Material
(medium-Z)
Description x (m) y (m) z (m)
Sand Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
20 cm
2.1 0.56 -0.608
Sand Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
20 cm
-0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Gravel Weathering Steel Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
15 cm
-2.1 0.56 -0.608
Polyethylene Aluminium Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
16 cm
0 0 0.512
Carbon Iron Hollow sphere of outer radius 35 cm and inner radius
12 cm
0.8 0.56 -0.608
Gravel Stainless Steel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 70 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm ×
33 cm
0.8 -0.56 -0.608
Carbon Iron Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 70 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm ×
33 cm
-0.8 0.56 -0.5
Carbon Iron Solid block of dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9 cm ×
10 cm
-1.55 -0.56 0.662
Sand Weathering Steel Hollow block of outer dimensions 101.9 cm × 101.9
cm × 50 cm and inner dimensions 33 cm × 33 cm ×
33 cm
2.1 -0.56 -0.5
Appendix B
Scattering within Low-Z Clutter
Given is a table of data for one of the twenty simulations conducted for when 5 shielded
HEU threats were placed randomly in a cargo container filled with low-Z clutter. The
position of each of the threat materials, their average scattering angle per voxel, the
average scattering angle of the plane the threat is located in and the reconstructed ratio,
is given. The clutter consists of eleven wooden crates of size 1.1 m × 1.1 m × 1.1 m
placed in the cargo container. For low-Z clutter configurations the crates are filled with
various sized blocks of aluminium, carbon, polystyrene, gravel, sand and air. The crates
are at most stacked two crates high and placed in random locations.
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Appendix C
Muon Disappearances within Low-Z
Clutter
Given is a table of data for one of the twenty simulations conducted for when 5 shielded
HEU threats were placed randomly in a cargo container filled with low-Z clutter. The
position of each of the threat materials, their average total path length angle per voxel
and the average total path length of the plane the threat is located in, is given. The
clutter consists of eleven wooden crates of size 1.1 m × 1.1 m × 1.1 m placed in the
cargo container. For low-Z clutter configurations the crates are filled with various sized
blocks of aluminium, carbon, polystyrene, gravel, sand and air. The crates are at most
stacked two crates high and placed in random locations.
234 Muon Disappearances within Low-Z Clutter
Table C.1 Position and average total path length per voxel of each of the threats mate-
rials identified by applying muon disappearance tomography, to the ‘areas of interest’
obtained using the muon scattering algorithm.
Target I.D Resolution x (m) y (m) z (m) Muons
Disappearances
(Target)
Average Total Path
Length
Average Total
Path Length of
Plane
(1) Perfect -0.9 0.46 -0.7 274 11.81 ± 0.40 6.86 ± 0.02
(2) Perfect 0.7 -0.66 -0.708 203 11.42 ± 0.42 6.86 ± 0.02
(3) Perfect 2 -0.66 -0.7 264 10.51 ± 0.36 6.86 ± 0.02
(4) Perfect -1.45 0.36 0.312 120 12.15 ± 0.54 6.94 ± 0.02
(5) Perfect -1.55 -0.56 0.2 1 31 12.81 ± 0.38 6.97 ± 0.02
(1) 0.1 mm -0.9 0.46 -0.7 274 11.80 ± 0.40 6.86 ± 0.02
(2) 0.1 mm 0.7 -0.66 -0.708 203 11.42 ± 0.42 6.86 ± 0.02
(3) 0.1 mm 2 -0.66 -0.7 264 10.51 ± 0.36 6.86 ± 0.02
(4) 0.1 mm -1.45 0.36 0.312 120 12.16 ± 0.54 6.94 ± 0.02
(5) 0.1 mm -1.55 -0.56 0.2 131 12.81 ± 0.38 6.97 ± 0.02
(1) 0.2 mm -0.9 0.46 -0.7 274 11.79 ± 0.40 6.86 ± 0.02
(2) 0.2 mm 0.7 -0.66 -0.708 203 11.42 ± 0.42 6.86 ± 0.02
(3) 0.2 mm 2 -0.66 -0.7 264 10.51 ± 0.36 6.86 ± 0.02
(4) 0.2 mm -1.45 0.36 0.312 120 12.16 ± 0.54 6.94 ± 0.02
(5) 0.2 mm -1.55 -0.56 0.2 131 12.81 ± 0.38 6.97 ± 0.02
(1) 1 mm -0.9 0.46 -0.7 274 11.72 ± 0.38 6.86 ± 0.02
(2) 1 mm 0.7 -0.66 -0.708 203 11.41 ± 0.41 6.86 ± 0.02
(3) 1 mm 2 -0.66 -0.7 264 10.49 ± 0.37 6.86 ± 0.02
(4) 1 mm -1.45 0.36 0.312 120 12.18 ± 0.54 6.94 ± 0.02
(5) 1 mm -1.55 -0.56 0.2 131 12.81 ± 0.40 6.97 ± 0.02
(1) 2 mm -0.9 0.46 -0.7 274 11.64 ± 0.36 6.86 ± 0.02
(2) 2 mm 0.7 -0.66 -0.708 203 11.38 ± 0.39 6.86 ± 0.02
(3) 2 mm 2 -0.66 -0.7 264 10.46 ± 0.35 6.86 ± 0.02
(4) 2 mm -1.45 0.36 0.312 120 12.20 ± 0.52 6.93 ± 0.02
(5) 2 mm -1.55 -0.56 0.2 131 12.80 ± 0.39 6.97 ± 0.02
Appendix D
Scattering within Medium-Z Clutter
Given is a table of data for one of the twenty simulations conducted for when 5 shielded
HEU threats were placed randomly in a cargo container filled with medium-Z clutter.
The position of each of the threat materials, their average scattering angle per voxel, the
average scattering angle of the plane the threat is located in and the reconstructed ratio,
is given. The clutter consists of eleven wooden crates of size 1.1 m × 1.1 m × 1.1 m
placed in the cargo container. For medium-Z clutter configurations the crates are filled
with various sized blocks of aluminium, weathering steel, stainless steel and iron. The
crates are at most stacked two crates high and placed in random locations.
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Appendix E
Muon Disappearances within
Medium-Z Clutter
Given is a table of data for one of the twenty simulations conducted for when 5 shielded
HEU threats were placed randomly in a cargo container filled with medium-Z clutter.
The position of each of the threat materials, their average total path length angle per
voxel and the average total path length of the plane the threat is located in, is given.
The clutter consists of eleven wooden crates of size 1.1 m × 1.1 m × 1.1 m placed
in the cargo container. For medium-Z clutter configurations the crates are filled with
various sized blocks of aluminium, weathering steel, stainless steel and iron. The crates
are at most stacked two crates high and placed in random locations.
238 Muon Disappearances within Medium-Z Clutter
Table E.1 Position and average total path length per voxel of each of the threats mate-
rials identified by applying muon disappearance tomography, to the ‘areas of interest’
obtained using the muon scattering algorithm.
Target I.D Resolution x (m) y (m) z (m) Muons
Disappearances
(Target)
Average Total Path
Length
Average Total
Path Length of
Plane
(1) Perfect -2.1 -0.56 -0.608 245 12.33 ± 0.40 6.68 ± 0.02
(2) Perfect -2.1 0.56 0.512 269 18.17 ± 0.51 7.17 ± 0.03
(3) Perfect 2.1 0 0.512 267 11.53 ± 0.46 7.17 ± 0.03
(4) Perfect 0 -0.56 -0.608 97 14.47 ± 0.52 6.68 ± 0.02
(5) Perfect 2.1 0.56 -0.608 126 17.88 ± 0.34 6.68 ± 0.02
(1) 0.1 mm -2.1 -0.56 -0.608 245 12.33 ± 0.40 6.68 ± 0.02
(2) 0.1 mm -2.1 0.56 0.512 269 18.17 ± 0.51 7.17 ± 0.03
(3) 0.1 mm 2.1 0 0.512 267 11.53 ± 0.46 7.17 ± 0.03
(4) 0.1 mm 0 -0.56 -0.608 97 14.47 ± 0.52 6.68 ± 0.02
(5) 0.1 mm 2.1 0.56 -0.608 126 17.89 ± 0.35 6.68 ± 0.02
(1) 0.2 mm -2.1 -0.56 -0.608 245 12.32 ± 0.40 6.68 ± 0.02
(2) 0.2 mm -2.1 0.56 0.512 269 18.17 ± 0.51 7.17 ± 0.03
(3) 0.2 mm 2.1 0 0.512 267 11.53 ± 0.46 7.17 ± 0.03
(4) 0.2 mm 0 -0.56 -0.608 97 14.47 ± 0.52 6.68 ± 0.02
(5) 0.2 mm 2.1 0.56 -0.608 126 17.89 ± 0.35 6.68 ± 0.02
(1) 1 mm -2.1 -0.56 -0.608 245 12.31 ± 0.39 6.68 ± 0.02
(2) 1 mm -2.1 0.56 0.512 269 18.21 ± 0.49 7.17 ± 0.03
(3) 1 mm 2.1 0 0.512 267 11.57 ± 0.46 7.17 ± 0.03
(4) 1 mm 0 -0.56 -0.608 97 14.45 ± 0.53 6.68 ± 0.02
(5) 1 mm 2.1 0.56 -0.608 126 17.91 ± 0.35 6.68 ± 0.02
(1) 2 mm -2.1 -0.56 -0.608 245 12.25 ± 0.38 6.68 ± 0.02
(2) 2 mm -2.1 0.56 0.512 269 18.20 ± 0.48 7.17 ± 0.03
(3) 2 mm 2.1 0 0.512 267 11.58 ± 0.45 7.17 ± 0.03
(4) 2 mm 0 -0.56 -0.608 97 14.45 ± 0.53 6.68 ± 0.02
(5) 2 mm 2.1 0.56 -0.608 126 17.90 ± 0.38 6.68 ± 0.02
